Climate Litigation Updates (June 30, 2026)

The Sabin Center for Climate Change Law publishes monthly summaries of developments in climate-related litigation. We also add these developments to The Climate Litigation Database on an ongoing basis. If you know of any cases we have missed, please email us at [email protected]. Thanks to Sabin Center summer interns Ishana Bhattacharya and Peter Kranitz for their assistance in preparing this update.

HERE ARE THE ADDITIONS TO THE CLIMATE LITIGATION DATABASE FOR UPDATE #212

FEATURED CASES

France: French Court Orders TotalEnergies to Include Scope 3 Emissions in Vigilance Plan

On January 28, 2020, French NGOs Notre Affaire à Tous, Sherpa, Zéa, Les Eco Maires, and France Nature Environnement, together with several French local governments, filed a lawsuit against TotalEnergies before the Nanterre Judicial Court under France’s Duty of Vigilance Law. The claimants alleged that TotalEnergies’ vigilance plan failed to adequately identify and address climate-related risks arising from its activities, including greenhouse gas emissions resulting from the use of the oil and gas products it sells, known as Scope 3 emissions.

The claimants argued that TotalEnergies was required, under Article L.225-102-4 of the French Commercial Code, now Articles L.225-102-1 and L.225-102-2, to publish a vigilance plan identifying risks to human rights, health and safety, and the environment, and to adopt appropriate measures to prevent or mitigate those risks. They sought an order requiring TotalEnergies to publish a new vigilance plan that would identify the climate risks associated with its activities, including Scope 1, 2, and 3 emissions; assess risks linked to warming beyond 1.5°C; account for the depletion of the global carbon budget and the continued development of oil and gas projects; and adopt measures aligned with the Paris Agreement and scientific pathways for limiting warming to 1.5°C.

The claimants also sought more specific remedial measures. They asked the court to order TotalEnergies to reduce oil and gas production or emissions in line with IPCC and International Energy Agency pathways, cease certain new hydrocarbon exploration and exploitation projects, explain and quantify the investments and financing needed to implement its mitigation targets, and pay a daily penalty in the event of non-compliance. In the alternative, they relied on provisions of the French Civil Code concerning the prevention of ecological damage.

TotalEnergies contested the claims. It argued, among other things, that climate change is a global and multifactorial phenomenon that falls outside the scope of the Duty of Vigilance Law; that climate-related information belongs instead in sustainability reporting; that Scope 3 emissions result from the activities of customers and other economic actors rather than from TotalEnergies’ own activities; and that the court could not prescribe specific corporate climate measures without interfering with the company’s management and broader public energy policy choices.

On June 25, 2026, the Paris Judicial Court issued its first merits decision. The court held that TotalEnergies’ vigilance plan was incomplete because it included Scope 1 and 2 emissions in its risk mapping but excluded Scope 3 emissions. The court found that Scope 3 emissions form part of the climate-related risks and impacts arising from the group’s activities and therefore must be addressed in the vigilance plan. The court ordered TotalEnergies to supplement its current vigilance plan within six months by including Scope 3 greenhouse gas emissions in the risk mapping and in the related vigilance measures.

The court did not grant the broader remedies requested by the claimants. It declined to order TotalEnergies to adopt specific emissions reduction targets, align its business strategy with a particular 1.5°C pathway, or cease new hydrocarbon exploration and exploitation projects. The court reasoned that the Duty of Vigilance Law allows judges to require a company to comply with its vigilance obligations and correct an incomplete plan, but does not authorize the court to prescribe the specific content of the company’s climate strategy or the particular measures it must adopt.

The court dismissed the claims brought under Article L.225-102-2 of the Commercial Code, reserved judgment on the remaining claims pending submission of the revised vigilance plan, referred the case for further proceedings in January 2027, and declined to impose a penalty payment at this stage. It ordered TotalEnergies to pay €20,000 to each of the remaining claimants—Notre Affaire à Tous, Sherpa, Zéa, France Nature Environnement, and the City of Paris—under Article 700 of the Code of Civil Procedure. Notre Affaire à Tous et al. v. TotalEnergies SE (France, Paris Judicial Court)

Australia: Environmental groups file UN Human Rights Committee complaint over Australia’s export of fossil fuels, alleging violations of rights under the ICCPR

On June 23, 2026, Environmental Justice Australia, the Human Rights Law Centre, and Earthjustice filed a communication before the United Nations Human Rights Committee (UNHRC) challenging Australia’s continued production and export of coal and gas.

The communication is brought on behalf of ten Australians who allege that they have suffered climate-related harms resulting from flooding, bushfires, and extreme heat. The claimants argue that Australia’s ongoing support for fossil fuel production contributes substantially to climate change and violates rights protected under the International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights (ICCPR), including the right to life (Article 6), the right to privacy, family, and home life (Article 17), and the rights of minorities to enjoy their culture (Article 27).

According to the claimants, the role of fossil fuels in driving climate change is well established and the resulting harms are foreseeable. They contend that Australia has failed to adequately protect its population from these harms by continuing to approve and support coal and gas projects without adopting measures sufficient to prevent dangerous climate impacts. The communication asks the Human Rights Committee to assess the compatibility of Australia’s fossil fuel policies with its obligations under the ICCPR.

A central feature of the complaint is its challenge to Australia’s treatment of emissions associated with exported fossil fuels. The claimants argue that Australia bears responsibility not only for emissions released within its territory, but also for emissions resulting from coal and gas extracted in Australia and combusted abroad. In their view, the cumulative and transboundary nature of climate change makes it inappropriate to distinguish between domestic and export-related emissions when assessing a state’s contribution to climate harm and its corresponding human rights obligations.

The communication draws extensively on the International Court of Justice’s 2025 advisory opinion on climate change. Relying on the ICJ’s recognition that states have obligations to prevent significant harm to the climate system and to exercise due diligence in regulating activities within their jurisdiction that contribute to climate change, the claimants argue that Australia’s continued expansion of fossil fuel production is inconsistent with its human rights obligations. The complaint further invokes the advisory opinion’s treatment of climate change as a global, cumulative, and transboundary problem to support the argument that states cannot avoid responsibility by focusing solely on territorial emissions while facilitating fossil fuel combustion elsewhere.

More broadly, the case seeks to test how the principles articulated in the ICJ advisory opinion apply in the context of individual human rights claims. It asks the Human Rights Committee to clarify the extent to which states’ obligations under the ICCPR require them to consider the downstream climate impacts of fossil fuel production and export when protecting individuals from foreseeable climate-related harm. Anne Poelina and Others v Australia (United Nations, United Nations Human Rights Committee).

Ninth Circuit Said Young Plaintiffs Could Not Challenge President Trump’s Energy-Related Executive Orders

In an unpublished memorandum, the Ninth Circuit Court of Appeals affirmed the dismissal of youth and young adult plaintiffs’ lawsuit challenging the constitutionality of three energy-related executive orders issued by President Trump: Executive Order 14154, “Unleashing American Energy”; Executive Order 14156, “Declaring a National Energy Emergency”; and Executive Order 14261, “Reinvigorating America’s Beautiful Clean Coal Industry and Amending Executive Order 14241.” The Ninth Circuit agreed with the district court that the plaintiffs lacked standing, but in addition to concluding that its decision in Juliana v. United States foreclosed the existence of the redressability element of standing, the Ninth Circuit also found that the plaintiffs did not plausibly allege that the executive orders caused their climate change-related injuries. The district court had found that the plaintiffs satisfied the standing requirement that alleged injuries be “fairly traceable” to the challenged actions, but the Ninth Circuit determined that the link between the executive orders and the alleged injuries was “too speculative” to support standing because courts could not predict how government agencies and officials might exercise their discretion. Regarding redressability, the Ninth Circuit concluded both that the plaintiffs did not plausibly allege that injunctive relief barring implementation of the executive orders would redress their injuries and also that the requested injunction would be beyond the courts’ Article III power. In addition, the Ninth Circuit stated that “a sweeping injunction against hundreds of agency actions in one lawsuit” was “unprecedented”; the appellate court viewed the suit as an attempt “to circumvent the jurisdictional and procedural rules Congress has established for challenges to agency actions.” The Ninth Circuit also rejected the argument that declaratory relief alone could redress their injuries and found that the district court did not abuse its discretion by allowing the plaintiffs leave to amend their complaint. Lighthiser v. Trump, No. 25-6714 (9th Cir. June 2, 2026)

U.S. DECISIONS AND SETTLEMENTS

Supreme Court Denied Review of Decision Upholding EPA Rule Implementing HFC Phasedown 

The U.S. Supreme Court denied a petition for writ of certiorari in which a refrigerant producer sought review of the D.C. Circuit’s August 2025 decision upholding a U.S. Environmental Protection Agency (EPA) rule setting an allocation methodology for hydrofluorocarbon (HFC) allowances for 2024 through 2028 as part of the cap-and-trade program to implement the HFC phasedown required by the American Innovation and Manufacturing Act (AIM Act). The petition presented the question of whether Congress in the AIM Act violated the Vesting Clause of Article I of the Constitution by giving EPA “unbounded discretion to choose which private parties are entitled to participate in a multibillion-dollar market” for HFCs. The petition contended that the AIM Act violated the nondelegation doctrine by failing to provide any “intelligible principle” to guide EPA’s exercise of discretion. RMS of Georgia, LLC, d/b/a Choice Refrigerants v. EPA, No. 25-1079 (U.S. June 22, 2026)

Supreme Court Vacated D.C. Circuit Judgment Upholding Biden-Era Energy Standards for Furnaces and Water Heaters, Remanded for New Consideration in Light of Trump Administration EPCA Interpretation

The U.S. Supreme Court granted a petition for writ of certiorari and vacated a D.C. Circuit judgment upholding Biden administration amendments to the energy conservation standards for consumer furnaces and commercial water heaters. The Supreme Court remanded the case to the D.C. Circuit for further consideration in light of the Solicitor General’s position in a brief filed for the U.S. Department of Energy and other federal respondents, in which the Solicitor General argued that the energy conservation standards “reflect an unduly narrow understanding” of what constitutes a “performance characteristic[]” under the Energy Policy and Conservation Act (EPCA). The D.C. Circuit had rejected a contention by manufacturers, trade groups, and energy providers that because the standards would drive less efficient noncondensing consumer furnaces and commercial water heaters out of the market in favor of condensing furnaces and water heaters, the standards would impermissibly make “unavailable” a product that offers unique “performance characteristics” and features. American Gas Association v. Department of Energy, No. 25-879 (U.S. June 8, 2026)

Federal Defendants Voluntarily Dismissed Appeal of Decision Vacating Pause on Wind Energy Authorizations

On June 15, 2026, the First Circuit Court of Appeals granted federal defendants-appellants motion for voluntary dismissal of their appeal of a Massachusetts federal district court’s December 2025 judgment vacating federal agencies’ orders pausing all wind energy authorizations. The district court had concluded that the federal agencies’ orders were arbitrary and capricious and contrary to law. New York v. Trump, No. 26-1174 (1st Cir. June 15, 2026)

D.C. Circuit Declined to Block Work on Southeast Supply Enhancement Gas Pipeline Project

The D.C. Circuit Court of Appeals denied a motion by Appalachian Voices and three other environmental organizations for a stay pending review of a Federal Energy Regulatory Commission (FERC) order authorizing construction and operation of the Southeast Supply Enhancement Project, a gas pipeline project involving installation of 55.3 miles of pipeline in Virginia and North Carolina. The organizations’ stay motion argued that they were likely to succeed on the merits of their claim that FERC violated the National Environmental Policy Act (NEPA) by failing to take a hard look at aquatic impacts, including cumulative impacts from a co-located pipeline project. (The organizations’ non-binding statement of issues indicated that they also would argue that FERC violated NEPA and the Natural Gas Act by failing to adequately consider the project’s greenhouse gas emissions and their impacts.) In its order denying the stay motion, the D.C. Circuit found that the petitioners did not demonstrate that they would likely succeed in showing that FERC’s consideration of the project’s environmental effects fell outside a “broad zone of reasonableness.” The court also found that harm to the public and other parties of stopping the project midway outweighed any irreparable harm to the environmental organizations. Appalachian Voices v. Federal Energy Regulatory Commission, No. 26-1100 (D.C. Cir. June 5, 2026)

Fifth Circuit Stayed Injunction that Blocked Enforcement of Texas Prohibition on State Business with Companies that “Boycott Fossil Fuels”

In 2021, Texas enacted SB 13, a law that prohibits certain State entities from investing in or contracting with companies that “boycott fossil fuels.” In February 2026, a federal district court in Texas enjoined enforcement of the law, ruling that it violated the First Amendment and was unconstitutionally vague. On May 29, 2026, in a one-sentence published order, the Fifth Circuit Court of Appeals granted the Texas Comptroller of Public Accounts and Texas Attorney General’s motion to stay pending appeal the district court injunction. Judge Ho wrote a concurrence, stating that “S.B. 13 is about spending, not speech,” and that “[t]he Constitution permits—and citizens expect—government agencies to care about how public funds are used. State officials have the right to champion nondiscrimination by refusing to engage with those who discriminate. They’re allowed to boycott those who boycott others.” The Comptroller and Attorney General filed their opening brief in the Fifth Circuit on May 4, 2026. The brief of appellee American Sustainable Business Council is due on July 2. American Sustainable Business Council v. Hancock, No. 26-50111 (5th Cir. May 29, 2026) 

Fourth Circuit Enjoined Enforcement of Maryland Restriction on Marketing of “Green Power”

The Fourth Circuit Court of Appeals reversed a district court’s denial of a motion for a preliminary injunction enjoining enforcement of a Maryland law that prohibited renewable energy suppliers advertising “green power” from marketing their electricity as “clean, green, eco-friendly, environmentally friendly or responsible, carbon-free, 100% renewable, 100% wind, 100% hydro, 100% solar, 100% emission-free, or similar claims” unless the electricity is at least 51% renewable or backed by renewable energy credits derived from within the service territory managed by PJM Interconnection. The Fourth Circuit found that the plaintiffs were likely to prevail on their First Amendment facial challenge to the law because they would be able to show that the restriction failed intermediate scrutiny review. The Fourth Circuit agreed with the district court that the regulated speech was not inherently or in fact misleading and further found that the law’s restrictions did not “directly advance the State’s asserted interest in consumer protection and are not adequately tailored.” The Fourth Circuit declined to consider Maryland’s interest in promoting local renewable energy because Maryland did not assert this interest until late in the litigation. The court also found that the plaintiffs showed they would suffer irreparable harm in the absence of an injunction of the speech restriction, that the balance of equities leaned in their favor, and that an injunction was in the public interest. With respect to the plaintiffs’ constitutional challenges to the law’s disclosure requirements, the court remanded these questions to the district court to address new disclosure language promulgated by the Maryland Public Service Commission after the district court issued its ruling. Retail Energy Advancement League v. Brown, No. 25-1012 (4th Cir. May 15, 2026)

First Circuit Stayed Preliminary Injunction Barring New Hampshire Officials from Ceasing Enforcement of Vehicle Emissions Inspection and Maintenance Program; Plaintiff Dismissed Suit But Said It Would File New Suit

In June 2025, New Hampshire enacted a law abolishing the State’s vehicle inspection and maintenance (I/M) program, and the State subsequently took steps to wind down the program effective January 31, 2026. A few days before the effective date, a federal district court in New Hampshire issued a preliminary injunction enjoining State officials from ceasing implementation or enforcement of the program. On April 30, the First Circuit Court of Appeals stayed the preliminary injunction. The First Circuit found that the officials were likely to succeed on the merits of their arguments that the plaintiff—the sole vendor contracted to administer I/M services—failed to meet its burden of alleging that the officials were “in violation of” an emission standard or limitation under the Clean Air Act’s citizen suit provision. The First Circuit was persuaded by the officials’ arguments that the Clean Air Act regulations that they allegedly violated were not emission standards or limitations that could provide the basis for a citizen suit and that termination of the I/M services contract with the plaintiff did not violate Clean Air Act regulations or the state implementation plan. The First Circuit further found that that the officials made a “strong showing” that the district court “likely erred in concluding that [the plaintiff] adequately alleged a violation based on conduct that was, at the time of the complaint, wholly prospective.” In addition, the First Circuit found that the officials demonstrated irreparable harm from being forced to continue a repealed program and that the equities favored the officials, given their likelihood of success on the merits, the demonstrated irreparable harm, and the First Circuit’s conclusion that the only harm the plaintiff faced was a lost opportunity to bid on a new contract. After the First Circuit granted the stay, the plaintiff voluntarily dismissed its lawsuit, stating that the First Circuit’s procedural concerns could now be “easily remedied” because it was “now undisputed that New Hampshire is currently in violation of an emission standard or limitation under the Clean Air Act due to its failure to implement and enforce its vehicle inspection and maintenance (‘I/M’) program as contained in its federally enforceable state implementation plan.” The plaintiff said it planned to serve notice on State officials of its intent to commence a new action. The New Hampshire officials filed a notice of appeal of the dismissal. Gordon-Darby Holdings, Inc. v. Quinn, No. 26-1209 (1st Cir. Apr. 30, 2026)

D.C. Court Ordered Exxon to Produce All Documents Produced in Massachusetts Case in D.C. Consumer Protection Suit Against Fossil Fuel Companies

In the District of Columbia’s lawsuit asserting that fossil fuel industry defendants violated its consumer protection law by misleading consumers about their products’ role in causing climate change, the D.C. Superior Court granted the District of Columbia’s motion to compel Exxon Mobil Corporation and ExxonMobil Oil Corporation (together, Exxon) to produce all documents produced in the Commonwealth of Massachusetts’ lawsuit against Exxon. Noting that Exxon conceded that there was “substantial overlap” between the two cases, the court found that Exxon’s productions in the Massachusetts case were “at least minimally relevant” to D.C.’s claims in this case. The court was not persuaded by Exxon’s arguments that the documents produced in the Massachusetts case were not sufficiently relevant because that case also included an investor deception case or because that case involved sales and advertising to Massachusetts consumers while this case involved D.C. consumers. In addition, the court rejected Exxon’s arguments that the temporal scope of the Massachusetts case extended back to 1976, while D.C.’s allegations claims began in 2000. The court also was not persuaded by Exxon’s arguments that it had agreed to produce relevant documents from the Massachusetts case and that introduction of irrelevant documents would delay the litigation. District of Columbia v. Exxon Mobil Corp., No. 2020 CA 002892 B (D.C. Super. Ct. May 22, 2026)

Washington Court Granted Exxon Request for Disqualification of Judge in Tribes’ Climate Cases

In the cases brought by Shoalwater Bay and Makah Indian Tribes seeking to hold fossil fuel companies liable for harms cause by climate change, a Washington Superior Court granted Exxon Mobil Corporation and ExxonMobil Oil Corporation’s request for disqualification of the judge. The disqualification occurred one month after the judge denied a motion to dismiss for failure to state a claim and a motion to stay proceedings while the U.S. Supreme Court considers Suncor Energy (U.S.A.) Inc. v. County Commissioners of Boulder County. Washington law provides that any party to a lawsuit may disqualify a judge, subject to several limitations, including that no party may disqualify more than one judge in any matter and the notice of disqualification must be filed before the judge makes any discretionary ruling in the case. In the order granting the request for disqualification, the court noted that all parties seemed to agree that the judge had not made any discretionary rulings. The court concluded that although Chevron defendants previously exercised their statutory right to disqualification in the Shoalwater Bay Indian Tribe’s case prior to the administrative consolidation of the cases for pre-trial proceedings, no defendant had yet exercised their collective right to disqualify a judge in the Makah Indian Tribe’s case. The court therefore granted the request for disqualification in the Makah Indian Tribe’s case. Because of the consolidation for pre-trial proceedings, the order also operated, “at a minimum,” to disqualify the judge in the Shoalwater Bay Indian Tribe’s case during such proceedings. Shoalwater Bay Indian Tribe v. Exxon Mobil Corp., No. 23-2-25215-2 SEA (Wash. Super. Ct. June 4, 2026)

Delaware’s Climate Case Against Fossil Fuel Defendants Stayed While U.S. Supreme Court Considers Boulder 

A Delaware Superior Court granted fossil fuel industry defendants’ motion to stay proceedings in the State of Delaware’s climate change lawsuit pending the U.S. Supreme Court’s decision in Suncor Energy (U.S.A.) Inc. v. County Commissioners of Boulder County. The court found that it was “unclear” whether the State’s sole remaining claim, which asserted a violation of the Delaware Consumer Fraud Act, would fall within the scope of the Supreme Court’s decision in Boulder. The court concluded that it would be “prudent” to wait for the Supreme Court’s decision, which “[a]t a minimum, … will likely provide helpful guidance as to future determinations in this case.” The court was not persuaded by the State’s arguments that a delay would cause the State substantial harm; the court noted that the State sought money damages, not injunctive relief. State of Delaware v. BP America Inc., No. N20C-09-097-EMD-CCLD (Del. Super. Ct. June 8, 2026)

Marathon Petroleum Corporation Dismissed from Multnomah County’s Climate Lawsuit

On June 5, 2026, County of Multnomah voluntarily dismissed its claims against Marathon Petroleum Corporation with prejudice. County of Multnomah v. Exxon Mobil Corp., No. 23CV25164 (Or. Cir. Ct. June 5, 2026)

South Carolina Federal Court Said EPA Guidance Closing Environmental and Climate Justice Block Grant Program Was Unlawful

On remand from the Fourth Circuit Court of Appeals, the federal district court for the District of South Carolina ruled that U.S. Environmental Protection Agency (EPA) guidance closing the Inflation Reduction Act’s (IRA’s) Environmental and Climate Justice (ECJ) Block Grant Program in February 2025 was illegal. The court concluded that it had jurisdiction to hear the challenge to the guidance and rejected the defendants’ contention that the One Big Beautiful Bill Act’s rescission of the program mooted the action. The district court found that the EPA guidance was a “final and discrete” agency action subject to Administrative Procedure Act review, that the plaintiff grant recipients had Article III standing to challenge the guidance, and that “there is no doubt” that the internal guidance terminating the ECJ Program in contravention of IRA Section 7438 was arbitrary and capricious and unlawful. The court denied the plaintiffs’ requests for a permanent injunction requiring EPA to implement the ECJ Program and for an “equitable extension” of IRA Section 7438’s September 30, 2026 deadline, finding the relief “impractical” but noting that the plaintiffs were “of course free to pursue their claims for alleged unlawful termination” in the Court of Federal Claims. The court declined to consider the plaintiffs’ nonstatutory ultra vires claims. Sustainability Institute v. Trump, No. 2:25-cv-02152 (D.S.C. June 11, 2026)

Massachusetts Federal Court Denied Motion to Dismiss Challenge to Federal Actions Imposing Permitting Restrictions on Renewable Energy Facilities

Almost two months after granting a preliminary injunction enjoining enforcement of five federal agency actions that plaintiffs alleged “choke” private developers’ ability to build new wind and solar energy generation projects, the federal district court for the District of Massachusetts denied the federal defendants’ motion to dismiss the plaintiffs’ Administrative Procedure Act (APA) challenge to those actions. The court was not persuaded by the defendants’ argument that the challenged actions were not “final agency actions” subject to review under the APA. The court noted, moreover, that it had concluded in its decision granting a preliminary injunction that the plaintiffs were likely to succeed on the merits of their claims. The court dismissed the plaintiffs’ challenge to the U.S. Fish and Wildlife Service’s January 2025 announcement that it would temporarily cease issuance of eagle incidental take permits to wind energy facilities. The court found that the withdrawal of this permitting ban after the plaintiffs filed the lawsuit mooted this claim. On June 17, 2026, the defendants filed a notice of appeal of the preliminary injunction and the order denying dismissal. The Sabin Center for Climate Change Law’s Renewable Energy Legal Defense Initiative filed an amicus brief in support of the motion for preliminary injunction on behalf of several rural-advocacy organizations with an interest in promoting renewable energy. More discussion of the case is available in this Climate Law Blog post. Renew Northeast v. U.S. Department of the Interior, No. 25-cv-13961 (D. Mass. June 16, 2026)

Massachusetts Federal Court Ordered Halt to Removal of Climate Change and Other Interpretive Materials at National Park Sites; First Circuit Granted Administrative Stay

On June 4, 2026, the federal district court for the District of Massachusetts denied federal defendants’ motion to dismiss six organizations’ lawsuit challenging the lawfulness of the removal of certain displays at National Park sites. The removed materials included exhibits and signs regarding climate change and its impacts at the New York Gateway National Recreation Area, Glacier National Park, Fort Sumter, and Acadia National Park. The district court found that the organizations demonstrated at this stage that they had organizational and associational standing; that the Secretary of the Interior’s order, “Restoring Truth and Sanity to American History,” was a final agency action reviewable under the Administrative Procedure Act; that the order was ripe for review; and that the order was not committed to agency discretion by law. The court also rejected the defendants’ argument that the District of Massachusetts was an improper venue. The court also found that the complaint adequately pleaded the plaintiffs’ claim that the defendants acted arbitrarily or capriciously and that the complaint’s allegations were sufficient to state a claim under the Federal Land Policy and Management Act.

On June 12, the court granted the plaintiffs’ motion for a stay of the actions challenged in the lawsuit, enjoined the defendants from further implementation of the Secretary’s order, and ordered the defendants to restore and reinstall the removed materials. The court found that the plaintiffs demonstrated a likelihood of success on the merits of their claims. First, the court found they were likely to succeed on the claim that the order was arbitrary and capricious because it failed to provide a reasoned justification for the directive to review and remove interpretive materials and instead merely cited President Trump’s Executive Order 14253, “Restoring Truth and Sanity to American History.” In addition, the court found that the plaintiffs demonstrated they were likely to succeed on their claim that the Secretary’s order was a departure from prior practice and failed “to recognize or consider substantial reliance interests in the continued availability of interpretive materials at park sites,” as well as on their claim that the defendants “failed to consider important aspects of the problem and acted counter to the evidence before them.” The court further concluded that the plaintiffs showed a likelihood of success on the merits of their claims that the Secretary’s order contravened the National Park Service Organic Act, the National Park Service Centennial Act, and the National Parks Omnibus Management Act. The court held that the Organic Act “contains an express and unambiguous directive that the [National Park Service (NPS)] prioritize conservation of the environment” and found that the NPS’s Management Policies “repeatedly emphasize that ‘conservation’ includes the avoidance of conduct that promotes or results in detrimental impacts to the environment, including climate change, pollution, and other forms of degradation.” The court found that the Secretary’s order and the removal of climate-related interpretive materials conflicted with the Organic Act’s conservation mandate. The court also mentioned the removal of signage regarding glacier melt, carbon dioxide emissions, and climate change in support of its conclusion that the Secretary’s order conflicted with the Centennial Act’s requirement that NPS interpretive and education programs reflect current scientific research and the Omnibus Management Act’s directive to NPS to implement a “broad program” of the “highest quality science and information.” Regarding the other elements of the standard for injunctive relief, the court found that the plaintiffs demonstrated a risk of “immediate and irreparable” harm and that many of their alleged aesthetic, recreational, and informational harms were “nonquantifiable.” In addition, the court found that the balance of the equities and public interest weighed in favor of an injunction. On June 15, the defendants filed a notice of appeal and filed an emergency motion for stay pending appeal. On June 18, the district court denied the motion for a stay pending appeal. 

On June 23, 2026, the First Circuit Court of Appeals granted an administrative stay of the portions of the order enjoining the defendants from implementing the Secretary’s order, directing the defendants to restore and reinstall interpretive materials, enjoining further alterations to interpretive materials, and requiring weekly status reports. The First Circuit left in place the district court’s stay of the Secretary’s order. The First Circuit said it would “promptly” rule on the request for a stay pending appeal. National Parks Conservation Association v. U.S. Department of the Interior, No. 1:26-CV-10877 (D. Mass. June 4 and 12, 2026), No. 26-1714 (1st Cir. June 23, 2026)

Federal Court Dismissed States’ Challenge to EPA’s Termination of Solar for All Grants, Citing Lack of Jurisdiction

The federal district court for the Western District of Washington granted summary judgment to the U.S. Environmental Protection Agency (EPA) in a suit filed by state recipients of grants under EPA’s terminated Solar for All program. The court determined that it lacked subject matter jurisdiction over the claims and dismissed them without prejudice. Per the Tucker Act, breach-of-contract suits against the US government can only be brought in the Court of Federal Claims. The Tucker Act also bars Administrative Procedure Act (APA) claims for injunctive and declaratory relief that function as “disguised” breach-of-contract claims. The court reasoned that the states’ APA claims for nonmonetary relief essentially challenged the rescission of their Solar for All grants and so derived from rights created by contract. Further, although the states sought an order reversing EPA’s termination of the Solar for All program rather than direct reinstatement of their grants, Congress had already decided to halt the program going forward. If granted, the order would only have the effect of ordering specific performance of the terminated contracts by requiring disbursement of the withheld funds. The court determined that since the APA claims functioned as contract claims and would essentially grant contractual relief by distributing the funds to the states, the Tucker Act required the suit to be heard in the Court of Federal Claims. The court also dismissed the states’ constitutional and ultra vires claims as being inextricable from the APA claims. Arizona v. EPA, No. 2:25-cv-02015 (W.D. Wash. June 1, 2026)

Colorado Federal Court Granted Preliminary Injunction Preventing Transfer of Stewardship of National Center for Atmospheric Research’s Climate Supercomputing Center

The federal district court for the District of Colorado granted a preliminary injunction preventing the National Science Foundation (NSF) from transferring stewardship of the NCAR-Wyoming Supercomputing Center (NWSC) away from the University Corporation for Atmospheric Research (UCAR) and National Center for Atmospheric Research (NCAR). The NWSC conducts weather, climate, and atmospheric research used by governmental agencies and private companies to inform their operations and prepare for extreme weather patterns. The court rejected NSF’s challenge to its subject matter jurisdiction. The court found that NSF’s decision to divest UCAR of stewardship of NWSC was final and was determinative of UCAR’s rights and obligations, as required for jurisdiction under the Administrative Procedure Act. The court further rejected NSF’s contention that the case was not ripe for judicial review, concluding that NSF’s decision represented a final agency action that did not depend on uncertain or contingent future events and that withholding review would cause significant hardship to UCAR. In assessing UCAR’s request for a preliminary injunction, the court determined that UCAR was likely to succeed on the merits of its claim that NSF’s decision was arbitrary and capricious because NSF failed to provide an explanation for its decision to divest UCAR of stewardship over NWSC. The record showed no evidence of dissatisfaction with UCAR, and the court noted evidence in the record indicating that the decision might have been motivated by the Trump administration’s dispute with the State of Colorado. Additionally, the NSF failed to follow its own timeline for collecting public feedback before making a decision and ignored the majority of responses disfavoring transfer. The court determined that UCAR would suffer irreparable harm in the absence of a preliminary injunction, including loss of employees, potential financial impact, and damage to its institutional mission. Finally, the court found that the balance of equities favored an injunction since there was a strong public interest in efficient and uninterrupted data collection and there would be no concrete harm caused by preserving the current stewardship. University Corporation for Atmospheric Research v. National Science Foundation, No. 1:26-cv-01061 (D. Colo. June 1, 2026)

Hawaii Federal Court Approved $100 Million Settlement in Maui Wildfire Shareholder Derivative Action Against Electric Utility

The federal district court for the District of Hawaii approved a $100 million settlement to resolve a shareholder derivative action filed against officers and directors of Hawaiian Electric Industries, Inc. (HEI), the largest electricity supplier in Hawai‘i, in connection with the 2023 Maui wildfires, which killed more than 100 people and destroyed thousands of homes. The shareholder plaintiffs alleged that certain HEI directors and officers caused and exacerbated the fires because they “knew about the risk of severe weather events, knew that HEI’s equipment was inadequately maintained, and knew that the company’s safety protocols were insufficient” and “downplayed the risks, too, by making false statements that misled government agencies, HEI shareholders, and the public.” The plaintiffs estimated that the defendants’ wrongdoing would cost HEI more than $3.8 billion from settlements, litigation expenses, infrastructure investment, compensation to the individual defendants, and credit downgrade. The court found that the amount of the settlement—which was to be paid to HEI and its subsidiary Hawaiian Electric Company—was fair, reasonable, and adequate. The court also found that the plaintiffs’ requested fees and expenses—which included $25 million in attorney fees—were reasonable. In re Hawaiian Electric Industries, Inc. Stockholder Derivative Litigation, No. 1:24-cv-00164 (D. Haw. May 28, 2026)

D.C. Federal Court Ordered Department of Agriculture Defendants to Produce Documentation Regarding Grant Terminations

The federal district court for the District of Columbia ordered the U.S. Department of Agriculture and several component agencies and officials (together, USDA) to supplement the administrative record in a case challenging the termination of five grants awarded to four plaintiffs involved in agriculture and ecology-related projects. The plaintiffs alleged that their grants were terminated “without individualized review but rather based on vague allegations that the projects were not aligned with the President’s newly stated goals of eliminating funding for [diversity, equity, and inclusion (DEI)] and climate initiatives—without any effort to determine whether the projects could be brought into line.” The court directed USDA to produce records regarding any instruction received by USDA regarding the implementation of the Trump administration’s DEI and climate-related policies; documentation regarding how spreadsheets cataloguing grants were used to evaluate the grants for termination; termination letters for grants other than the plaintiffs’ grants; and all documents related to the termination of the plaintiffs’ own grants. The court also ordered USDA to produce a privilege log. The court denied the plaintiffs’ request for depositions but required the defendants to respond to certain interrogatories and requests for production. The court found that the plaintiffs were not entitled to an order for adverse inferences that the defendants “terminated DEI and climate-related grants based solely on the presence of DEI and climate-related search terms in grant documents” because the defendants’ alleged conduct did not at this point rise to bad faith. Urban Sustainability Directors Network v. U.S. Department of Agriculture, No. 1:25-cv-01775 (D.D.C. May 29, 2026)

D.C. Federal Court Declined to Stay Vacatur of Agency Actions Authorizing Wyoming Oil and Gas Project

The federal district court for the District of Columbia denied motions to stay pending appeal its February 2026 judgment vacating the environmental impact statement, record of decision, and related resource management plan amendment for the Converse County Oil and Gas Project in Wyoming’s Powder River Basin. The court had found that the U.S. Bureau of Land Management violated its obligation under the National Environmental Policy Act (NEPA) to “rigorously evaluate a reasonable range of alternatives” by eliminating a greenhouse gas reduction alternative and an alternative that reduced the pace of oil and gas development. In its decision denying a stay, the court rejected the argument that it failed to accord deference to the defendants’ NEPA analysis as required by the Supreme Court’s 2025 decision in Seven County Infrastructure Coalition v. Eagle County as well as an argument that its vacatur of the agency actions was improper. The court also found that the intervenors (private energy companies and the State of Wyoming) did not establish irreparable harm or demonstrate that the plaintiffs’ or the public interest weighed in favor of a stay. Motions to stay the district court’s order have also been filed in the D.C. Circuit. Powder River Basin Resource Council v. U.S. Department of the Interior, No. 1:22-cv-02696 (D.D.C. May 29, 2026)

Idaho Federal Court Denied Preliminary Injunction to Halt Mining Construction Activities

The federal district court for the District of Idaho denied environmental organizations’ motion for a preliminary injunction to prevent a mining company from commencing construction activities in a gold, silver, and antimony mining project on National Forest Systems lands in the Boise and Payette National Forests. Although the court found that the organizations showed a likelihood of success on the merits or serious questions regarding discrete defects in the U.S. Fish and Wildlife Service’s (FWS’s) Endangered Species Act analyses, the court concluded that the plaintiffs failed to make the required showing of imminent, irreparable harm. Regarding the organizations’ arguments that the FWS’s biological opinion failed to consider climate change effects to bull trout and wolverines, the court found that the plaintiffs were not likely to succeed on the merits of these challenges. The organizations appealed the denial of the preliminary injunction; the Ninth Circuit denied a request for an injunction pending appeal on June 17. Save the South Fork Salmon v. U.S. Forest Service, No. 1:25-cv-00086 (D. Idaho May 29, 2026)

D.C. Federal Court Declined to Vacate 2023 Gulf Oil and Gas Lease Sale and Related EIS

In a decision on the appropriate remedy for National Environmental Policy Act (NEPA) violations in connection with a March 2023 Gulf of Mexico oil and gas lease sale (Lease Sale 259), the federal district court for the District of Columbia held that the case was not moot but granted the federal defendants’ and intervenor-defendants’ requests for remand without vacatur. The court found in March 2025 that the Bureau of Ocean Energy Management’s (BOEM’s) NEPA review for the sale failed to take a hard look at impacts on greenhouse gas emissions and the Rice’s whale. In its decision on the remedy, the court rejected the defendants’ contention that the case was rendered moot by the completion of another environmental impact statement (EIS) in 2025 regarding oil and gas lease sales in the Gulf and the issuance of a new record of decision (ROD) in 2026 that covered Lease Sale. The court concluded that remand without vacatur was the appropriate remedy, however, because subsequent events such as the 2026 ROD “demonstrated a strong likelihood that BOEM can reach the same result after examining the latest information on greenhouse gas emissions and the Rice’s whale’s habitat.” The court also found that even partial vacatur would have disruptive consequences. Healthy Gulf v. Burgum, No. 1:23-cv-00604 (D.D.C. May 21, 2026)

Minnesota Court of Appeals Reversed and Remanded Determination that Proposed Data Center Development Could Proceed Without Environmental Impact Statement

The Minnesota Court of Appeals reversed and remanded a decision by the City of Faribault to allow Archer Datacenters to construct a new facility without preparation of an environmental impact statement (EIS). The Minnesota Center for Environmental Advocacy (MCEA) argued that the City violated the Minnesota Environmental Policy Act (MEPA) in its review of Archer’s environmental assessment worksheet (EAW), which the City uses to evaluate whether a more exhaustive EIS is necessary. The court determined that MCEA had organizational standing to challenge the City’s decision as well as standing on behalf of its members. In examining the City’s decision not to require an EIS for the project, the court determined that the City did not provide sufficient evidence or reasonable explanation for their analyses of the project’s impact on air quality and noise pollution, its estimated greenhouse gas emissions, or its cumulative potential effects. Regarding greenhouse gas emissions, the court found that the City failed to explain why the project’s estimated emissions in the revised EAW decreased by 98% from the estimate in the draft EAW. The court also rejected the defendants’ argument that when evidence is lacking at the EAW stage, later permitting and regulatory processes could adequately safeguard environmental interests without requiring an EIS prior to approval. The court stated that, since information was unavailable or uncertain, the City could not approve the project and should have either required an EIS that provided the missing information or extended the period for decision by up to 30 days or for another agreed-upon window in order to obtain the information. Approving the Findings of Fact and Record of Decision for Archer Datacenters Environmental Assessment Worksheet (EAW) and Negative Declaration Concerning the Need for an Environmental Impact Statement (EIS), No. A25-1617 (Minn. Ct. App. June 8, 2026)

New York Appellate Court Ruled that Public Service Commission’s Approval of Transfer of Power Plant Ownership to Cryptocurrency Company Should Have Included Review Under State Climate Law 

The New York Appellate Division affirmed a New York trial court’s ruling that the New York State Public Service Commission’s (PSC’s) approval of the transfer of a membership interest in the owner of an upstate gas power plant to a cryptocurrency company was subject to a Climate Leadership and Community Protection Act (CLCPA) requirement to consider whether certain agency actions “are inconsistent with or will interfere with the attainment of the statewide greenhouse gas emissions limits” established by the CLCPA. The appellate court rejected the PSC’s contention that the action it took was a “declaratory ruling that did not amount to an administrative approval” because the action “was simply a determination that no further review—i.e., approval—was necessary.” The appellate court found that “[t]he declaratory ruling had the effect of approval inasmuch as it determined that the acquisition was subject to this lower standard of review and no further review was necessary.” The appellate court also rejected the PSC’s argument that because the New York State Department of Environmental Conservation regulated the power plant, PSC review under the CLCPA was not necessary. In addition, the appellate court found that the PSC’s “pro forma statement” that its declaratory ruling would not interfere with CLCPA greenhouse gas emissions limits did not satisfy the PSC’s obligations under the CLCPA. Clean Air Coalition of Western New York, Inc. v. New York State Public Service Commission, No. CV-24-2101 (N.Y. App. Div. May 28, 2026)

New York Federal Court Dismissed Claim that New York City Defendants Fraudulently Induced Developer to Commit to Flood Protection System

The federal district court for the Southern District of New York dismissed a developer’s fraudulent inducement claim against New York City Health and Hospitals Corporation and New York City Economic Development Corporation (together, the City) for allegedly falsely representing the finality of design criteria for a flood protection system in connection with a planned building on the East Side of Manhattan. The developer alleged that it relied on statements and omissions by the City in letters, draft contractual provisions, and oral statements that misrepresented that the design criteria in an October 2020 report were final. The court first found that one of the defendants’ alleged misstatements and all but one of the alleged omissions were not pled with sufficient particularity as required under Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 9(b). In its review of the remaining alleged misstatements and omission, the court concluded that the allegations did not establish that the City represented that the October 2020 report was “final and exclusive” and that any such belief the developer might have formed “was clearly contradicted by other statements made by the City.” The court further found that the developer’s reliance on the alleged misrepresentations was unreasonable as a matter of law. In addition to finding that the developer did not establish the elements of fraudulent inducement, the court also found that the developer did not demonstrate a fraudulent misrepresentation that was “collateral or extraneous” to the contract as required by the Second Circuit’s decision in Bridgestone/Firestone v. Recovery Credit Services. The court also dismissed the developer’s claim that the City breached the implied covenant of good faith and fair dealing by demanding the developer abide by new design criteria for the flood protection system. The court denied leave to amend. A declaratory judgment claim remained pending. ARE-East River Science Park, LLC v. New York City Health & Hospitals Corp., No. 24 Civ. 5956 (S.D.N.Y. Mar. 27, 2026)

New York Appellate Court Said Brooklyn Property Owner Who Challenged Approvals for Waterfront Development—Including for Failure to Address Climate Resilience—Lacked Standing

The New York Appellate Division affirmed the dismissal for lack of standing of a property owner’s lawsuit challenging the New York City Planning Commission and New York City Council’s approval of Zoning Map and Zoning Resolution amendments and special use permits for development of a waterfront property in the Williamsburg neighborhood of Brooklyn. The appellate court found that the petitioner’s property was “too far a distance”—0.4 miles—from the project site to allow a presumption of injury-in-fact and that the property owner offered nothing more than “merely conclusory and speculative allegations” that it would suffer a cognizable injury different in kind or degree from that of the public at large. The property owner had alleged that it was likely to be affected by the development’s environmental impacts, including impacts on “flooding or overflow during storms.” The owner argued “that by building the Project partly in and adjoining the East River, Respondents are endangering extensive adjoining areas—much further than 2,000 feet—with flooding due to storms and sea level rise.” The property owner’s claims included that the City failed to take a hard look at the project’s impacts as required by the State Environmental Quality Review Act, including climate resiliency issues such as sea level rise. The owner had alleged that “[i]n the absence of a hard look under applicable regulations incorporating climate change, sea level rise and the increasing frequency of 100-year storms into the New York City Code, the Project should not be permitted to proceed.” 292 Bedford, LLC v. City of New York, Nos. 2023-04247, 2023-05122 (N.Y. App. Div. May 13, 2026)

New York Court Largely Rejected Challenge to Renewal and Modification of Landfill Permit

In a lawsuit brought by Rensselaer Environmental Coalition and the City of Rensselaer to challenge the New York State Department of Environmental Conservation’s (NYSDEC’s) renewal and modification of a permit for the Dunn Landfill in Rensselaer County, a New York Supreme Court dismissed claims under the Climate Leadership and Community Protection Act (CLCPA) and the New York Constitution’s Green Amendment, as well as most claims under the State Environmental Quality Review Act (SEQRA). The court also held that the City did not have capacity to challenge NYSDEC’s determinations but could proceed with claims against the operator of the landfill for property damage. Under the CLCPA, the court found that NYSDEC had considered the operator’s submissions and public comments concerning greenhouse gas emissions and other air pollutants before issuing the permit with limitations designed to reduce greenhouse gas emissions. The court noted that NYSDEC was entitled to deference on these technical assessments. Under SEQRA, the court rejected the argument that SEQRA claims were untimely and found that DEC took the required hard look at potential impacts, including greenhouse gas emissions, release of hazardous air pollutants, and truck traffic, and included limitations in the permit to mitigate impacts. Citing appellate court precedent, the Supreme Court further declined to apply the Green Amendment to impose standards “above and beyond” those in place under SEQRA. The court, however, denied motions to dismiss a SEQRA segmentation claim, finding that NYSDEC’s characterization of a berm as an “independent structure” was “not reasonable as stated,” given that the berm was meant to mitigate the landfill’s environmental effects. The court dismissed claims under NYSDEC Commissioner Policies regarding the incorporation of environmental justice concerns into SEQRA reviews and the permit review process and regarding NYSDEC’s incorporation of climate change considerations into its activities. The court also found that the petitioners did not meet their burden of establishing that the issues they raised were “substantive” and “significant” requiring an adjudicatory hearing. Rensselaer Environmental Coalition v. New York State Department of Environmental Conservation, No. EF2025-279567 (N.Y. Sup. Ct. May 15, 2026)

U.S. NEW CASES AND FILINGS

Lawsuit Filed to Challenge Amendments to 2024 Clean Air Act Regulations for Oil and Natural Gas Sources

Environmental Defense Fund filed a petition for review in the D.C. Circuit Court of Appeals challenging EPA’s April 2026 final rule amending the New Source Performance Standards and Emission Guidelines for Existing Sources for the Crude Oil and Natural Gas Source Category in response to petitions for reconsideration of a March 2024 final rule. EPA described the April 2026 amendments as making “discrete technical changes to the temporary flaring provisions for associated gas in certain situations” and finalizing “discrete technical changes to the vent gas net heating value (NHV) continuous monitoring requirements and alternative performance test (sampling demonstration) option for flares and enclosed combustion device(s).” Environmental Defense Fund v. Zeldin, No. 26-1152 (D.C. Cir., filed June 8, 2026)

Center for Biological Diversity Sought to Compel Final Rule on Listing Sunflower Sea Star as Threatened Species

Center for Biological Diversity (CBD) filed a lawsuit in the federal district court for the Northern District of California seeking to compel the National Marine Fisheries Service (NMFS) to issue a final listing determination on the proposed rule to list the sunflower sea star as a threatened species under the Endangered Species Act. NMFS published the proposed rule in March 2023, and CBD alleged that NMFS violated the ESA by failing to finalize the proposed rule within 12 months. CBD alleged that the species, which lives along the Pacific Coast, had experienced mass mortalities and a 90% decline in its population since 2013 due to a wasting disease that spreads in warm waters. The complaint alleged that scientific studies had demonstrated a link between climate change and the wasting disease and also that sunflower sea stars are at risk from ocean acidification. Center for Biological Diversity v. National Marine Fisheries Service, No. 3:26-cv-06157 (N.D. Cal., filed June 22, 2026)

California Challenged EPA Reclassifications of Clean Air Act Preemption Waivers as “Rules” Subject to Congressional Review Act

California filed suit in the federal district court for the District of Columbia asserting that EPA could not lawfully reclassify four Clean Air Act preemption waivers for California emissions standards for vehicles and small equipment from “orders” to “rules” in order to make the waivers subject to disapproval under the Congressional Review Act (CRA). The waivers at issue in this case were granted in 2009, 2013, 2022, and 2024 and authorized enforcement of California’s first greenhouse gas emissions standards for new motor vehicles, California’s Advanced Clean Cars I regulation, and regulations requiring manufacturers to transition to zero-emission small equipment such as leaf blowers and lawnmowers. EPA announced on June 12, 2026 that it had determined that each of the four waivers was now a rule and that EPA was therefore obligated to submit the waivers to Congress for review under the CRA. California asserted that the reclassifications violated the Administrative Procedure Act because they were arbitrary and capricious, undertaken with no public process, outside EPA’s authority, and not in accordance with law. In addition, California asserted a separate claim that EPA’s actions were ultra vires. California asked the court for declaratory relief as well as preliminary and permanent injunctive relief. California v. EPA, No. 1:26-cv-02185 (D.D.C., filed June 22, 2026)

Nebraska Nonprofit Filed Breach of Contract Action for Termination of Solar for All Grant

Center for Rural Affairs, a Nebraska nonprofit corporation that received a $62 million grant under the Inflation Reduction Act’s Solar for All program, filed a breach of contract action in the Court of Federal Claims arising from EPA’s termination of the grant agreement. The Center asserted that EPA’s unilateral termination of the grant agreement based on the One Big Beautiful Bill Act’s repeal of the Solar for All program breached the express terms of the grant agreement. The Center also asserted that EPA breached the implied duty of good faith and fair dealing. The Center sought monetary damages, including the full value of the award, as well as direct, expectation, and consequential damages; pre- and post-judgment interest, and attorney fees. Other pending breach of contract cases in the Court of Federal Claims concerning EPA’s termination of IRA grants include Native CDFI Network Inc.’s and Appalachian Community Capital Corporation’s suits regarding the terminations of their $400 million and $500 million grants under the Greenhouse Gas Reduction Fund’s Clean Communities Investment Accelerator program. Center for Rural Affairs v. United States, No. 1:26-cv-00894 (Fed. Cl., filed June 18, 2026); Native CDFI Network, Inc. v. United States, No. 1:26-cv-00646 (Fed. Cl., filed May 4, 2026); Appalachian Community Capital Corp. v. United States, No. 1:26-cv-00562 (Fed. Cl., filed Apr. 16, 2026) 

Environmental Groups Challenged Approval of Second Gulf of Mexico Oil and Gas Lease Sale Under 2025 Reconciliation Act

Five environmental organizations filed a lawsuit in the federal district court for the District of Columbia challenging federal defendants’ finalization of the Gulf of America Outer Continental Shelf Oil and Gas One Big Beautiful Bill Act (OBBBA) Lease Sale 2 (BBG2) in March 2026. The organizations contended that the OBBBA (also referred to as the 2025 Reconciliation Act of 2025), which provided that the Interior Secretary “shall conduct” 30 oil and gas lease sales in this region of the Gulf, did not exempt the Bureau of Ocean Energy Management from its legal obligations under NEPA. The organizations alleged that by failing to prepare an environmental impact statement, the defendants violated NEPA and failed “to properly consider or mitigate the extensive harms from this action to the Gulf ecosystem and surrounding communities.” The complaint alleged that “[t]he oil and natural gas production resulting from BBG2 over the next fifty years will lock in decades of greenhouse gas pollution that will exacerbate the climate crisis worldwide and increase harms to these communities.” The complaint described “effects of climate warming [that] are already being acutely felt by vulnerable Gulf communities,” including increasingly severe storms, flooding, sea level rise, and coastal erosion. The organizations also alleged that the defendants failed to satisfy Outer Continental Shelf Lands Act obligations to consider relevant environmental information and to assess the impacts of delayed decommissioning of oil and gas infrastructure. In addition, the organizations asserted a violation of the Endangered Species Act, alleging that the defendant failed to ensure that the project was not likely to jeopardize the continued existence of the Rice’s whale. The organizations also alleged that a former industry lobbyist’s failure to recuse himself from the review and approval of the project demonstrated that the approval of the project was arbitrary and capricious in violation of the Administrative Procedure Act. Healthy Gulf v. Burgum, No. 1:26-cv-02150 (D.D.C., filed June 17, 2026)

New York, New Jersey, and Five New England States Sued to Challenge Federal Government’s Cancellation of Offshore Wind Lease via Settlement Agreement

New York, New Jersey, Connecticut, Maine, Massachusetts, Rhode Island, and Vermont filed a complaint in the federal district court for the District of Columbia challenging the cancellation of Attentive Energy’s offshore wind lease and its settlement agreement with the U.S. Department of Interior. The complaint named the U.S. Department of the Interior, Secretary of the Interior Douglas J. Burgum, the Bureau of Ocean Energy Management (BOEM), Acting Director of BOEM Matthew Giacona, the U.S. Department of Justice, Acting Attorney General Todd Blanche, and Attentive Energy LLC (Attentive) as defendants. On March 23, 2026, the Department of the Interior announced that it had entered into an agreement with TotalEnergies, the parent company of Attentive, in which it would cancel TotalEnergies’s existing offshore wind leases, including the Attentive lease, and reimburse TotalEnergies for the amount it had paid for its leases. In exchange, TotalEnergies agreed to reinvest those funds in constructing a new liquefied natural gas plant and developing conventional oil and shale gas projects and pledged not to develop new offshore wind projects in the U.S. The settlement agreement stated that the Department of War had “raised classified national security concerns” that would have prevented construction of the project. The states challenged the lease cancellation as arbitrary and capricious and unlawful under the Administrative Procedure Act, the National Environmental Policy Act, and the Outer Continental Shelf Lands Act (OCSLA). Additionally, they claimed that the settlement agreement violated OCSLA and the Judgment Fund Act, and was in excess of statutory authority and ultra vires. The states requested declaratory relief and injunctions against the implementation of the lease cancellation and settlement agreement in addition to requesting that the court vacate them. New York v. U.S. Department of the Interior, No. 1:26-cv-01910 (D.D.C., filed June 2, 2026)

Organizations Challenged North Carolina Utilities Commission Order Halting Duke Energy Solar and Storage Procurement Process

Four nonprofit organizations filed a lawsuit in North Carolina Superior Court challenging the North Carolina Utilities Commission’s order directing Duke Energy defendants to stop activity in their annual procurement process for solar and storage resources until the Commission issues a final order in its current long-term integrated resources plan proceeding. The organizations alleged that Duke Energy had reduced its proposed solar and energy targets for 2026 to “far less” that what was required under the Commission’s 2024 final order governing long-term resource planning (the 2024 Carbon Plan Order). The complaint alleged that in the Commission’s order deferring Duke Energy’s solar and storage procurement, the Commission discussed Duke Energy’s rationale for the proposed lower targets, including the sunset of federal tax credits, increased costs for solar, and the elimination of North Carolina’s 2030 carbon-reduction deadline. The Commission’s deferral order stated that modification of an existing procurement target should be based on a Commission-approved Carbon Plan, which was not due until December 31, 2026. The plaintiff organizations asserted by the Commission’s order violated their right to due process under the North Carolina Constitution. They also asserted a violation of their right to access the courts. Southern Alliance for Clean Energy v. North Carolina Utilities Commission, No. 26CV022857-910 (N.C. Super. Ct., filed June 17, 2026)

NEW CASES OUTSIDE THE UNITED STATES

Germany: Environmental organization sues Berlin for failure to meet energy and climate obligations

On Dec. 9, 2025, environmental organization Deutsche Umwelthilfe (DUH; Environmental Action Germany) filed a lawsuit against the State of Berlin before the Higher Administrative Court of Berlin-Brandenburg. The case concerns the Berlin Senate’s alleged failure to meet its statutory obligation to update the Berliner Energie-und Klimaschutzprogramm (BEK, or Berlin Climate Protection and Energy Transition Act), Berlin’s central climate action program, by 2024. As of the date of filing, the Senate had not presented even a draft of the updated program and had reduced funding for climate protection measures. According to monitoring data from the Berlin Climate Protection Council, Berlin’s GHG emissions declined by approximately 200,000 metric tons per year between 2020 and 2023. DUH submits that this pace of reduction would need to more than triple to meet the legally established target of a 70% reduction in GHG emissions by 2030. DUH requests the court to order the Senate to adopt a legally compliant updated BEK. Environmental Action Germany (DUH) v. Land Berlin (Germany, Higher Administrative Court Berlin-Brandenburg)

United Kingdom: OECD complaint filed by faith groups over due diligence for financial institutions

On June 8, 2026, various faith-based groups, including the Methodist Churches in Great Britain, Colombia and Ireland, the Ecumenical Center for Communication in Latin America, and Epworth Investment, submitted a complaint to the UK National Contact Point (NCP) against HSBC Holdings plc. The complaint pertains to HSBC’s provision of financial services to Glencore, the company operating the Cerrejón coal mine in La Guajira, Colombia. 

The complainants ask the UK NCP to examine whether this financial relationship is consistent with the OECD (Organization for Economic Co-operation and Development) Guidelines regarding responsible business conduct and due diligence. The complainants argue that HSBC, and financial institutions more generally, are responsible for ensuring that financing and investment practices are aligned with human rights, environmental standards, and their own climate commitments. OECD complaint by faith groups against HSBC (OECD, United Kingdom National Contact Point)

Brazil: NGO sues municipality and landowners over fire, alleging climate damage from destruction of carbon sinks and absence of municipal fire prevention policy

In February 2026, the Aimara Institute for Environmental Defense and Education and the Association of Friends of Citizenship and the Environment of Piracicaba - AMAPIRA filed a Public Civil Action against the Municipality of Piracicaba (SP), the Piracicaba Educational Institute of the Methodist Church (IEP), and Zayo Administradora de Bens SA due to a fire on the former campus of the Methodist University of Piracicaba (UNIMEP) in May 2025, that destroyed approximately  16 hectares of vegetation. 

The plaintiffs allege direct damage to health, fauna, and flora from the removal of hundreds of trees and native vegetation. They argue that the destruction of carbon sinks and resulting increase in greenhouse gas (GHG) emissions constitute climate damage and a violation of Brazil’s climate obligations. They highlight a pattern of urban fires in  Piracicaba amid a total absence of fire prevention and rehabilitation policies. 

The plaintiffs contend that both private landowners and public authorities are liable through their duty to supervise. They allege that the land affected by the fire was recently purchased at a judicial auction, for commercial activity, and that environmental licensing of new buildings cannot proceed before the restoration of the existing environment, under penalty of violating the prevention, precaution, and the polluter pays principles. The municipality’s failure to adopt a Municipal Climate Change Policy is also cited.

The plaintiffs seek (i) urgent relief prohibiting any environmental licensing procedure without remediation of the environmental and climate damage; (ii) judicial recognition of the environmental and climate damage and the objective liability of the defendant; (iii) compensation for moral and material damages; and (iv) obligations to prepare and execute a Degraded Area Recovery Plan, which must include reforestation, additional compensation for the generated climate liability, including continuous monitoring and maintenance, preventive measures, and the creation of a conservation unit. They further request that the municipality develop a GHG Inventory, a Municipal Plan to Combat Fires and Wildfires, and a Municipal Policy to address climate change.

In February 2026, the court denied the request for urgent relief, citing the complexity of the case.

In its defense, the Municipality argued that responsibility for the site’s conservation rests solely with IEP and Zayo, and that its own liability is at most subsidiary under STJ Precedent 652. It contended that no duty to inspect existed in the absence of requests for licensing or evidence of potentially polluting activity, and denied any causal link between municipal omissions and the environmental damage. Finally, it requested the dismissal of the case without prejudice and its total dismissal in relation to the municipality.

Zayo argued it did not possess or manage the property at the time of the fire and that the imposition of a municipal park on private land is legally impermissible. It requested its full dismissal from the action and a dismissal of compensation claims. IEP similarly contended that it had already transferred possession of the property through a judicial auction completed on May 5, 2025 (twenty days before the fire) and therefore held no supervisory authority. IEP also challenged the methodology used to calculate carbon emissions, arguing that incompatible parameters were applied to the vegetation in question. It requested exclusion from the suit and a declaration that the claim was unfounded. Instituto Aimara and AMAPIRA vs. Piracicaba Municipality, Piracicaba Educational Institute of the Methodist Church (IEP) and Zayo Administradora de Bens S.A. (Brazil, São Paulo State Court)

Brazil: NGO requests an injunction against the inclusion of coal plants in Brazil’s capacity reserve auction 

In March, 2026, the Arayara International Institute of Education and Culture filed a Public Civil Action (ACP) with a request for a preliminary injunction against the Federal Government, the Ministry of Mines and Energy (MME), the Energy Research Company (EPE), and the National Electric Energy Agency (ANEEL) due to the inclusion of coal-fired thermoelectric plants in the 2026 Capacity Reserve Auction in the Form of Power (LRCAP 2026). It argued that the aforementioned auction, conducted by the MME, presents flaws in its justification and deviation from its purpose by allowing the participation of coal-fired plants in a mechanism intended for contracting flexible power to meet peak demand in the National Interconnected System. It also argued that these plants lack the technical capacity for rapid response due to their low operational flexibility, long start-up times and need for continuous operation, which disqualifies them as a suitable source for capacity reserve. 

The complaint alleged that the auction model unduly favors these power plants, guaranteeing longer operating times and revenue predictability, which generates competitive distortions, risks of tariff increases, and potential future litigation. It also highlighted that this structure encourages the maintenance of highly emitting sources, increasing greenhouse gas emissions and exacerbating the impacts of climate change. Finally, it argued that the inclusion of coal contradicts climate commitments made by Brazil, the National Energy Transition Policy, and the constitutional principles of environmental protection, constituting environmental regression and incompatibility with the transition to a low-carbon energy matrix. 

The complaint seeks a preliminary injunction to suspend the administrative act by the Ministry of Mines and Energy (MME) that included the possibility of participation by coal-fired thermal power plants in the LRCAP 2026 (Brazilian National Auction for the Reduction of Coal-Fired Power Plants). Additionally, it requests the subsequent exclusion of proposals by similar projects, as well as the prohibition of any acts that would continue the auction with regard to such plants. On the merits, the plaintiff requests that the action be granted to declare the nullity of the administrative acts that authorized the inclusion of the coal-fired thermal power plants in the LRCAP 2026, with their definitive exclusion from the bidding process, as well as the permanent prohibition of any acts continuing the auction in relation to these projects. Instituto Internacional Arayara de Educação e Cultura vs. Federal Union, Ministry of Mines and Energy, and Others (Brazil, Federal District Federal Court)

Brazil: Public Prosecutor’s Office sues São Paulo State over climate-driven coastal erosion threatening traditional communities in Ilha do Cardoso State Park

In January 2026, the Public Prosecutor’s Office of the State of São Paulo (MPSP) filed a Public Civil Action (ACP) against the State of São Paulo and the Forestry Foundation (Foundation for the Conservation and Production of Forests of the State of São Paulo) over accelerating erosion threatening the ecological integrity of the Ilha do Cardoso State Park (PEIC) and the safety of its traditional communities. 

Located in Cananéia, São Paulo, the island is home to approximately 400 inhabitants across nine traditional fishing communities and two indigenous villages. The Park is part of the Iguape-Cananéia-Paranaguá Estuarine-Lagoon Complex, a stretch of exceptional coastal biodiversity. According to a Technical Report from the Center for Operational Support to Environmental Public Prosecutors (CAEX), the intensification of extreme weather events and rising sea levels—both related to climate change—exacerbate the erosion across PEIC, causing soil erosion and degrading restinga vegetation that naturally protects the coast. This situation is most critical in the Pereirinha and Melão areas, threatening the stability of buildings. In the Ararapira Canal area, a 2018 erosion split the island in two and forced the autonomous relocation of two Caiçara communities. 

The Traditional Communities of Ilha do Cardoso developed a Community Plan for the Management of Erosion and Climate Change in 2023, proposing containment structures, technical studies, and community relocation strategies. After meetings with public bodies held in 2025, it was found that the necessary measures should be preceded by adequate technical studies and proper environmental licensing. Although the State is carrying out studies, the Public Prosecutor’s Office emphasizes the advancement of the erosion process and the urgency for taking preventive measures against the ongoing damage. According to a technical note from the Forestry Foundation, there are no clear deadlines for the completion or implementation of concrete measures to adopt measures to contain erosion processes or identify areas for relocating communities, which would constitute a state omission that jeopardizes the physical integrity of the communities and the environmental preservation of the Conservation Unit. Therefore, it requests(i) completion of technical studies and environmental licensing to contain erosion in the Melão and Pereirinha areas; (ii) implementation of containment measures once studies confirm environmental viability; and (iii) authorization for the relocation of traditional communities to safe areas in accordance with the Atlantic Forest Law and the Park Management Plan.

In February 2026, the court granted the urgent injunction, finding that the extent of the damage and the urgency of addressing it had been proven. It was decided that the Forestry Foundation and SP Águas’ technical studies to mitigate the erosion process alone would be insufficient to protect vulnerable families and communities. It pointed out that the predicted increase in extreme weather events and the erosion on the island exacerbate the risks to the environment, the ecosystem, and the lives of families and communities living in the PEIC. The Forestry Foundation and the State of São Paulo were ordered to: (i) obtain the necessary environmental licenses for the adoption of the suggested measures and complete environmental and technical impact studies within 45 days; (ii) implement effective measures to mitigate and/or eliminate imminent environmental damage; and (iii) grant authorizations to relocate traditional communities to safe areas identified in the studies carried out by the defendants, observing the requirements of the Atlantic Forest Law and the Management Plan of the conservation unit.

In an amendment to the complaint, the Public Prosecutor’s Office submitted CAEX Technical Report No. 16395934, which identified a serious risk of collapse of the  Melão dam as early as 2026 due to increased frequency and intensity of extreme weather events that exacerbated erosion. The Report recommends developing an emergency response plan for a potential collapse, pursuing minimal-impact relocation approaches, and refraining from heavy engineering interventions in still-preserved coastal areas. In March 2026, the court accepted the amendment and ordered the immediate incorporation of the Technical Opinion issued by CAEX in the monitoring and execution of the measures already underway. São Paulo Public Prosecutor’s Office vs. São Paulo State and Fundação Florestal (Brazil, São Paulo State Court)

Brazil: Public prosecutor sues municipality for failing to implement climate impact requirements in environmental licensing, citing administrative omission

In April 2026, the Public Prosecutor’s Office of the State of Rio de Janeiro (MPRJ) filed a Public Civil Action (ACP), with a request for urgent relief against the Municipality of Rio de Janeiro to regulate the assessment of climate impacts and require climate diagnostic studies in environmental licensing processes, and to demand mitigation and compensation measures in projects that cause significant greenhouse gas (GHG) emissions in the city. The plaintiff argued that recurring extreme weather events make climate change central to the state’s duties of environmental protection and that the Municipality of Rio de Janeiro, in Article 25 of Municipal Law 5.248/2011—which establishes the Municipal Policy on Climate Change and Sustainable Development—stipulates that environmental licenses for projects with significant GHG emissions must present an emissions mitigation plan and compensation measures. It is argued that despite this provision, the application of this rule is nonexistent, constituting an administrative omission, which hinders the proper assessment of impacts and the effectiveness of the municipal climate policy. 

The complaint alleges that, in September 2024, the Public Prosecutor’s Office of Rio de Janeiro (MPRJ) issued Recommendation No. 02/2024 to the city’s mayor, requesting, among other measures, the enactment of a regulatory act implementing Article 25 of Municipal Law 5.248/2011 within 90 days. In March 2025, a Technical Opinion from the Municipal Attorney General’s Office concluded that the aforementioned article should be regulated by law and not by decree. It is argued that this opinion suggested the creation of a Working Group to discuss the issue, with the consequent formulation of a legislative proposal to be submitted to the City Council; however, up to the date of writing the initial petition, the MPRJ was unaware of the creation of the group. 

The city of Rio de Janeiro ranks 8th among the largest greenhouse gas (GHG) emitting municipalities in Brazil, with significant emissions from the waste, energy, and industrial sectors, all of which are subject to environmental licensing. Between 2023 and 2025, there were significant local impacts of climate change from events such as intense rainfall, flash floods, and inundations, demonstrating that climate stability is inseparable from the protection of life and the well-being of the population. Through Municipal Law 7.315/2022, the city of Rio de Janeiro itself recognized the state of global climate emergency as a factor threatening humanity. The complaint also invokes Advisory Opinion 32/2025 of the Inter-American Court of Human Rights, which recognized global warming as a violation of human rights, and argues that a stable climate constitutes a fundamental human right under international jurisprudence.

The plaintiffs request that Article 25 be regulated as an urgent measure within 120 days, making the granting and renewal of environmental licenses for projects with significant GHG emissions contingent on the presentation of an emissions mitigation plan and compensation measures preceded by climate studies covering impact identification and measurement, analysis of locational and technological alternatives, and mitigation measures across the licensing process. Should the 120-day period pass without regulation, the complainant requests that the municipality require these plans directly. Confirmation of these measures is requested on the merits, making them definitive. Rio de Janeiro Public Prosecutor’s Office vs. Rio de Janeiro Municipality (Brazil, Rio de Janeiro State Court)

Brazil: Federal prosecutors secure R$15 million judgment against Volkswagen for NOx emissions fraud, appeal for full R$30 million award citing climate emergency 

In August 2020, the Federal Public Prosecutor’s Office (MPF) filed a Public Civil Action against Volkswagen do Brasil Indústria de Veículos Automotores Ltda. over the installation of software that defrauds emissions tests in diesel vehicles, concealing real nitrogen oxides (NOx) emissions in “Amarok” vehicles sold in Brazil. The plaintiff alleged that 17,057 Amarok vehicles from the 2011 fleet and part of the 2012 fleet were equipped with the device, as part of the “dieselgate” scandal affecting more than 11 million vehicles globally. According to Civil Inquiry 1.34.001.007121/2015-23, a technical report prepared by CETESB (Environmental Company of the State of São Paulo), and the defendant’s confession to IBAMA, the software manipulated NOx readings during tests to comply with phase L4 of PROCONVE (Program for the Control of Air Pollution by Motor Vehicles) to obtain licenses for the fleets in question. It is estimated that the fraud generated a production of pollutants approximately 31% above what is permitted by law, releasing 2,737.2 tons of NOx between 2011 and 2016. A recall in 2017 reached less than 30% of the affected vehicles, and was never certified by IBAMA, leaving a large portion of them still in circulation. The MPF thus sought R$ 30,000,000.00 in collective moral and environmental damages payable to the Fund for the Defense of Diffuse Rights.

In its defense, Volkswagen denied fraudulent practices, arguing that its vehicles comply with Brazilian emissions limits, that the applicable standard in Brazil (1,000 mg/km) was far less stringent than in the US (70 mg/mile), and that the CETESB report contained “severe methodological flaws and inconsistent conclusions.”  The defendant submitted a counter report by the Mauá Institute, concluding that the software could not alter NOx readings and that Amarok vehicles always met national emissions limits. The defendant argued that the amount requested by the Public Prosecutor’s Office was arbitrary and excessive and requested the recognition of partial lis pendens, with a proportional reduction in the value of the case and, on the merits, the total dismissal of the plaintiff’s claims.

In April 2026, the court issued a judgment condemning Volkswagen to pay R$ 15 million in collective environmental and moral damages.  The court considered a judicial expert report that affirmed the defendant’s acknowledgment of the presence of the fraudulent device to IBAMA. However, it found that only the 90kW models (approximately 26% of the fleet, approximately 4,448 vehicles) exceeded the maximum limit, while the 120kW models did not. The court considered the narrowed scope of the damage, the partial recall, and the prior IBAMA fine as mitigating factors in favor of the defendant, thus justifying a reduction in the initially requested compensation amount.

The MPF appealed, seeking the full R$ 30 million. On appeal, the climate dimension of the case is most directly mobilized: the MPF argued that the damage stems from the licensing fraud itself, rendering all sales and emissions illegal from the outset, regardless of subsequent emissions qualification, so the sentence should not be limited to the 90kW vehicles. It rejected the use of  IBAMA’s administrative fine as a mitigating factor, citing the independence of the spheres of responsibility for environmental damage, and criticized the application of criminal-law mitigation concepts to collective environmental civil liability. In the context of a declared climate emergency, given NOx’s associations with respiratory damage, acid rain, and photochemical pollution, the MPF argued that R$ 15 million would be insufficient to fulfill the compensatory, deterrent, and punitive functions of civil liability against a multinational company the size of Volkswagen. Federal Public Prosecutor’s Office vs. Volkswagen do Brasil Indústria Ltda (Brazil, São Paulo Federal Court)

Brazil: Federal prosecutors seek an injunction for paper mill until free, prior, and informed consultation with affected communities

In May 2026, the Federal Public Prosecutor’s Office (MPF) filed a Public Civil Action (ACP) with a request for provisional relief against the Federal Government (Ministry of Fisheries and Aquaculture), the National Foundation for Indigenous Peoples (FUNAI), the National Institute for Colonization and Agrarian Reform (INCRA), the Henrique Roessler State Environmental Protection Foundation (FEPAM), and CMPC Celulose Riograndense Ltda., due to alleged irregularities in the environmental licensing process of the project called “Projeto Natureza.” The project aims to implement a pulp and paper industrial complex and associated logistics structures in the municipality of Barra do Ribeiro/RS. The action seeks the suspension of the environmental licensing until the Prior, Free and Informed Consultation (CPLI) of the affected communities is carried out, the environmental studies are completed, and any administrative acts issued in violation of Convention 169 of the International Labour Organization (ILO) and other environmental legislation are halted. 

The Federal Public Prosecutor’s Office (MPF) argues that the Environmental Impact Assessment and Report (EIA-RIMA) presented by CMPC contains omissions and methodological inconsistencies that prevent the adequate identification and measurement of the socio-environmental, territorial, and climatic impacts of the project on the Mbya Guarani and Kaingang indigenous peoples, quilombola communities, artisanal fishermen, and other traditional peoples and communities of the Guaíba Lake, Lagoa dos Patos, and Pampa Biome hydrographic basin. The plaintiff argues that disregarding the cumulative effects on the Pampa biome, water resources, and traditional territories compromises ecosystems relevant to regional climate balance, in addition to making invisible the disproportionate impacts borne by traditional peoples and communities. It emphasizes that these communities have special protection under the Federal Constitution and the mandates of Advisory Opinion 32/2025 (PC-32/2025) of the Inter-American Court of Human Rights (IACHR). It also raises arguments related to environmental and climate justice, arguing that Indigenous peoples, quilombola communities, and artisanal fishermen will bear the brunt of the environmental and territorial burdens of the project, without adequate participation in decision-making processes and without full access to the environmental information necessary for the exercise of self-determination. In summary, the preliminary injunction requests that environmental licensing be suspended until prior, free, and informed consultations are held; FEPAM refrain from issuing licenses without the conclusion of the consultations; CMPC cover the costs of consultation activities and independent technical assistance; that the conclusions of the consultations be linked to the institutional position of the competent public bodies; and the preparation of specific work plans and terms of reference for the Indigenous, quilombola, and traditional peoples and communities components. 

On the merits, the request seeks confirmation of the preliminary injunctions; a declaration of nullity of any licenses issued without prior consultation; the cessation of the material activities of the Nature Project and the establishment of safeguards listed in the initial petition in relation to areas already cultivated or that will be used by the enterprise. It is requested that the Protocol for Judgment with a Racial Perspective of the National Council of Justice (CNJ) be observed in the analysis of the claim. Federal Public Prosecutor’s Office vs. Federal Union and Others (Brazil, Rio Grande do Sul Federal Court)

Brazil: Attorney General seeks declaration of unconstitutionality over law allowing exemptions to building regulations in exchange for financial compensation

In May 2026, the Attorney General of the State of Rio de Janeiro filed a Representation of Unconstitutionality (RI) before the Court of Justice, intending to declare the unconstitutionality of Municipal Complementary Law 281/2025—subsequently amended by Complementary Law 291/2025—from the Municipality of Rio de Janeiro. The law promotes changes and flexibilities in the urban and building parameters established by the Master Plan, instituting a broad exceptional regime for the regularization, licensing, and expansion of buildings through financial compensation to the Municipality. The legislative changes allow the legalization of irregular constructions, the addition of sidewalks, horizontal and vertical expansion of buildings, the enclosure of balconies, and changes in real estate uses. 

According to the Public Prosecutor, the legislation promotes structural changes in municipal urban policy without observing the constitutional limits applicable to territorial planning or conducting studies that demonstrate the environmental and urban carrying capacity of the municipal territory. These mechanisms are operationalized through digital self-declaration procedures and impact assessments without sufficient technical guarantees. Coupled with inadequate regulation of the Neighborhood Impact Study and Report at the municipal level, the prior assessment of urban impacts and the observance of the principles of precaution, the social function of the city, and the democratic management of the territory are compromised. The public prosecutor argues that the law violates provisions of the State Constitution related to the social function of the city and property, sustainable urban planning and development, popular participation, the protection of cultural heritage, the right to an ecologically balanced environment, and the guidelines for reducing socio-environmental vulnerabilities.

It highlights how Technical Information from the Specialized Technical Support Group (GATE/MPRJ) indicates that the expansion of construction potential resulting from vertical and horizontal additions may cause damage to the urban landscape, increase soil impermeability, intensify the risk of flooding, and overload the drainage infrastructure, especially in areas already classified as having a high degree of climate vulnerability. It emphasizes that the law affects areas already subject to significant environmental and climate vulnerabilities—notably risks of flooding and the formation of urban heat islands—and highlights that the changes may contribute to increased local temperatures and the worsening of urban thermal discomfort. It concludes that these changes are incompatible with the Sustainable Development and Climate Action Plan of the Municipality of Rio de Janeiro, contradict guidelines aimed at protecting the landscape, addressing climate change, and preserving the natural and cultural values of the city, and violate the precautionary duty established in Advisory Opinion 23/2017 (OC-23/2025) of the Inter-American Court of Human Rights (IACHR). As a preliminary measure, it requests the suspension of the effects of the challenged regulation and, on the merits, a judgment declaring the regulation unconstitutional. Action for Declaration of Unconstitutionality 3009429-27.2026.8.19.0000 (Brazil, Rio de Janeiro State Court) 

DECIDED CASES OUTSIDE THE U.S.

Brazil: Injunction suspended in Climate Observatory’s challenge to Amazon highway reconstruction; case alleges DNIT bypassed mandatory environmental licensing for BR-319

In April 2026, the Climate Observatory (Observatório do Clima) filed a Public Civil Action against the National Department of Transport Infrastructure (DNIT) over the attempted execution of reconstruction and paving works on the “middle section” of the BR-319/AM highway without completing the mandatory environmental licensing by IBAMA (Brazilian Institute of Environment and Renewable Natural Resources). 

The dispute arose after DNIT unilaterally classified the works as mere “maintenance and improvement services” of a previously existing highway under Article 8, item VII, of Framework Law on Environmental Licensing (Law No. 15.190/2025), a provision that exempts certain infrastructure works from environmental licensing. On this basis, DNIT published four electronic bidding processes (Nos. 90127-90130/2026) to contract the works. The Observatório do Clima argued that the framework established by DNIT is incompatible with the size and environmental impacts of the project, since the BR-319 highway crosses an area of high ecological sensitivity in the Amazon with a history of requiring a full Environmental Impact Assessment (EIA/RIMA) from IBAMA. The plaintiff contended that paving the highway would intensify deforestation, greenhouse gas (GHG) emissions, land grabbing, irregular occupation, and biodiversity loss, and that exemption from licensing would constitute a violation of Article 225 of the Federal Constitution and the principles of prevention and environmental precaution. Therefore, it requests the annulment of the four bidding processes, an injunction barring any works until the full environmental licensing process, and immediate suspension of the bidding processes and all related acts.

In April 2026, the 7th Federal Environmental and Agrarian Court of the Judicial Section of Amazonas recognized the relevance of the controversy and the urgency of the situation. It granted a partial injunction, suspending the four bidding processes pending submissions from DNIT and environmental agencies. The court emphasized that the BR-319 highway is a project with significant environmental impact and that environmental licensing is an essential instrument for transparency and oversight of the project’s socio-environmental impacts. It was considered that the documents presented demonstrated relevant evidence of incompatibility between the magnitude of the works and their classification as simple road maintenance, especially given that contracts of approximately R$ 678 million were at stake.

DNIT and the Union filed a request for suspension of the injunction with the Federal Regional Court of the 1st Region (TRF1). The Presidency of the TRF1 granted the suspension, finding potential harm to administrative public order, the public economy, public safety, and public health, and admitted the Union as a co-litigant assistant to DNIT. The bidding processes were reinstated pending the final judgment of the original public civil action. Climate Observatory vs. DNIT (Brazil, Amazonas Federal Court)

Germany: Berlin court finds FIFA guilty of greenwashing

The Verbraucherzentrale Bundesverband (VZBV), the umbrella body of German consumer organizations, brought an action against the Fédération Internationale de Football Association (FIFA) before the Landgericht Berlin II, challenging environmental advertising claims FIFA had made on its German-language website (fifa.com/de) in connection with ticket sales for the 2022 FIFA World Cup in Qatar. After issuing a formal warning (Abmahnung) to FIFA on November 17, 2022, which FIFA declined to honor, VZBV filed suit in 2023.

The contested statements appeared under a “Sustainability” tab on FIFA’s German-language ticket website and included: (1) a commitment that FIFA and Qatar would host “a fully climate-neutral FIFA tournament in 2022”; (2) a description of the sustainability strategy as including “energy-efficient stadiums, low-emission transport and sustainable waste management”; and (3) an assurance that “remaining unavoidable emissions will be offset to ensure a fully CO₂-neutral event.”

On October 16, 2025, the court upheld the claim in full, finding that all three categories of statements constituted misleading commercial practices under § 5 Abs. 1, Abs. 2 Nr. 1 UWG. The court applied the strict standards the Bundesgerichtshof (BGH) had established for environmental advertising in its June 2024 ruling in Wettbewerbszentrale v. Katjes Fassin GmbH (BGH I ZR 98/23 — “klimaneutral”), holding that environmental claims must meet heightened requirements of accuracy, clarity, and transparency because of consumers’ elevated environmental awareness and the risk that vague “green” language disproportionately influences purchasing decisions.

The court found FIFA’s disclosures insufficient on multiple grounds. First, FIFA never disclosed the ratio of actual emissions reductions to offsetting, creating a risk that consumers would overestimate the share of genuine reductions, especially given the BGH-established principle that emissions reduction takes precedence over compensation. Second, sub-claims about “energy-efficient stadiums,” “low-emission transport,” and “sustainable waste management” were vague and undefined, lacking any benchmarks or concrete metrics. Third, the substantiating information was accessible only via hyperlinks to documents written exclusively in English (and partly Arabic), which the court held insufficient for German consumers, as advertisers cannot discharge their disclosure obligations by referring consumers to foreign-language sources. 

The court rejected FIFA’s argument that exact emissions data had not yet been available at the time of advertising, holding that FIFA was at a minimum obliged to disclose projected magnitudes and the types of offsetting planned. The court also confirmed a risk of repetition (Wiederholungsgefahr) on the basis that FIFA’s sustainability page had historically referenced multiple past tournaments, making future use of the contested statements foreseeable even after the Qatar tournament had concluded.

The court ordered FIFA to refrain from making the three categories of statements in connection with ticket sales for any FIFA-organized World Cup, subject to a penalty of up to €250,000 per violation, and to reimburse vzbv’s warning costs (€242.99 plus interest). The judgment is provisionally enforceable but not yet final (nicht rechtskräftig). Federation of German Consumer Organisations v. FIFA (Germany, Berlin, Regional Court II (Landgericht Berlin II))

France: Court rules that a mayor may deny a building permit based on concerns about water scarcity, accounting for climate change projections 

In January 2023, the plaintiff asked the Administrative Tribunal of Dijon to overturn the denial of his building permit application in 2022 for a chicken coop. He argued that the municipality’s refusal, based on interests protected under the Environmental Code, was unfounded and that the municipality could not claim the project posed a threat to public health or safety without actually demonstrating such a threat.

The tribunal held that the fact that the project involves a facility regulated under a facility classified for environmental protection purposes (industrial and agricultural activities that may pose dangers or disadvantages to health, public safety, agriculture, nature, the environment, or landscapes) does not prevent the mayor from denying a building permit on the grounds of risk to water resources, taking climate change into account. The tribunal further held that a municipality is entitled to deny a land use permit on public health grounds when the project creates a risk to the drinking water supply, considering not only current population water needs but also climate change projections. The Administrative tribunal relied on current and historical data, and also on projections regarding the future evolution of water resources in the context of climate change: “The study conducted by the Morvan Regional Nature Park also indicates a downward trend in water resources, which could decrease by 30% by 2050 according to projections. The low flow rate recorded in August 2023, therefore, has a high likelihood of recurring regularly; moreover, if a flow rate below 70 m³ occurs while a flock of poultry is at the end of its growth cycle, daily withdrawals from the public network reservoir could exceed the flow rate of its source springs by approximately 5 m³ per day.” 

Ultimately, the tribunal found that the water resource concern, standing alone, was sufficient to justify the building permit denial. The tribunal therefore dismissed Mr. A’s demands on November 13, 2025. Mr A v. Municipality of Saint-Brancher (France, Administrative Tribunal of Dijon)

Belgium: Court denies asylum application, ruling that water scarcity does not constitute a threat under the 1951 Refugee Convention

An individual from Freetown, Sierra Leone, applied for asylum in August 2015, making his claim primarily due to fleeing violence from his former partner’s family. After receiving a refusal, the individual, ‘X’, filed for appeal in August 2017. As part of his claim on appeal, he evidenced that there was water scarcity in his region, worsened by climate change and exacerbating scarcity in the dry season. This caused him to walk distances to fetch it, exposing him to mosquitoes and the possibility of becoming infected with malaria. The applicant claimed the former partner’s family had publicly blamed him for water scarcity in the local area, as the family strife the father alleged X had caused had prevented him from building a water tank. This, it was argued, put the applicant’s life at even more risk as the importance of water made people vengeful towards X.

In the appeal, the applicant and his legal team identified him as ‘klimaatvluchteling’ (“climate refugee”), providing a definition to the court. His legal team attempted to argue that being sent back to a country where there is no water may violate Article 3 of the European Convention on Human Rights. The court raised concerns that the applicant had not included climate reasons in his initial application, but only on appeal.

The court found that this asylum motive is also not related to any of the 1951 Refugee Convention criteria for granting asylum (political or religious beliefs, nationality, or race or belonging to a social group). The court found that this issue concerns “the general level of development” in the applicant’s region of origin, without indicating for what reason this would affect him personally. The court buttressed this decision by using the European Union’s Qualification Directive, which establishes that dangers that threaten a whole population with serious harm do not in themselves constitute an individual threat. The court also required that he demonstrate a real risk of suffering serious harm because of torture, inhuman or degrading treatment, or punishment on his behalf in the event of his return to Sierra Leone. The court did not find that any of his arguments made a plausible case in this regard. X v. Commissioner General for Refugees and Stateless Persons (Arrest No 191 948 of 13 September 2017 in case RvV X / IV)(Belgium, Council for Alien Disputes (Raad voor Vreemdelingenbestwistingen))

Italy: Court grants refugee status, finding that climate vulnerability leading to trafficking qualifies as a well-founded fear of persecution under the Refugee Convention

An individual from Bangladesh and his family had experienced frequent flooding that caused repeated destruction of their homes and land and forced the family to live in extremely precarious conditions for prolonged periods of time. The government failed to provide any kind of assistance, support, or compensation to deal with the recurrent flooding and related damage.

The applicant was trafficked to Romania, and then was later trafficked to Italy. He then found underpaid work in Palermo, Italy, where he was told by a doctor he was suffering from exhaustion as a result of his working conditions. The case was referred to a regional anti-trafficking body (SATIS), which determined he had been trafficked from the outset. It was acknowledged that climate vulnerability had led to his being trafficked. He filed his claim for protection in 2017. 

Initially, the Florence Territorial Commission (Commissione Territoriale per la Protezione Internazionale di Firenze) found the applicant’s account plausible; it found there was insufficient evidence to identify the applicant as a victim of trafficking or to consider that there was a risk of return related to trafficking. Specifically, it decided that the applicant did not have a well-founded fear of persecution within the 1951 Refugee Convention definition, nor did it find he was exposed to an actual risk of serious harm as defined in Italian law (Legislative Decree 251/2007). Furthermore, they established that there were no elements of risk of serious harm, as there is currently no armed conflict in Bangladesh and therefore no possibility of a different type of international protection (subsidiary protection). They also found that the conditions for humanitarian protection (outlined in Legislative Decree 25/2008) were not met. As such, in October 2019, they denied the application for protection, and the applicant appealed in December 2019.

On appeal to the Ordinary Tribunal of Florence (Tribunale Ordinario di Firenze), in December 2019, the legal team emphasized that the Brahmaputra River flooding was continuous and that there was no state support. Additional evidence established the risks of flooding in both the applicant’s home region and in Bangladesh, the country of origin, as a whole. His legal team argued that the applicant would face a risk of being trafficked and a situation of extreme poverty if he returned to Bangladesh. They emphasized the lack of minimum welfare and community solidarity as exacerbating factors. This endangered the personal dignity of the applicant and his family, in line with the prerequisite for the recognition of humanitarian protection in Italian law, which deems serious natural disasters or other serious local factors hindering repatriation in dignity and safety as a factor. Large debts owed to his traffickers caused additional fear for his life, given the extreme violence (death, kidnapping, torture) and constant threats to his family members when he had failed to repay.

The Court in Florence (Tribunale Ordinario di Firenze) found that fear of persecution included a violation of the person’s human rights, as protected by international and regional law. Human trafficking involves violations of human rights, specifically those outlined in the European Convention on Human Rights, buttressed by case law at the European Court of Human Rights. Therefore, they decided that human trafficking is a form of persecution relevant to refugee status. The Court also found that the individual could be part of a ‘social group’ - as outlined in the 1951 Refugee Convention and Italian law - on account of his common identity with other trafficking victims.

Furthermore, the Court found that the individual and his family had already suffered persecution, serious harm, and threats of serious harm. Retaliation by traffickers was considered as part of the future threats of harm, as well as discrimination and ostracism once the applicant had returned to his village. Similarly, there are no comprehensive rehabilitation and reintegration programs for those who have been trafficked in rural village areas of Bangladesh, including the applicant’s own. As such, they found that the individual was at specific risk of trafficking exacerbated by poverty, debt, and social isolation. Therefore, the Court held that the applicant had a well-founded fear of suffering multiple forms of persecution if he were returned. The Court also noted that climate change would amplify the risk of being trafficked again.

As such, the applicant was granted refugee status. Anonymous (X) v. Ministry of the Interior and the Florence Territorial Commission for International Protection (Italy, Ordinary Court of Florence)

Italy: Court grants subsidiary protection, recognizing that climate-exacerbated poverty violates fundamental rights

An individual from a sand island (‘char’) in Bangladesh had suffered from severe and repeated flooding, causing land erosion and destroying his family’s home and land. This exacerbated the applicant’s socioeconomic deprivation, with the family repeatedly borrowing money to rebuild. The applicant and his family were repeatedly displaced as a result of the flooding. Furthermore, the state of Bangladesh had failed to implement preventative and adaptive measures as a result of corruption and ineffective disaster management. The applicant left Bangladesh for Italy in order to support his family back home. He applied for asylum in April 2017.

The Commission of Monza and Brinza had initially rejected the application, finding the applicant ineligible for refugee or subsidiary protection. It was then appealed in February 2020.

The Court considered whether the applicant was eligible for refugee status, considering environmental destruction in the applicant’s char and the effects of climate change. However, the Court found that the applicant did not meet the requirements for refugee status, as he was not part of any recognised group of race, religion, nationality, membership of a social group, or political opinion.

For subsidiary protection, the Court considered climate-related degradation, repeated displacement, poverty, lack of effective state protection, and severe impacts on livelihood conditions. Using jurisprudence from the European Court of Human Rights, they found that there was a risk of inhuman and degrading treatment upon return due to the severe and recurring impacts of climate change, including economic impacts. The applicant was granted subsidiary protection. Anonymous (X) v. Ministry of the Interior and the Monza and Brinza Territorial Commission for International Protection (Italy, Court of Milan)

France: Council of State rules against the consideration of external factors like air pollution while considering residency renewal applications 

The court of appeal of the Bordeaux region dismissed an appeal by the state challenging an earlier judicial decision to grant a temporary residence permit to a Bangladeshi national with serious respiratory illness. It was argued that his medical conditions would be made considerably worse if he returned to Bangladesh due to the adverse impacts of air pollution in the country. The decision of the Bordeaux court was appealed and reversed by the Supreme Administrative Court of France in December 2021.

The applicant argued to renew his residence permit and for his application for family reunification to be accepted. They questioned the medical opinions provided by the French office of immigration and integration, mentioning that the Prefect had waived medical confidentiality in 2015. The applicant stressed the specificity of his medical condition, highlighting the need for special treatment for his asthma and sleep apnoea syndrome and insisting on the unavailability of appropriate care in Bangladesh. Additionally, the applicant raised that the atmospheric pollution in Bangladesh would exacerbate his condition.

The Prefect (of Haute-Garonne) put forward several arguments to support the refusal to renew the applicant’s residence permit and the rejection of his application for family reunification. The Prefect disputed the validity of the medical evidence provided by the applicant, questioning in particular the necessity of the medical treatment and casting doubt on the justification of the constraints associated with the use of a respirator. In addition, he stressed the availability of the medicines needed for the treatment in Bangladesh and the possibility for the applicant to settle elsewhere in his country of origin.

The administrative court of appeal of Bordeaux rejected the Prefect’s appeal on the basis of article L.313-11, 11° of the French Code of entry and residence of foreigners and of the right to asylum (“Code de l’entrée et du séjour des étrangers et du droit d’asile”). It thus confirmed the ruling of the administrative court of Toulouse, which had ordered the Prefect to grant a residence permit to the applicant. To reach its decision, the court took into account several factors relating to the applicant’s medical needs (due to his chronic respiratory problems), the lack of appropriate treatments in his home country and environmental factors in his home country (air pollution severely exacerbating his medical condition).

The case was appealed to the Council of State (Conseil d’Etat). In its appeal, the Minister of the Interior alleged that the Bordeaux administrative court of appeal made two errors of law when assessing the criteria set out in 11° of Article L. 313-11 of the French Code of entry and residence of foreigners and of the right to asylum (now in article L.425-9 of the same Code), by (i) comparing the healthcare systems in France and the country of origin; and (ii) taking into account the exogenous factor of atmospheric pollution in the country of origin.

The Council of State overturned the Bordeaux administrative court of appeal’s decision, which had annulled the prefect’s refusal to renew Mr. A’s temporary residence permit on health grounds. The Council of State clarified that the court should have only assessed whether appropriate treatment was accessible in the home country (Bangladesh), rather than comparing the quality of healthcare to that in France or Europe, and without considering external factors like air pollution in the home country. The case was sent back to the Court of Appeal for reconsideration on the merits in light of this ruling. The Bordeaux Administrative Court of Appeal subsequently reconsidered the case and confirmed the prefect’s refusal to renew Mr. A’s temporary residence permit in France on 16 June 2022. MA v. Minister of the Interior (France, Administrative Court of Appeal Bordeaux (Cour administrative d’appel de Bordeaux 2ème chambre))