Climate Litigation Updates (May 15, 2025)

The Sabin Center for Climate Change Law publishes summaries of developments in climate-related litigation twice each month. We also add these developments to our U.S. and Global climate litigation charts. If you know of any cases we have missed, please email us at [email protected].

HERE ARE THE ADDITIONS TO THE U.S. CLIMATE CASE CHART FOR UPDATE #196:

FEATURED CASE

Colorado Supreme Court Said Federal Law Did Not Preempt Common Law Tort Claims in Boulder’s Climate Change Suit Against Fossil Fuel Companies

A 5-2 majority of the Colorado Supreme Court concluded that federal law did not preempt common law tort claims brought by the County Commissioners of Boulder County and the City of Boulder (together, Boulder) under Colorado law against four fossil fuel companies seeking damages for the companies’ alleged role in exacerbating climate change and causing harm to Boulder and its residents. Boulder asserted claims of public and private nuisance, trespass, unjust enrichment, and civil conspiracy. The court concluded that federal common law did not preempt Boulder’s state law common law claims because the Clean Air Act had displaced federal common law concerning air pollution. Instead, the court considered whether the Clean Air Act preempted the claims and determined that no form of preemption—express, field, or conflict—applied. The court also found that Boulder’s claims did not involve “uniquely federal areas of regulation” and that litigating the claims “would not upset any balance set by Congress because Boulder’s claims do not seek to impose liability for activities” regulated by the Clean Air Act. The court also disagreed with the fossil fuel companies’ contention that Boulder asserted what formerly would have been federal common law claims. The court said Boulder was not bringing an action against a “pollution emitter to abate pollution” but instead was seeking “damages from upstream producers for harms stemming from the production and sale of fossil fuels.” The court also found that the defendants did not support the proposition that because federal common law formerly existed, the Constitution’s structure precluded application of state law even though the federal common law no longer existed. The court also rejected the contention that state law claims previously preempted by federal common law could only proceed if authorized by federal statute. In addition, the court rejected arguments that Boulder’s claims were essentially attempts to regulate greenhouse gas emissions and therefore preempted by the Clean Air Act; instead, the court found that the common law claims “seek compensation for allegedly tortious conduct” not addressed by the Clean Air Act. The court also was not persuaded that the federal foreign affairs power preempted Boulder’s claims. The Supreme Court discharged the order to show cause and remanded to the district court for further proceedings, noting that it was not expressing any opinion on the “ultimate viability” of the claims. 

Two justices dissented. They would have considered whether the Clean Air Act affirmatively authorized “the interstate aspect of Boulder’s claims” and would have concluded that it did not. They also would have concluded that the federal government’s “primacy in foreign affairs” precluded the international aspect of Boulder’s claims. County Commissioners of Boulder County v. Suncor Energy USA, Inc., No. 2024SA206 (Colo. May 12, 2025) 

DECISIONS AND SETTLEMENTS

Fifth Circuit Required State Department to Release Names and Email Addresses of Employees Who Worked on Paris Agreement Emissions Target

In a split decision, the Fifth Circuit Court of Appeals held that the U.S. Department of State was required to disclose previously redacted names and agency email addresses of career staff members who participated in the development of the national emissions reduction pledge that the Biden administration set in 2021 after rejoining the Paris Agreement. The Fifth Circuit concluded that this information could not be withheld under the Freedom of Information Act’s Exemption 6, which applies to information in “personnel and medical files and similar files the disclosure of which would constitute a clearly unwarranted invasion of personal privacy.” The Fifth Circuit found that even if the names and email addresses constituted “similar files,” disclosure did not constitute “a clearly unwarranted invasion of personal privacy.” The court said the State Department did not establish that its employees had a “significant interest” in keeping private their work on the emissions reduction target, distinguishing this case from others in which courts found a privacy interest in being protected from “proven danger, public association with a fatal and heavily criticized incident, and targeting by bad actors for highly sensitive information.” The court also found that the Department had “not effectively contested” the plaintiff’s “position that disclosing email addresses would provide at least some marginal public benefit,” including by helping the plaintiff and others “craft more precise follow-up FOIA requests.”  Judge Haynes dissented, writing that the employees at issue did not have “policy-making authority” but were “career civil service employees” who could be “subject to harm or harassment if their names and email addresses were provided.” Judge Haynes disagreed with the plaintiff’s argument that this was “not a controversial situation.” She described “climate policy, including the greenhouse-gas-reduction target,” as “a high-profile and controversial matter.” She also characterized the benefits of disclosure as de minimis. Texas Public Policy Foundation v. U.S. Department of State, No. 24-50189 (5th Cir. May 5, 2025)

After Barring Federal Agencies from Freezing Inflation Reduction Act and Infrastructure Investment and Jobs Act Funding, Court Said EPA’s Termination of 800 Grants Did Not Violate Preliminary Injunction

On April 15, 2025, the federal district court for the District of Rhode Island granted six nonprofit organizations’ request for a preliminary injunction enjoining five federal agencies from freezing “on a non-individualized basis” the processing and payment of funding appropriated under the Inflation Reduction Act (IRA) or the Infrastructure Investment and Jobs Act (IIJA) that had already been awarded. The agencies were the U.S. Department of Energy, the U.S. Environmental Protection Agency (EPA), the U.S. Department of Housing and Urban Development (HUD), the U.S. Department of the Interior, and U.S. Department of Agriculture. Funding at issue in the case included a grant to support localities with plans to plant more trees and manage existing forests under the IRA’s Urban and Community Forestry Program and a grant through HUD’s Green and Resilient Retrofit Program funded by the IRA. The court also ordered the Office of Management and Budget (OMB) and the National Economic Council (NEC) Director to notify agencies not to implement their memorandum directing agencies to pause disbursement of funds supporting “Green New Deal” programs implicated by the policy set forth in President Trump’s “Unleashing American Energy” executive order. The court found that the organizations demonstrated standing against all defendants and that the doctrine of claim-splitting did not narrow their case despite some plaintiffs being involved in litigation challenging federal funding freezes in another court. The court also said it was “confident” that it had jurisdiction under the Administrative Procedure Act (APA) because the agency actions were final and the organizations’ claims were not “simple contract actions for money damages” that would be required to be heard in the Court of Federal Claims. On the merits, the court found that the organizations demonstrated a strong likelihood of success on their APA claim that the freeze of awarded funds was arbitrary and capricious because the freeze was not reasonable or reasonably explained and failed to account for reliance interests. The court also found that federal law did not authorize the “broad powers” asserted by the five agencies and by OMB and the NEC Director, even if the agencies “likely possess narrower powers related to individualized funding pauses and terminations.” The court also found that the organizations adequately demonstrated irreparable harm and that the balance of the equities and the public interest “weigh heavily” in favor of injunctive relief. The court—which declined to require the organizations to provide a bond—concluded that a nationwide injunction was appropriate. The federal government appealed the injunction to the First Circuit.

After holding a fourth status conference on May 5 about compliance with the preliminary injunction, the court issued an order explaining its determination that EPA did not violate the preliminary injunction by terminating approximately 800 grants. The court said the preliminary injunction fundamentally concerned “pauses, not terminations” and that the EPA’s termination of “only about 800 of the approximately 3,000 IIJA and IRA grants that were previously frozen … suggests to the Court that a more thoroughgoing individualized review had taken place between the mass freeze and the Court’s order enjoining it.” The court said the terminations created “fundamentally different legal issues” than the funding freezes and that the organizations could file another lawsuit to challenge the terminations. Woonasquatucket River Watershed Council v. U.S. Department of Agriculture, No. 1:25-cv00097 (D.R.I.), No. 25-1428 (1st Cir.)

Puerto Rico Withdrew Climate Lawsuit Against Fossil Fuel Industry Defendants

On May 2, 2025, the Commonwealth of Puerto Rico voluntarily dismissed without prejudice its climate change lawsuit against fossil fuel industry defendants. The filing did not comment on reasons for the withdrawal. The voluntary dismissal came several weeks after President Trump issued the “Protecting American Energy from State Overreach” executive order directing the U.S. Attorney General to take action to stop continuation of civil actions brought by states that burden use of domestic energy resources and two days after the U.S. Department of Justice filed lawsuits seeking to block the States of Hawai‘i and Michigan from filing climate lawsuits against fossil fuel companies. On April 25, 2025, American Energy Institute—a trade organization “representing American energy producers, suppliers, and affiliated businesses that support free markets”—sent a letter to Puerto Rico Governor Jenniffer González-Colón, who was elected in November 2024 and is a member of the New Progressive Party of Puerto Rico and the Republican Party. The letter urged the Governor to direct the Secretary of Justice to withdraw Puerto Rico’s lawsuit, to file amicus briefs in lawsuits brought by San Juan and other Puerto Rican municipalities in support of dismissal of the cases with prejudice, to appoint judges “who will respect the separation of powers and leave political issues to the democratically elected branches,” and to discourage state contracts with outside counsel “who are using public legal engagements to advance far-left political objectives.” Commonwealth of Puerto Rico v. Exxon Mobil Corp., No. 3:24-cv-01393 (D.P.R. May 2, 2025)

American Petroleum Institute Withdrew Challenge to Biden Five-Year Program for Outer Continental Shelf Oil and Gas Leasing After Trump Administration Announced It Would Develop New Plan

On April 30, 2025, the D.C. Circuit Court of Appeals granted American Petroleum Institute’s (API) motion for voluntary dismissal of its petition for review challenging the 2024-2029 National Outer Continental Shelf Oil and Gas Leasing Program approved by the Biden administration in 2023. API had asked the court to remand the program for the U.S. Department of the Interior to consider whether to schedule more than the three sales over five years that were included in the program. In its motion for voluntary dismissal, API said it was “heartened” by the Interior Department’s announcement on April 18, 2025 that it would develop a new offshore oil and gas leasing program to replace the Biden program. The Interior Department consented to API’s motion, providing a statement in which it said that “[d]eveloping a new schedule for oil and gas leasing on the Outer Continental Shelf is of the highest priority for Interior.” Environmental organizations’ challenge to the Biden administration’s program is still pending and was argued on May 6. American Petroleum Institute v. U.S. Department of the Interior, No. 24-1023 (D.C. Cir. Apr. 30, 2025)

Federal Magistrate Rejected Claim of Inadequate Climate Analysis in NEPA Review of Custer Gallatin National Forest Project

In a findings and recommendation issued on March 31, 2025, a magistrate judge in the federal district court for the District of Montana recommended that the court grant summary judgment to the U.S. Forest Service and other defendants on claims that approvals for the South Plateau Landscape Area Treatment Project in the Custer Gallatin National Forest violated the National Environmental Policy Act (NEPA) and other laws. The project authorized 5,551 acres of clearcut harvest, 6,593 acres of commercial thinning, and 2,514 acres of non-commercial thinning in a 39,909-acre project area over 15 years. Under NEPA, the magistrate rejected the plaintiffs’ argument that the Forest Service failed to take a hard look at climate-related impacts. The magistrate concluded that this case could be distinguished from a 2023 District of Montana decision in which the court found that the Forest Service’s consideration of impacts on carbon emissions failed to meet NEPA’s standards. The magistrate acknowledged factual similarities to the earlier case, but said that in this case the plaintiffs failed to show that the Forest Service borrowed “cookie-cutter” analysis of climate impacts from analyses of another forest. The magistrate also found that the plaintiffs failed to show that the Forest Service’s conclusion “that active management of the Forest might lead to a healthier forest, able to sequester carbon in the future” was unscientific. The magistrate also found that the plaintiffs did not rebut the quantitative carbon emissions analysis in the Custer Gallatin National Forest Plan environmental impact statement (EIS) that underlay the decision to prepare only a qualitative climate change analysis for the project. The EIS concluded that even maximum potential management levels “would have a negligible impact on national and global emissions and on forest carbon stocks.” Center for Biological Diversity v. U.S. Forest Service, No. 9:23-cv-00110 (D. Mont. Mar. 31, 2025)

Colorado Appellate Court Rejected Challenge to 2022 Transportation Sustainability Law

The Colorado Court of Appeals upheld a 2022 state law on transportation sustainability. The law created five state enterprises, three of which were directed to take actions to support vehicle electrification for retail deliveries, transportation network company rides, and public transit vehicles to reduce adverse impacts of air pollution and greenhouse gas emissions. The other enterprises would fund projects to reduce traffic or directly reduce air pollution and to complete bridge projects and tunnel projects. The appellate court rejected the contention that the law violated Proposition 117, which requires voter approval when creating a state enterprise that receives more than $100 million in revenue from fees and surcharges in its first five fiscal years. The law’s challenger had argued that the five enterprises’ revenues should be aggregated, but the appellate court held that Proposition 117 only required voter approval when enterprises are created simultaneously or within the preceding five years, serve the same purpose, and have a projected aggregate revenue of more than $100 million from fees and surcharges. The court noted that it was undisputed that the state enterprises created by the transportation sustainability law were created for different purposes and that no enterprise individually had a projected five-year revenue exceeding $100 million. The court also rejected the argument that the law violated the Colorado Constitution’s single-subject requirement. The appellate court said that this argument conflated the different purposes served by each enterprise with the law’s “sole subject matter: ensuring the sustainability of Colorado’s transportation system.” In addition, the court rejected the argument that the law’s increase to the excess state revenues cap violated the single-subject requirement or the Taxpayer Bill of Rights. Americans for Prosperity v. State of Colorado, No. 24CA1066 (Colo. Ct. App. May 1, 2025)

California Appellate Court Rejected Challenge to Climate Resiliency Project in Sacramento-San Joaquin Delta

The California Court of Appeal rejected arguments that the California Environmental Quality Act review for the Lookout Slough Tidal Habitat Restoration and Flood Improvement Project did not adequately analyze impacts on hydrology and water quality. The court described the project as involving restoration of 3,164 acres of tidal wetlands in the Cache Slough region of the Sacramento-San Joaquin Delta and the widening of a portion of the Yolo Bypass. Its purposes are to create habitat for various fish and other species and to provide flood protection, including with a new setback levee that includes additional height for climate change and sea level rise resiliency. The court found that the environmental review adequately considered impacts on harmful algal blooms, water salinity, and water quality. Central Delta Water Agency v. California Department of Water Resources, No. A167384 (Cal. Ct. App. Apr. 22, 2025)

Connecticut Court Rejected Town Authority’s Assertion of Need for Updated Climate Information as Basis for Denying Sewer Connection Application

A Connecticut Superior Court reversed the Town of New Canaan Water Pollution Control Authority’s (WPCA’s) denial of an application for a connection to, and allocation of capacity in, the sanitary sewer system for a proposed multifamily residential development. The WPCA denied the application for two reasons: (1) to await findings of a new sewer plan and (2) to await completion of a study by the National Oceanic and Atmospheric Administration (NOAA) about storm modeling that would reflect updated rainfall projections and climate change forecasts. The court found that was “no evidence whatsoever, much less substantial evidence,” to support denial of the application to connect to the sewer system. The court said that denying the application based on a need to await completion of the NOAA study was “patently unfair and invalid as an ad hoc basis for denial that plaintiff never had opportunity to address.” The court also found that the application to allocate sewer capacity was supported by “uncontroverted expert evidence” and that denial of the application did not have support in the record beyond “mere speculation,” “general concern,” and a “mere possibility” of “perceived impacts and general fears.” Hill Street-72, LLC v. Water Pollution Control Authority of Town of New Canaan, No. HHD CV23-6168031 (Conn. Super. Ct. Apr. 17, 2025)

NEW CASES AND FILINGS

Washington and 14 Other States Challenged President Trump’s Invocation of National Energy Emergency and Agencies’ Implementation of Emergency Permitting Procedures

On May 9, 2025, 15 states, led by Washington, filed a lawsuit against President Trump, the U.S. Army Corps of Engineers, the Advisory Council on Historic Preservation (ACHP), and related federal officials seeking to block use of emergency permitting procedures for energy projects. The plaintiff states asserted that President Trump’s Executive Order 14156, “Declaring a National Energy Emergency,” was unlawful under the common law ultra vires doctrine and that the agency defendants’ efforts to implement the order were arbitrary, capricious, and not in accordance with law. The states alleged that “the circumstances described in the Executive Order do not meet even an expansive definition of the term ‘emergency,’” and that the Executive Order was “internally inconsistent,” claiming insufficient energy supplies while proposing to export those supplies, and excluding solar and wind production—which “are consistently among the cheapest sources of electricity”—from the definition of “energy.” The states also alleged that the Executive Order’s “myopic focus on fossil fuels contradicts our Nation’s goal of promoting reliable, diverse, and affordable energy” and that “[e]xperts agree that extreme weather fueled by climate change—not the underproduction of fossil fuels—poses the most urgent challenge to our Nation’s electric grid.” The states alleged that the defendants’ actions directly harmed the states’ proprietary interests in their natural resources as well as their sovereign interests such as costs associated with “filling the regulatory gap” and quasi-sovereign interests “independent of and behind the titles of its citizens, in all the earth and air within its domain.” The plaintiff states asserted that the President acted ultra vires “by directing agencies to invoke emergency procedures to evade or shorten technical and/or environmental review under circumstances that—as a matter of law—do not qualify as an emergency under applicable statutory and regulatory provisions.” The states further asserted that the Corps and ACHP acted contrary to law and ultra vires by implementing emergency procedures under the Clean Water Act and National Historic Preservation Act and also violated the Administrative Procedure Act. Washington v. Trump, No. 2:25-cv-00869 (W.D. Wash., filed May 9, 2025)

States and District of Columbia Challenged Withholding of EV Infrastructure Funding

On May 7, 2025, Washington, 15 other states, and the District of Columbia filed a lawsuit alleging that the U.S. Department of Transportation, the Federal Highway Administration (FHWA), and the heads of those agencies acted unlawfully by categorically suspending or revoking State Electric Vehicle Infrastructure Deployment Plan approvals and withholding or withdrawing National Electric Vehicle Infrastructure (NEVI) Formula Program funds from the states. The NEVI Formula Program was established by the Infrastructure Investment and Jobs Act (IIJA), which appropriated $5 billion for funding to the states “to strategically deploy electric vehicle charging infrastructure and to establish an interconnected network to facilitate data collection, access, and reliability.” In Executive Order 14,143, “Unleashing American Energy,” President Trump directed federal agencies to pause the NEVI Formula Program funding. The plaintiff states alleged that the FHWA “almost immediately carried out President Trump’s anti-NEVI directive in diametric opposition to statutory mandate.” The states alleged that they each had invested in programs to encourage adoption of electric vehicles (EVs) to reduce greenhouse gas emissions and other pollution from combustion engine vehicles and that the defendants’ actions directly harmed the states’ interests, including through financial and environmental harms. They asserted that the defendants violated the Administrative Procedure Act, separation of powers, and the Take Care Clause, and that the defendants’ actions were ultra vires. They requested declaratory and injunctive relief, including injunctions enjoining the defendants from withholding or withdrawing NEVI Formula Program funds in contravention of IIJA’s express mandates. Washington v. U.S. Department of Transportation, No. 2:25-cv-00848 (W.D. Wash., filed May 7, 2025)

Lawsuit Filed to Compel Endangered Species Act Listing Decision on Alaska Chinook Salmon

Wild Fish Conservancy filed a lawsuit in federal district court in the District of Columbia to compel the National Marine Fisheries Service (NMFS) to make a determination under the Endangered Species Act as to whether listing of the Alaska Chinook salmon as endangered or threatened is warranted. The Conservancy submitted a petition to list the Alaska Chinook salmon on January 11, 2024, and NMFS issued a 90-day finding in May 2024 that listing may be warranted. The Conservancy alleged that NMFS failed to make the required finding regarding whether listing is warranted by the January 11, 2025 deadline. The complaint alleged that factors contributing to the depletion of Chinook salmon populations included “changes to the marine environment associated with climate change,” as well as fishery management decisions and “large-scale releases of hatchery pink and chum salmon in Alaska, Japan, and Russia.” Wild Fish Conservancy v. U.S. Department of Commerce, No. 1:25-cv-01401 (D.D.C., filed May 8, 2025)

Intervenors Asked Eighth Circuit to Dismiss “Moot” Appeal and Vacate District Court Decision Vacating Biden-Era NEPA Regulations

Washington, other states, the District of Columbia, New York City, and nonprofit organizations that intervened to defend the Biden administration’s amendments to the Council on Environmental Quality (CEQ) National Environmental Policy Act (NEPA) regulations asked the Eighth Circuit Court of Appeals to dismiss as moot the appeal of a district court decision vacating the amendments. They argued that the case no longer presented “a live case or controversy” because CEQ published an interim final rule on April 11, 2025 withdrawing all of its NEPA regulations. The intervenors further argued that the Eighth Circuit should vacate the district court’s judgment. Iowa v. Council on Environmental Quality, No. 25-1641 (8th Cir. Apr. 30, 2025)

Charleston and Fossil Fuel Companies Weighed in on Impact of Executive Order on City’s Lawsuit

In the climate case brought by the City of Charleston, South Carolina, against fossil fuel companies, the parties submitted a joint response to the court’s request that they set forth their positions on whether President Trump’s Executive Order 14260, “Protecting American Energy from State Overreach,” which directed the Attorney General to take action to stop state and local actions that burden domestic energy, had implications for the City’s case. The City contended that neither the executive order nor the executive branch possessed constitutional authority to dictate how the court should rule. Defendants argued that the executive order confirmed that the court should grant their motion to dismiss for failure to state a claim. City of Charleston v. Brabham Oil Co., No. 2020-CP-10-03975 (S.C. CCP May 5, 2025) 

States Challenged President Trump’s Halt on Wind Energy Projects

On May 5, 2025, New York, 16 other states, and the District of Columbia filed a lawsuit challenging President Trump’s Inauguration Day presidential memorandum that halted federal approvals for offshore and onshore wind energy projects, as well as agency actions implementing the memorandum. The plaintiffs alleged that President Trump’s directive “has stopped most wind-energy development in its tracks,” and that the directive and agency defendants’ “categorical and indefinite halt on federal wind-energy approvals” jeopardized “ the continued development of a power source critical to the States’ economic vitality, energy mix, public health, and climate goals.” The complaint asserted claims under the Administrative Procedure Act against the federal agency defendants, as well as an equitable claim that federal officials violated federal laws governing permits and approvals for wind energy projects. The complaint also asserted a common law ultra vires claim against all defendants, including the President, and a citizen suit claim against Department of Interior defendants under the Outer Continental Shelf Lands Act. On May 7, Alliance for Clean Energy New York (ACENY) sought to intervene as a plaintiff in the lawsuit. The plaintiff states and ACENY filed motions for preliminary injunction. New York v. Trump, No. 1:25-cv-11221 (D. Mass., filed May 5, 2025)

States Filed Complaint in Intervention in Lawsuit Challenging Vermont’s Climate Superfund Act

West Virginia and 23 other states filed a complaint in intervention in federal district court for the District of Vermont in the case brought by the Chamber of Commerce of the United States of America and American Petroleum Institute challenging Vermont’s Climate Superfund Act, which established a Climate Superfund Cost Recovery Program to be funded with payments by fossil fuel companies that extracted fossil fuels or refined crude oil from 1995 to 2024. The states alleged that the law is a “retroactive and extraterritorial shakedown” that is precluded by the Constitution’s “inherent structure,” is preempted by the Clean Air Act, violates the domestic and foreign Commerce Clauses, violates the Due Process and Equal Protection Clauses of the Fourteenth Amendment and due process and equal protection principles in the Vermont Constitution, imposes an excessive fine in violation of the Eighth and Fourteenth Amendments, constitutes an unconstitutional taking under the Fifth Amendment and Vermont Constitution, and violates the Vermont Constitution’s separation of powers clause. Chamber of Commerce of the United States of America v. Moore, No. 2:24-cv-01513 (D. Vt. May 1, 2025)

HERE ARE RECENT ADDITIONS TO THE GLOBAL CLIMATE LITIGATION CHART

HIGHLIGHTED CASE

African Court: Several NGOs request an advisory opinion on the human rights obligations of African states in addressing the climate crisis

On May 2, 2025, the Pan African Lawyers Union (PALU), supported by civil society organizations including the African Climate Platform, Natural Justice, Resilient40, and the Environmental Lawyers Collective for Africa, filed a petition before the African Court on Human and Peoples’ Rights requesting an Advisory Opinion on the human rights obligations of African states in the context of climate change. The request was submitted pursuant to Article 4 of the Protocol to the African Charter on Human and Peoples’ Rights on the Establishment of an African Court on Human and Peoples’ Rights.

The petition seeks the Court’s interpretation of regional human rights instruments, notably the African Charter on Human and Peoples’ Rights, the Maputo Protocol, the Kampala Convention, and the African Charter on the Rights and Welfare of the Child, as they relate to climate change. It argues that climate change poses a significant threat to numerous rights protected under these instruments, including the rights to life, health, food, water, housing, development, dignity, a healthy environment, and the rights of vulnerable groups such as women, children, Indigenous peoples, people with disabilities, and internally displaced persons.

The applicants request the Court to clarify states’ obligations regarding:

• Legal standards for climate change mitigation, adaptation, resilience, and the redress of loss and damage;
• The protection of environmental defenders and affected communities from reprisals;
• Participation, transparency, and accountability in climate-related decision-making;
• The just and equitable transition to low-carbon energy systems;
• The regulation of third-party conduct, particularly that of multinational corporations;
• The decolonization of natural resource governance frameworks.

The petition emphasizes the disproportionate impact of climate change on Africa, despite the continent’s minimal contribution to historical greenhouse gas emissions. It calls on the Court to affirm that African states have an obligation to protect their populations from climate-related harms and to ensure human rights are safeguarded in all climate action. Request for an advisory opinion on the human rights obligations of African states in addressing the climate crisis (African Court on Human and Peoples’ Rights)

DECISIONS AND SETTLEMENTS

Papua New Guinea: Court finds that failure to address climate change constitutes a violation of the right to a healthy environment

In 2015, the Department of Works and Implementation contracted the defendant, China Harbour Engineering Company Limited (CHECL), to reconstruct the Laloki Bridge outside Port Moresby in the Central Province. The plaintiff and their respective families lived and farmed on land described as an Agriculture State Lease, near the same Laloki Bridge (Land). During the course of CHECL’s reconstruction works, the plaintiffs were subjected to substantial environmental damage and the release of dust, chemicals, waste, and other pollutants, impairing the Land’s topsoil. After reconstruction, rectification works of the environmental damage inflicted were left unperformed by CHECL. 

Seeking redress, the plaintiffs brought the matter to the Conservation Environment Protection Authority (CEPA) to investigate and hired a private environmental impact assessor company, Chem Clean Environmental Services Limited (CCESL), to carry out an Environmental Impact Assessment. In 2018, CEPA and CCESL completed their reports and found that CHECL did not apply for or receive an appropriate environmental permit to carry out its works as per the Environment Act 2000 as amended, and confirmed the plaintiffs’ claim of having suffered environmental damage caused by CHECL’s works. Notwithstanding, CHECL declined to compensate the plaintiffs. The plaintiffs proceeded to sue CHECL for damages, trespass, and possible conversion. 

CHECL challenged the plaintiffs’ standing by way of a striking out motion, arguing that the plaintiffs lacked standing because title in the Land was vested in persons other than the plaintiff. 

The court decided the case in February 2020. The court first referred to the National Court Rules, wherein the concept of having sufficient interest in the context of judicial review was formalized, and to section 57 of the Constitution, which provides that rights or freedoms referred to in the Constitution shall be enforceable by the Supreme or National Court for the purpose provided by an Act of Parliament, either on its own initiative or on application by any person with an interest in its protection. The court stated that the objective of section 57 was to enable prompt intervention and judicial determination in respect of any actual, imminent, likely or reasonable probability of a breach of a person’s human rights, and is to happen with any ‘undue difficulty’. In the court’s view, standing to bring proceedings for the enforcement of human rights could prove an obstacle if normal conventions apply, as waiting for normal processes to take its cause could allow for breaches to continue unabated. As such, the court expressed that there ought to be no restriction on who can invoke the powers of the court as provided for by the Constitution. The only relevant test for such an action is that there must be actual, imminent, likely, reasonable, or probable breach of a human right. Once met, almost anybody, including the Court acting suo moto, or acting on its own initiative, can initiate proceedings under section 57 for the enforcement or protection of a human right. The court elaborated that the power to act suo moto was not unique to Papua New Guinea and referred to the judiciary in Pakistan and India. A court acting suo moto would decline its traditional adversarial role for a more inquisitorial role, with administrative time shortened to enable prompt hearings. Such powers may be invoked and applied to ongoing proceedings already before a court or for new proceedings the court itself initiates. Upon deliberation, the court found that the plaintiffs had the requisite standing. The plaintiffs’ agriculture lease of the Land showed their collective names as registered title holders, with the lead plaintiff as a member of the title-holding family and the rest of them as persons who had been invited to live on the Land by the title holders and who had lived off the Land for many years.

Further, the court observed that in light of climate change, there is a worldwide concern over how human activities are adversely affecting the environment and, in turn, the survival of the human race. As guaranteed under section 35 of the Constitution, the right to life was recognized by the court to be central to all rights. Reference was made to Munn v State of Illinois, and a host of Indian cases, where life was interpreted broadly to encompass not just physical existence but also the quality of life. The court, relying on the Declaration of the United Nations Conference on the Human Environment (Stockholm Declaration) of 1972, explained that international developments demonstrated the recognition of a right to a healthy environment. In the court’s view, any human activity that caused an adverse impact on the environment would give rise to a possible breach of the fundamental right to life.  To the court it followed, in reliance on the cases of Urgenda in the Netherlands, Leghari in Pakistan, and Himanchal Pradesh in India, that a failure of states to take adequate steps to address climate change may constitute a violation of the right to a healthy environment. Considering this legal backdrop, the court found that the possible breach of the fundamental right to life also gave the plaintiffs standing. 

The court then dealt with the defendant's claim that the plaintiff’s suit ought to be struck for disclosing no reasonable cause of action. Although the court observed that the pleadings did not follow a logical sequence and included submissions without pleading their full factual foundation, they were found to be curable by appropriate amendments. 

Finally, the court ordered that CEPA and other regulatory bodies were to be joined as parties to the suit. The fact that CHECL was never issued the appropriate permit under the Environment Act 2000, as amended, suggested a failure by the State through CEPA to monitor and ensure CHECL’s activities caused minimal environmental damage.

Japan: Court finds no causation between emissions and climate harms claimed by plaintiffs

On September 14, 2018, thirty-one families, represented by the Citizens’ Committee on the Kobe Coal-Fired Power Plant, sued Kobe Steel Ltd., Kobelco Power Kobe No. 2 Inc., and Kansai Electric Power Co., seeking an injunction to stop two new coal-fired units in Kobe. The plaintiffs argued the 1,300 MW plant would emit 0.6% of Japan’s energy-related CO₂ emissions, violate environmental rights, worsen already poor air quality, and undermine national climate targets.

On March 20, 2023, the Kobe District Court rejected the claims. It found no concrete danger to personal rights from SO₂, NO₂, SPM, mercury, or PM2.5 emissions. The Court also ruled that general anxiety about health or climate impacts could not justify limiting economic activities. Regarding climate change, the Court acknowledged a global risk but held that plaintiffs failed to show individualized concrete harm and that the plant would not alone prevent meeting emission reduction targets. It also found no legal protection for a right to a stable climate.

The plaintiffs appealed on April 1, 2023, arguing that being forced to live under conditions threatening to exceed 1.5°C of warming violates their rights. They sought an injunction or phased emissions cuts to reach zero CO₂ by 2040. Testimony concluded on October 23, 2024.

On April 24, 2025, the Osaka High Court dismissed the appeal. Regarding plaintiffs’ claim of an injunction based on personal rights in the context of climate change (the right to live a healthy and safe life in a world without a temperature increase of more than 1.5 degrees Celsius), the court acknowledged that the effects of climate change on life, body, health, etc. are not merely a matter of concern. Still, it held that the relationship is indirect and abstract, and that such legal interests cannot be incorporated into moral rights, because there is no concrete harm that could justify restricting the actions of others. As for causation, the court denied the legal causation between the climate harm claimed by the appellants and emissions from the defendant's plant because of the weakness and uncertainty in attributing liability to injure their social and economic activities. Citizens’ Committee on the Kobe Coal-Fired Power Plant v. Kobe Steel Ltd., et al. (Japan, Kobe District Court)

NEW CASES

Netherlands: Milieudefensie brings the first lawsuit against a bank for financing of greenhouse gas-intensive industries without adequate climate safeguards

On March 28, 2025, Milieudefensie served a formal summons to ING Bank, initiating a civil lawsuit before the Amsterdam District Court. The case follows a notice of liability issued on January 19, 2024, and a final demand letter on January 16, 2025. ING responded to both letters but did not meet the group’s demands. With over 30,000 co-claimants and 100,000 members, Milieudefensie claims standing under Dutch law to pursue collective environmental and human rights claims.

ING, headquartered in Amsterdam and classified as a systemically important bank, is accused of facilitating dangerous climate change through continued financing of greenhouse gas-intensive industries without adequate climate safeguards. In 2024 alone, ING reported emissions of 261.6 Mt CO₂e, which Milieudefensie notes is approximately 1.75 times the emissions of all Dutch citizens and companies.

Milieudefensie alleges that ING’s climate conduct violates the societal duty of care under Article 6:162 of the Dutch Civil Code. Drawing from precedent (Urgenda v. Netherlands, Milieudefensie v. Shell), international climate science (IPCC, IEA), and soft law instruments (UNGPs, OECD Guidelines), the claimant argues that ING’s failure to adopt effective emissions reduction policies constitutes a tortious act.

The summons outlines that ING’s role as a financial enabler of fossil fuel expansion and other high-emission sectors results in both direct and facilitated emissions (scope 3), which ING fails to adequately report or reduce. The case relies heavily on the endangerment doctrine, highlighting ING’s long-term knowledge of climate risks, its capacity to act, and the severe, foreseeable harm resulting from inaction.

Milieudefensie asks the court to compel ING to take the following actions:

1. Halve its total emissions by 2030, and continue reducing thereafter, in line with the IPCC’s 1.5°C pathway.
2. Reduce emissions in eight major sectors it finances (e.g., steel, aviation) in line with the International Energy Agency’s Net Zero Emissions (NZE) scenario.
3. Cease all financing and investment in companies starting new oil and gas projects.
4. Require all large corporate clients to submit credible, science-based climate plans, aligned with the OECD Guidelines and UNGPs.

These demands are grounded in Milieudefensie’s argument that absolute emissions reductions (not merely intensity reductions) are essential to fulfilling ING’s legal and human rights obligations.

The summons provides a comprehensive scientific basis, citing the IPCC’s Sixth Assessment Report and carbon budget data, which indicate that global CO₂ emissions must fall by at least 48% by 2030 and reach net-zero by 2050 to preserve a 50% chance of staying within 1.5°C warming.

Milieudefensie also invokes human rights law, emphasizing ING’s responsibility to protect rights to life, health, and a clean and sustainable environment under the ECHR and other international norms. The summons references the KlimaSeniorinnen v. Switzerland judgment, reinforcing that actors cannot evade climate responsibility by pointing to others.

Milieudefensie claims that ING’s “Terra approach” and other existing policies are inadequate because:

• They rely primarily on intensity targets instead of absolute reductions;
• They exclude 70% of ING’s financed emissions and all facilitated emissions;
• ING continues to support fossil fuel companies, including those expanding oil and gas production;
• ING lacks sector-specific targets in high-emission areas beyond upstream oil and gas;
• Executive remuneration is not linked to emissions reductions;
• ING’s engagement policy prioritizes financial risk over climate harm.

According to the Banking on Climate Chaos report, ING ranks among the top 30 fossil fuel financiers globally, having facilitated over €106 billion in fossil fuel investments since the Paris Agreement.

Anticipating ING’s likely “effectiveness” defence, Milieudefensie argues that requiring ING to act would have a direct and indirect impact on global emissions. Citing legal precedents (Urgenda, Shell, KlimaSeniorinnen, Brussels Court of Appeal, Montana case), it affirms that partial responsibility is sufficient for tortious liability and that holding ING accountable can have a systemic, flywheel effect on the market and policy landscape. Milieudefensie v. ING Bank (District Court of Amsterdam)