Climate Litigation Updates (July 30, 2026)

The Sabin Center for Climate Change Law publishes monthly summaries of developments in climate-related litigation. We also add these developments to The Climate Litigation Database on an ongoing basis. If you know of any cases we have missed, please email us at [email protected]. Thanks to JeeHyun Chung and Sabin Center summer interns Ishana Bhattacharya, Peter Kranitz, and Joy Tian for their assistance in preparing this update.

HERE ARE THE ADDITIONS TO THE CLIMATE LITIGATION DATABASE FOR UPDATE #213

FEATURED CASES

United States: Seventh Circuit Affirmed that Fossil Fuel Defendants Could Not Invoke Federal Officer Removal Statute to Move City of Chicago’s Climate Suit to Federal Court

The Seventh Circuit Court of Appeals affirmed the remand to Illinois state court of the City of Chicago’s climate deception lawsuit asserting state and local law claims against fossil fuel industry defendants. The Seventh Circuit agreed with the district court that the requirements for federal officer removal were not met. Citing the U.S. Supreme Court’s grant of certiorari in Suncor Energy (U.S.A.) Inc. v. Board of County Commissioners of Boulder County, the Seventh Circuit stated that “[s]uits like this one have proliferated all over the country and many raise difficult and novel legal questions,” but that “this one does not.” Instead the Seventh Circuit characterized Chicago as having “defined its claims narrowly” to seek compensation only for harm resulting from the increase in fossil fuel consumption attributable to the defendants’ alleged misrepresentations regarding the effects of fossil fuel emissions on global warming. Based on this theory of liability, the court found that the work the defendants undertook “acting under” a federal officer was “too attenuated from Chicago’s claims to support removal at this time.” That work included providing fossil fuels to the military during and after World War II, operating the Elk Hills Reserve oil field in California on behalf of and alongside the Navy, supplying and managing the federal government’s Strategic Petroleum Reserve, and receiving federal oil leases for the Outer Continental Shelf and onshore federal lands. The Seventh Circuit found that the connection between the war-related fossil fuel production and alleged false advertising decades later was “tenuous, remote, or peripheral” and that even more recent federal work was “simply too attenuated” to satisfy the federal officer removal statute’s requirement that conduct at issue be “relating to” acts performed under color of federal office. The Seventh Circuit noted that it was not writing “on a clean slate,” given that every circuit court of appeal to consider a similar question in climate deception suits had found that federal officer removal was unwarranted and the Supreme Court had cited two of these decisions favorably in its 2026 decision on federal officer removal, Chevron USA Inc. v. Plaquemines Parish. City of Chicago v. BP p.l.c., No. 25-1916 (7th Cir. July 15, 2026)

Canada: Youth advocates and environmental groups seek court order compelling federal government to update its 2030 Emissions Reduction Plan

On June 15, 2026, youth climate advocates Marie Maltais, Sophia Mathur, and Shirley Barnea, together with Environmental Defence Canada and the Canadian Association of Physicians for the Environment (CAPE), filed an application for judicial review in the Federal Court against the Minister of Environment, Climate Change and Nature and the Attorney General of Canada. The applicants allege that the Minister failed to comply with mandatory obligations under the Canadian Net-Zero Emissions Accountability Act (CNZEAA) by not amending Canada’s 2030 Emissions Reduction Plan (ERP) after the federal government repealed, weakened, or substantially altered several of the plan’s key emissions reduction measures.

According to the application, the 2030 ERP, adopted in 2022, described the federal measures intended to achieve Canada’s statutory target of reducing greenhouse gas emissions by 40-45% below 2005 levels by 2030. The applicants argue that subsequent policy changes, including the elimination of consumer carbon pricing, the weakening of industrial carbon pricing, the repeal of the electric vehicle sales mandate, the cancellation of the proposed oil and gas emissions cap, delays to methane reduction requirements, and significant changes to clean electricity regulations, mean that the ERP no longer accurately describes the measures the government intends to implement and no longer provides a credible pathway to achieve the 2030 target.

The applicants rely in part on the Minister’s 2025 Progress Report, which projected emissions reductions of only 21-28% by 2030 under existing and announced measures. They contend that the Minister was therefore required to initiate the statutory amendment process under the CNZEAA, which would update the ERP and trigger the public consultation process provided for under the Act. The application seeks an order of mandamus requiring the Minister to amend the ERP, or alternatively declarations that the current ERP and the Minister’s failure to amend it are unlawful under sections 9(1) and 10(1)(b) of the CNZEAA. Maltais et al. v. Minister of Environment (Canada, Federal Court)

U.S. DECISIONS AND SETTLEMENTS

Second Circuit Rejected Preemption Challenges to New York State and New York City Laws Prohibiting Fossil Fuel-Powered Appliances in New Construction

The Second Circuit Court of Appeals held that the Energy Policy and Conservation Act (EPCA) did not preempt New York State and New York City laws that effectively prohibit use of fossil fuel-powered appliances in new buildings. The Second Circuit concluded that EPCA “does not directly regulate the availability of fossil-fuel-powered appliances, and its express preemption provision does not extend to laws far beyond its defined regulatory reach.” EPCA’s preemption provision provides that for a “covered product” for which an energy conservation standard has been established under EPCA, “no State regulation concerning the … energy use … of such covered product shall be effective with respect to such product.” The Second Circuit first concluded that the statutory definition of “energy use” and statutory context “make abundantly clear that the term refers to a metric determined before an appliance ever reaches consumers, not the energy that appliance uses in the hands of consumers”; the court therefore rejected the argument that the State and City laws were preempted because they effectively set fossil fuel-powered appliances’ “energy use” to zero. Second, the court held that the State and City laws were not regulations “concerning” the energy use of covered products. The court found that the challenged laws were not impermissibly connected to EPCA’s objectives “to establish a standardized set of performance standards for covered appliances to promote energy conservation. The court also found that the laws’ prohibition on use of certain covered appliances was not the kind of effect that created an impermissible connection. In addition, the Second Circuit concluded that the State and City laws did not reference or rely on an appliance’s “energy use.” The Second Circuit also rejected arguments asserted by the laws’ challengers based on the EPCA preemption provision’s title, EPCA’s definition of “energy conservation standard,” EPCA’s preemption exemption for certain building code regulations, and the history of the preemption provision. The Second Circuit also concluded that its interpretation avoided absurd results such as precluding a “whole slate of seemingly standard regulations” such as zoning laws that bar use of certain appliances in residential neighborhoods. The Second Circuit acknowledged that the Ninth Circuit had adopted a different interpretation of the EPCA preemption provision in California Restaurant Association v. City of Berkeley but stated that “the reasons for divergence” from the Ninth Circuit’s interpretation were “too compelling” and it was thus necessary to create a circuit split. Association of Contracting Plumbers of the City of New York v. City of New York, No. 25-977 (2d Cir. June 30, 2026); Mulhern Gas Co. v. Mosley, No. 25-2041 (2d Cir. June 30, 2026)

Ninth Circuit Affirmed District Court’s Decision Upholding Local Zero-NOx Emissions Standard for Certain Appliances

The Ninth Circuit Court of Appeals affirmed the federal district court for the Central District of California’s decision allowing the South Coast Air Quality Management District (SCAQMD) to prohibit the manufacture, sale, and installation of natural gas-fired water heaters, boilers, and process heaters that emit more than zero nitrogen oxides (NOx). SCAQMD instituted the rule in an effort to remedy its “extreme” nonattainment status for federal ozone pollution standards established by the Clean Air Act (CAA). Several manufacturers of gas appliances and industry groups challenged the rule as preempted by the Energy Policy and Conservation Act (EPCA) and as facially invalid. The Ninth Circuit affirmed the district court’s determination that the rule was not preempted by EPCA because it does not concern the energy use of regulated appliances, but instead regulates NOx emissions pursuant to obligations under the CAA. While EPCA does preempt state-level energy use standards for covered appliances, its text does not mention emissions regulations and nothing in the legislative history suggests that it was intended to preempt state-level emissions standards consistent with the CAA. The court distinguished the present case from California Restaurant Association v. City of Berkeley, which struck down Berkeley’s ban on installing natural gas piping in new buildings; the Ninth Circuit reasoned that SCAQMD’s rule does not regulate the energy use of appliances covered by EPCA and does not present a physical barrier to the use of natural gas appliances writ large but instead it simply sets a NOx emissions limit of zero. The court rejected the facial challenge to the rule because process heaters are not covered by EPCA standards, meaning that even if the law were invalid with regard to water heaters and boilers, it would not be unconstitutional in all its applications. Rinnai America Corp. v. South Coast Air Quality Management District, No. 25-5129 (9th Cir. July 2, 2026)

D.C. Circuit Vacated Dismissal of Challenge to Termination of Environmental and Climate Justice Block Grants, Citing District Court’s Failure to Assess Jurisdictional Issue

The D.C. Circuit Court of Appeals vacated a district court order dismissing a putative class action brought by grantees under the Inflation Reduction Act’s (IRA’s) Environmental and Climate Justice Block Grant program to challenge the termination of all grants awarded under the program. The D.C. Circuit found that the district court erred by reaching the merits of the plaintiffs’ constitutional claims without first assessing the jurisdictional issue of whether the case was mooted by Congress’s rescission of the “unobligated balances of amounts made available to carry out” the IRA provision establishing the Environmental and Climate Justice Block Grant program. The D.C. Circuit vacated the dismissal order in full, including the district court’s determination that it lacked jurisdiction over the plaintiffs’ Administrative Procedure Act claims because the Tucker Act precluded district court jurisdiction over the plaintiffs’ “essentially” contractual claims. The D.C. Circuit concluded that since a decision on mootness could render review of the Tucker Act issue unnecessary, it was “appropriate to leave that issue for another day.” The D.C. Circuit remanded the case to the district court for further proceedings. Appalachian Voices v. EPA, No. 25-5333 (D.C. Cir. July 21, 2026)

D.C. Circuit Rejected Claim that Nuclear Regulatory Commission Violated NEPA by Failing to Consider Increased Severe Accident Risks at Nuclear Power Plants

The D.C. Circuit Court of Appeals denied a petition for review challenging the Nuclear Regulatory Commission’s (NRC’s) 2024 revision of the Generic Environmental Impact Statement (GEIS) for nuclear power plant operating license renewals. The court rejected Beyond Nuclear and Sierra Club’s argument that in determining that the environmental impacts of “severe accidents” during extended operation was “small,” the GEIS did not adequately consider how aging components and climate change affect the risk of accidents involving reactor-core damage. Noting that its review of the GEIS was required to be “substantially deferential,” the D.C. Circuit found that the NRC reasonably addressed the risks of aging and of climate change effects such as storms and flooding. The court stated that “[t]wo high-level considerations frame our analysis.” First, “neither the effects of aging on components nor the effects of climate change on external hazards are themselves environmental impacts that [the National Environmental Policy Act (NEPA)] required the [NRC] to address”; instead these issues were “upstream factors that may increase the likelihood of severe accidents.” Second, the NRC reasoned that its risk estimate would have to increase by more than 10,000% to alter the determination that the environmental impacts of severe accidents were small. Regarding climate change, the court found that the NRC had acknowledged climate-related events but had declined to conduct additional modeling of the future effects of climate change on severe storms because (1) the NRC concluded that such risks were “minimal compared to other risks” such as seismic events and fires, (2) “its overall analysis already included a large buffer that could account for these types of uncertainties,” and (3) “regulatory mechanisms exist to address the issue should circumstances change.” The court further noted that no party had identified “any estimate—or even speculation—suggesting that the impact of climate change on storm severity could put a meaningful dent in the greater-than-10,000 percent buffer for uncertainties in the [NRC’s] analysis.” The D.C. Circuit also rejected the petitioners’ related challenge to the NRC’s decision not to require plant-specific severe-accident mitigation alternatives because that decision also rested on the premise that the GEIS’s consideration of aging and climate change was insufficient. Beyond Nuclear, Inc. v. U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission, No. 24-1318 (D.C. Cir. July 21, 2026)

Washington Trial Court Allowed Plaintiff to Proceed with Claims that Fossil Fuel Companies’ Deceptive Conduct Regarding Climate Change Led to Mother’s Death During 2021 Extreme Heat Event; Three Defendants Dismissed from Case

In a wrongful death action in which a plaintiff alleges that fossil fuel industry defendants caused her mother’s death during the 2021 extreme heat event in the Pacific Northwest by engaging in deceptive conduct that delayed measures to mitigate climate change, a Washington Superior Court denied the defendants’ motion to dismiss the complaint for failure to state a claim. The court described the case as “factually distinguishable” from cases in which municipalities bring “claims for the ongoing and continuing effects of climate change.” The court instead described this case as “about a single individual and an allegation that a single weather event contributed to her untimely passing” and as seeking damages as opposed to prospective relief regarding future emissions. The court further stated that the plaintiff would be held to a theory of liability based on failure to warn Washington consumers and for deceptive marketing to Washington consumers. With the claims framed in this way, the court concluded that the state law claims were not preempted or precluded by the Clean Air Act or other federal law. In addition, the court found the claims were not non-justiciable political questions. The court stated that it was “skeptical” of the plaintiff’s ability to establish causation but found that causation was sufficiently alleged to survive a motion to dismiss.  The court also found that the plaintiff sufficiently alleged the application of the discovery rule for purposes of the statute of limitations; that the plaintiff properly pled both public nuisance and Washington Product Liability Act (WPLA) claims; that the WPLA did not preempt the public nuisance claim; and that the issue of whether the dangers were known or obvious was a disputed fact for purposes of the WPLA claim. 

The court also denied a motion by out-of-state defendants to dismiss the action against them for lack of personal jurisdiction. The court found the plaintiff established “sufficient minimum contacts” with Washington State to sustain personal jurisdiction. 

However, the court dismissed Olympic Pipeline Company LLC (Olympic Pipeline) and ConocoPhillips and ConocoPhillips Company (together ConocoPhillips) from the case. The court dismissed ConocoPhillips from the case on personal jurisdiction grounds, finding that the complaint did not adequately connect alleged pre-2012 ConocoPhillips contacts with Washington to the 2021 extreme heat event. The court also found that a ConocoPhillips subsidiary’s contacts with Washington could not be imputed to ConocoPhillips in the absence of an agency relationship. 

Regarding Olympic Pipeline, the court found that the WPLA claim failed because Olympic Pipeline was not a product seller and there was no allegation that it had control over the product it transported. The court also found that given the plaintiff’s counsel’s admission that there was no evidence that Olympic Pipeline participated in advertising or marketing, the complaint’s allegations were insufficient to state a public nuisance claim against Olympic Pipeline based on misleading and deceptive advertising and marketing of petroleum products. Leon v. Exxon Mobil Corp., No. 25-2-15986-8 SEA (Wash. Super. Ct. July 8, 2026)

In Vermont Climate Consumer Protection Case, State Court Denied Fossil Fuel Companies’ Request for Protective Order Limiting Use of All Discovery Materials

In the State of Vermont’s action asserting that fossil fuel companies misrepresented and concealed their products’ role in causing climate change, a Vermont Superior Court granted a joint motion for a protective order limiting use of designated confidential and highly confidential materials produced in litigation to use only in this litigation and restricting the uploading of such materials to certain “AI Tools.” The court, however, denied the defendants’ request that the protective order apply to all materials produced in discovery. The defendants argued that a broader scope for the protective order was warranted because discovery could be “deployed for adverse publicity, policy advocacy, or to seed new lawsuits.” The court agreed with the State that defendants did not establish “good cause” for a broad protective order, finding that the defendants’ claims were “precisely the type of vague, broad, and unsubstantiated allegations of harm that are insufficient to support the issuance of a protective order.” Vermont v. Exxon Mobil Corp., No. 21-CV-02778 (Vt. Super. Ct. June 4, 2026)

D.C. Circuit Rejected Claim that Climate Change Considerations Improperly Influenced EPA’s 2024 Particulate Matter Standard

The D.C. Circuit Court of Appeals denied petitions for review challenging the 2024 U.S. Environmental Protection Agency (EPA) rule revising the National Ambient Air Quality Standards (NAAQS) for particulate matter from 12 to 9 micrograms per cubic meter. The D.C. Circuit also denied the Trump administration EPA’s motion to vacate the rule on the grounds that the 2024 rule exceeded EPA’s authority and that EPA unreasonably failed to consider costs. The D.C. Circuit held that the EPA Administrator acted within his statutory authority and rejected state and industry petitioners’ and EPA’s arguments that the rule was arbitrary and capricious. The state petitioners argued, among other things, that the EPA Administrator impermissibly relied on considerations related to promoting environmental justice and countering climate change in revising the NAAQS. The D.C. Circuit noted that EPA’s August 2024 response brief “did not dispute … the … premise that environmental justice and climate change are impermissible reasons for setting primary NAAQS” under the Clean Air Act, which provides that primary NAAQS be standards “requisite to protect the public health.” EPA instead argued, and the D.C. Circuit agreed, that the record did not support the state petitioners’ claim “that climate or environmental justice considerations improperly influenced the Agency’s course of action.” The court found that EPA’s statements in the final rule did not suggest that the Administrator considered environmental justice or climate change and that “[o]n the contrary, the EPA made clear in its response to public comments that it had ‘no intention or goal to reduce greenhouse gases through this rulemaking.’” Kentucky v. EPA, Nos. 24-1050, 24-1051, 24-1052, 24-1073, 24-1091 (D.C. Cir. June 26, 2026)

Fifth Circuit Rejected Environmental Groups’ Standing to Challenge LNG Deepwater Port License

The Fifth Circuit denied a petition for review brought by the Center for Biological Diversity, Sierra Club, and Habitat Recovery Project challenging the Maritime Administration’s (MARAD’s) approval of a deepwater port license for a liquefied natural gas (LNG) export facility in the “Gulf of America,” finding that petitioners lacked Article III standing. MARAD, an arm of the U.S. Department of Transportation, approved Delfin LNG’s project to build a deepwater port in 2017 following an environmental impact statement under the National Environmental Policy Act (NEPA). After Delfin modified the project’s financing, ownership, and design, MARAD in 2024 determined that the original approval no longer supported the modified project and asked Delfin to submit an amended application. Delfin did not do so. In 2025, following a presidential executive order directing MARAD to determine within 30 days whether the modifications presented “seriously different [environmental] consequences,” MARAD concluded the changes reduced the project’s environmental effects and issued the license without further environmental review in March 2025. Petitioners argued that MARAD’s approval violated the Deepwater Port Act, NEPA, and the Administrative Procedure Act (APA) by forgoing a supplemental environmental review, amended application, and public comment period. The Fifth Circuit, however, ruled that none of the individual members whose statements the petitioners relied on had shown they would suffer a concrete, particularized injury fairly traceable to the licensing decision. These individuals described harms to their fishing, hunting, health, recreation, and research activities, but did not show that those harms were caused by this particular project rather than by industrial activity in the region more broadly. They also failed to show they lived or worked close enough to the project site to be affected by it. Because petitioners failed to establish standing, the court did not reach the merits of their statutory claims and denied the petition for review. Center for Biological Diversity v. U.S. Department of Transportation, No. 25-60282 (5th Cir. July 7, 2026)

First Circuit Stayed Preliminary Injunction that Blocked Removal or Replacement of Climate Change and Other Interpretive Materials at National Park Sites

The First Circuit Court of Appeals granted the U.S. Department of the Interior and other federal defendants’ (together, the Department) motion for a stay pending appeal of a district court preliminary injunction enjoining the defendants from implementing the Secretary of the Interior’s May 2025 order, “Restoring Truth and Sanity to American History.” The Secretary’s order implemented President Trump’s executive order of the same name and required review of interpretive materials at National Park Service sites to identify whether they “contain images, descriptions, depictions, messages, narratives or other information (content) that inappropriately disparages Americans past or living (including persons living in colonial times), or, with respect to content describing natural features, that emphasizes matters unrelated to the beauty, abundance, or grandeur of said natural feature,” and to remove or replace such materials. Plaintiff organizations alleged that removed materials included exhibits and signs regarding climate change and its impacts at the New York Gateway National Recreation Area, Glacier National Park, Fort Sumter, and Acadia National Park. The First Circuit found that the Department made a strong showing that it was likely to succeed on the merits in its appeal of the preliminary injunction because the district court erred in determining that the plaintiffs would likely suffer irreparable harm in the absence of preliminary relief. The First Circuit found that the district court relied on alleged harms to the plaintiff organizations’ members but that the plaintiffs’ declarations alleged, with one exception, only general—not specific—harms to their members’ aesthetic, recreational, and information interests, and that the one alleged specific harm was premised on the removal of material at parks where no changes had been made. The First Circuit also found that some of the district court’s findings regarding irreparable harm were “not sufficiently connected to any specific harms likely to be experienced by the plaintiffs” because of the order. The court also stated that findings of harm to the public were not relevant to the question of whether the plaintiffs suffered irreparable harm. The First Circuit noted that the plaintiffs also alleged organizational harms on which the district court did not rely for its irreparable harm determination, but the First Circuit further noted that the plaintiffs did not show how the harms were traceable to the Secretary’s order. The court further found that the Department met its burden of showing that it would be irreparably injured absent a stay, that the plaintiffs did not show that a stay would cause them substantial injury, and that the public interest factor did not require denial of the stay given the Department’s likelihood of success on the merits. National Parks Conservation Association v. U.S. Department of the Interior, No. 26-1714 (1st Cir. July 2, 2026)

Connecticut Federal Court Rejected Climate Change Adaptation Claims in Clean Water Act Citizen Suit Concerning New Haven Coastal Terminal

In a Clean Water Act citizen suit brought by Conservation Law Foundation (CLF), the federal district court for the District of Connecticut granted summary judgment to the former owner and operator of a coastal bulk fuel storage terminal in New Haven, Connecticut, on claims that the owner-operator failed to consider climate change factors in its stormwater pollution prevention plan and to implement certain best management practices and/or control measures. With respect to the implementation-related claims, the court found that CLF had focused solely on whether the requirement in Connecticut’s General Permit for the Discharge of Stormwater Associated with Industrial Activity (the permit) to implement control measures constituting “best industry practices” imposed obligations on permittees to account for severe weather and climate change. The court found that even if the permit did require implementation of such measures, CLF did not show a genuine issue of material fact as to whether the owner-operator failed to implement a “technologically available” and “economically practicable and achievable” control measure, as required to establish a Clean Water Act violation. With respect to the claims that the owner-operator failed to “consider” climate change, the court found that CLF did not allege that it suffered a concrete injury traceable to this alleged failure and ruled that CLF therefore lacked standing for the claims. The court found that CLF’s claim that the defendant violated the permit by acting inconsistently with the goals and policies of the Connecticut Coastal Management Act failed on the additional basis that it sought to enforce state standards that exceeded federal standards. The court also ruled that CLF’s request for declaratory relief was moot after the owner-operator submitted evidence that it no longer owned or operated any coastal bulk fuel storage facilities but that CLF’s request for civil penalties was not moot. In addition, the court rejected the defendant’s claim that the permit was impermissibly vague. Although the court granted summary judgment to the defendant on all of the “Climate Change Counts,” the court granted summary judgment to CLF on its claim that the defendant failed to maintain an impervious containment area and denied summary judgment to both parties on CLF’s claim that the defendant infiltrated stormwater at the terminal in violation of the permit. The court granted in part and denied in part the owner-operator’s summary judgment motion as to a claim that the defendant failed to identify discharges to impaired waters and to document procedures for implementing impaired waters monitoring and granted summary judgment to the defendant on a claim of failure to comply with certain monitoring requirements. Conservation Law Foundation, Inc. v. Pike Fuels LP, No. 3:21-CV-00932 (D. Conn. July 24, 2026)

Challenges to Biden Administration’s Arctic National Wildlife Refuge Oil and Gas Leasing Program Dismissed After Settlement in Which BLM Agreed that 2017 Tax Act Required More Expansive Development

Alaska and the Alaska Industrial Development and Export Authority (AIDEA) entered into a settlement with the U.S. Bureau of Land Management and other federal defendants (together BLM) to resolve Alaska’s and AIDEA’s lawsuits challenging the Biden administration’s 2024 supplemental environmental impact statement and record of decision (ROD) governing oil and gas leasing on the Coastal Plain of the Arctic National Wildlife Refuge. Alaska and AIDEA alleged that the plan approved in 2024 was unlawful, including because it violated Tax Cuts and Jobs Act of 2017 (Tax Act) requirements by failing to make available a minimum of two Coastal Plain lease sales by December 2024, with a minimum of 400,000 acres offered for lease at each sale. In addition, Alaska and AIDEA alleged that BLM erroneously interpreted the Tax Act’s provision authorizing production and support facilities on up to 2,000 surface acres. In the settlement agreement, BLM agreed that the 2024 ROD violated the Tax Act “by preventing meaningful leasing, exploration, and development of oil and gas on the Coastal Plan, as Congress mandated,” in at least four ways that were set forth in settlement agreement. BLM agreed not to issue a new ROD with any of those deficiencies, absent a change in law. In exchange, Alaska and AIDEA agreed to dismiss their claims without prejudice. Alaska v. U.S. Department of the Interior, No. 3:25-cv-00003 (D. Alaska July 6, 2026); Alaska Industrial Development & Export Authority v. U.S. Department of the Interior, No. 3:24-cv-00282 (D. Alaska July 6, 2026)

South Carolina Federal Court Ordered EPA to Administer Environmental and Climate Justice Block Grant Through End of September

The federal district court for the District of South Carolina granted in part plaintiffs’ motion to enforce judgment and clarify the court’s June 2026 order vacating U.S. Environmental Protection Agency (EPA) guidance terminating the Inflation Reduction Act’s Environmental and Climate Justice Block Grant Program (ECJ Program). The June order also required that ECJ Program funds “must be made available through September 30, 2026.” The plaintiffs argued in their motion that the vacatur of the guidance required EPA to comply with its statutory obligations, including operating the Program. The federal defendants argued, however, that the court denied the plaintiffs’ request for injunctive relief and that the vacatur did not alter the One Big Beautiful Bill Act’s (OBBBA’s) rescission of unobligated funds. In its order, the court clarified that EPA “must comply with its statutory obligations to administer the ECJ Program.” The court also stated that its interpretation of the OBBBA in the June order (i.e., that the OBBBA’s rescission of unobligated funds did not moot the plaintiffs’ claims) was the law of the case and “EPA may not flout the Court’s prior order based on a legal argument which it advanced and the Court rejected.” Sustainability Institute v. Trump, No. 2:25-cv-02152 (D.S.C. July 22, 2026)

California Federal Court Denied Motion to Dismiss and Motion to Transfer to Court of Federal Claims in Challenge to Canceled Energy and Infrastructure Programs

The federal district court for the Northern District of California denied a request to transfer to the Court of Federal Claims (CFC) several claims in a suit by 13 states and a California State agency against the Secretary of Energy, the U.S. Department of Energy (DOE), the Director of the U.S. Office of Management and Budget (OMB), and OMB. The suit alleged that OMB took unlawful actions to eliminate energy and infrastructure programs and projects established and funded under the Infrastructure Investment and Jobs Act, the Inflation Reduction Act, and other laws. The complaint included requests for injunctive and declaratory relief to enjoin defendants from taking similar actions in the future and to restore the terminated programs, as well as a request to vacate the allegedly unlawful review process on a prospective basis. The court determined that 28 U.S.C. § 1500 barred transferring the claims challenging the past termination of grants to the CFC because those claims involved the same operative facts as those that would remain before the district court. It declined to rule on the defendants’ alternative motion to dismiss those claims because, under 28 U.S.C. § 1292, the defendants have 60 days to appeal the denial of their transfer motion, and adjudication of all implicated claims is stayed during that period or pending appeal. The court further denied the defendants’ motion to dismiss the remaining claims that sought to vacate the policy underlying the grant terminations and to enjoin future terminations. It determined that the ultra vires claim was not barred by sovereign immunity because it challenged “actions allegedly taken contrary to specific spending requirements set by Congress’s Appropriations Acts of 2024 and 2025” and implicated specific constitutional provisions, making it a fundamentally constitutional claim. That claim also did not represent a “disguised breach of contract claim” that must be brought in the CFC because it requested equitable relief, which could not be granted in the CFC, and was not based on the terms of the contract. It also found that the plaintiffs had Article III standing because vacating the underlying policy would redress nonspeculative pending injuries that would result from further award terminations. Finally, the court determined that the agency policy represented a final agency action that could properly be challenged under the Administrative Procedure Act as arbitrary and capricious because the language of the memo establishing the policy was not tentative or interlocutory and legal consequences could plausibly flow from it. California v. Wright, No. 3:26-cv-01417 (N.D. Cal. July 2, 2026)

Additional Plaintiffs Added in Suit Challenging Termination of Department of Agriculture Grants

On June 30, 2026, the federal district court hearing a case challenging the U.S. Department of Agriculture’s termination of grants awarded under a variety of programs granted the plaintiffs’ motion to amend the complaint to add 24 plaintiff organizations that received termination letters for grants under USDA’s Increasing Land, Capital, and Market Access Program (Land Access Program Plaintiffs). The court rejected the defendants’ arguments that amendment would be futile or unduly prejudice them. The court also granted the Land Access Program Plaintiffs’ motion for a preliminary injunction. The defendants appealed the preliminary injunction and on July 14 requested a stay pending appeal from the D.C. Circuit. Urban Sustainability Directors Network v. U.S. Department of Agriculture, No. 1:25-cv-01775 (D.D.C. June 30, 2026), No. 26-5264 (D.C. Cir. July 14, 2026)

Kansas and Indiana Federal Courts Enjoined Enforcement of State Laws Requiring Disclosures by Proxy Advisors When They Recommend Votes Against Management

The federal district court for the District of Kansas granted motions by the proxy advisors Institutional Shareholder Services Inc. (ISS) and Glass, Lewis & Co. (Glass, Lewis) for a preliminary injunction enjoining the Kansas Attorney General from enforcing the Proxy Advisory Transparency Act (SB 375). SB 375 imposes certain disclosure requirements on proxy advisors when they recommend a vote “against company management.” The disclosure requirements differ depending on whether the recommendation is based on a “written financial analysis.” No disclosure is required if a proxy advisor recommends a vote in favor of company management. The court’s decision described ISS’s and Glass, Lewis’s processes for providing voter recommendations, noting, among other things, that recommendations are tailored based on the proxy voting policies selected by their clients. Those policies include, for ISS, specialty policies that are thematic and may be focused on areas such as sustainability, social responsibility, or the climate. Glass, Lewis also offers thematic policies, including one focused on mitigating climate change. The court found that SB 375 regulated speech based on viewpoint and that strict scrutiny therefore applied. The Attorney General did not argue that the law would withstand strict scrutiny. The court therefore found that the proxy advisory firms were likely to succeed on the merits of their First Amendment claims. The court further rejected the argument that the “against-company-management language” could be severed so that SB 375 would apply to all proxy advisory recommendations. The court cited “many problems” with this argument, including that SB 375 would still compel speech and therefore still be subject to strict scrutiny. The court rejected the argument that the regulated speech was “commercial speech” that would require a less stringent standard of review. The court further found that the plaintiffs would suffer irreparable harm in the absence of an injunction, that the balance of the equities weighed in favor of an injunction, and that an injunction was in the public interest. Institutional Shareholder Services Inc. v. Kobach, No. 2:26-cv-02254 (D. Kan. June 24, 2026); Glass, Lewis & Co. v. Kobach, No. 2:26-cv-02286 (D. Kan. June 24, 2026)

In lawsuits brought by ISS and Glass, Lewis in Indiana, the federal district court for the Southern District of Indiana enjoined H.B. 1273, which imposed similar disclosure requirements when a proxy advisor makes a recommendation against management. The court concluded that H.B. 1273 “runs afoul of the First Amendment because it places a thumb on the scale in favor of management’s recommendation on all issues by burdening the opposite viewpoint.” The court rejected the Indiana Attorney General’s argument that deferential review should apply because the speech at issue was commercial and the law’s disclosure requirements are designed for consumer protection purposes. The court assumed, however, that the regulated speech was commercial and applied intermediate scrutiny, finding that although the State asserted the substantial government interest of consumer protection, it was “difficult to see how H.B. 1273 ‘directly advances’ that interest by requiring Plaintiffs to produce either a ‘written financial analysis’ or to disclose to their clients that they did not do such an analysis any time they disagree with management.” The court noted that the proxy advisors’ clients choose the policy they wish to apply to given shareholder votes, that clients are not bound by the recommendations, and that the defendant did not present evidence that clients had been “confused or deceived” by the proxy advisors’ recommendations. The court also found that the connection between the law’s disclosure requirements and the State’s interest in “keeping consumers and retail investors informed about proxy advisors’ services” was “too attenuated” to “directly advance” that interest. The court further found that the remaining preliminary injunction factors favored the proxy advisors and determined that consideration of the question of severing the unconstitutional portions of H.B. 1273 would be premature. The court did not address the proxy advisors’ claims that H.B. 1273 was unconstitutionally vague and violated the Commerce Clause by attempting to regulate out-of-state companies. Institutional Shareholder Services Inc. v. Rokita, No. 1:26-cv-00717 (S.D. Ind. June 26, 2026); Glass, Lewis & Co., LLC v. Rokita, No. 1:26-cv-00862 (S.D. Ind. June 26, 2026)

Maryland Federal Court Dismissed Endangered Species Act Challenge to Federal Authorization for Oil and Gas Development in Gulf of America

On June 24, 2026, the federal district court for the District of Maryland dismissed for lack of subject matter jurisdiction a lawsuit brought by environmental organizations challenging the National Marine Fisheries Service’s compliance with the Endangered Species Act in connection with “Federally Regulated Oil and Gas Program Activities in the Gulf of America.” The federal defendants and industry intervenors filed motions to dismiss after the Endangered Species Committee convened on March 31 and exempted all “Gulf of America” oil and gas exploration and development activities associated with the Outer Continental Shelf Oil and Gas Program from ESA requirements. The federal defendants and industry intervenors argued that the Committee’s action rendered the plaintiffs’ claims moot. The court dismissed the case without prejudice. Sierra Club v. National Marine Fisheries Service, No. 8:25-cv-01627 (D. Md. June 24, 2026)

Massachusetts High Court Found that Town’s Denial of Special Permit for Large-Scale Solar Facility Was Improper

The Massachusetts Supreme Judicial Court ruled that the Town of Petersham Zoning Board of Appeals (Zoning Board) did not provide “reasonable opportunities” to build solar energy systems, as required by Massachusetts law, when it denied a special permit for a large-scale ground-mounted solar energy system. The court concluded that a special permit for such a project could not be denied unless denial was “necessary to protect public health, safety, or welfare,” a determination that requires “individualized and site-specific reasons.” The court described the Zoning Board’s denial as based on “generally applicable concerns about tree cutting,” which in a town that is 97% forested would effectively constitute a “blanket prohibition” on large-scale ground-mounted solar energy systems. The court found that because Massachusetts law (the solar provision of the Dover Amendment) requires that “sylvan as well as urban communities” provide reasonable opportunities for solar energy facility development, the denial of the special permit was improper. The Supreme Judicial Court directed that the matter be remanded to the Zoning Board for further proceedings. Sunpin Energy Services, LLC v. Zoning Board of Appeals of Petersham, No. SJC-13860 (Mass. July 14, 2026)

California Court of Appeal Upheld Discharge of Writ of Mandate Directing San Diego County to Remedy CEQA Violations in Connection with Climate Action Plan

In the fourth appeal in litigation related to San Diego County’s approval of a climate action plan under the California Environmental Quality Act (CEQA), the California Court of Appeal upheld the trial court’s discharge of a writ of mandate directing the County to remedy CEQA violations. Previously, in 2020, the court had directed the County to update a supplemental environmental impact report (SEIR) to sufficiently analyze a “smart growth alternative” to reduce vehicle miles traveled. In September 2024, the County prepared a new SEIR and approved a new climate action plan. The trial court then discharged the writ. On appeal, the Sierra Club contended that the writ had been improperly discharged because the County’s SEIR had not remedied the deficiencies previously identified by the court. Sierra Club further claimed that the County still had not complied with CEQA because it provided contradictory feasibility findings for its smart growth alternative and failed to adopt all feasible mitigation measures and alternatives. The Court of Appeals determined that Sierra Club forfeited its claim that the County had not remedied the deficiencies in its SEIR by failing to raise it in the trial court. Additionally, it found that other CEQA issues Sierra Club raised were not properly before the trial court because they were distinct from the issues addressed by the original writ and therefore could not be addressed on appeal. Sierra Club v. County of San Diego, No. D085664 (Cal. Ct. App. June 26, 2026)

Washington State Supreme Court Upheld Method for Exempting Agricultural Fuel from State Cap-and-Invest Program

The Washington Supreme Court affirmed a lower court’s dismissal of a challenge by the Washington Farm Bureau (WFB) to a rule promulgated by the Washington State Department of Ecology implementing an exemption to the State’s cap-and-invest program. The program, established under the Washington Climate Commitment Act (CCA), “generally imposes caps on the amount of emissions from fuel suppliers but exempts fuel used exclusively for agricultural purposes … if the fuel buyer provides the seller with an exemption certificate.” To offset losses from the program, some suppliers implemented surcharges to the wholesale price of fuels. WFB requested declaratory judgment and review of agency action under Washington’s Administrative Procedure Act, claiming that the rule “failed to create a workable mechanism to receive CCA exemptions” and imposed an undue financial burden on the agricultural industry because of the surcharges. WFB further claimed that the Department exceeded its statutory authority and acted in an arbitrary and capricious manner in implementing the rule and wrongly denying its petition for rulemaking. The court determined that the plain language of the CCA indicates that the legislature intended for the Department to place the point of compliance on the suppliers, rather than the end users, making the method for claiming exemptions consistent with the law. Additionally, the court found that the regulation was not arbitrary and capricious because the Department acknowledged the challenges in applying the rule, considered alternatives, and determined that the chosen method was the most workable. The Department further demonstrated that it was not arbitrary and capricious in denying WFB’s request for rulemaking because it provided clear reasons for the denial. Washington Farm Bureau v. Washington State Department of Ecology, No. 103413-0 (Wash. June 25, 2026).

California Appellate Court Rejected Challenges to City of San Diego’s Award of Gas and Electric Franchises, Rejecting Argument that Climate Change- and Renewable Energy-Related Provisions Were Impermissibly Changed

The California Court of Appeal affirmed trial court orders rejecting challenges to the City of San Diego’s award of gas and electric franchises to San Diego Gas & Electric Company (SDG&E). The appellate court rejected the Protect Our Communities Foundation’s (POCF’s) argument that in the final ordinances approving the franchises, the City improperly changed requirements set forth in the invitations to bid, including by eliminating or modifying requirements for the franchisee to cooperate in good faith to attain the goals of the City’s Climate Action Plan, to eliminate greenhouse gases to the “fullest” extent practical, and to require that the franchisee “not unreasonably oppose or obstruct” mechanisms to support renewable energy. The appellate court concluded that the invitations to bid contemplated that the final ordinances would be “substantially similar”—not identical—to the draft ordinances attached to the invitations. The court found that the record demonstrated that post-bid changes were within the scope of the invitations to bid and that no bidder was misled or disadvantaged. The Court of Appeal also found that POCF failed to meet its burden of showing that SDG&E received an improper advantage because it lacked a constitutional franchise. In addition, the court ruled that surcharges imposed by the ordinances awarding the franchises were not unconstitutional taxes; that the trial court properly severed a two-thirds voting requirement for franchise termination; and that the California Environmental Quality Act did not apply to the ordinances. Protect Our Communities Foundation v. City of San Diego, No. D083588 (Cal. Ct. App. May 26, 2026)

New York State Supreme Court Dismissed Challenge to Lower Manhattan Coastal Resiliency Project

The New York State Supreme Court dismissed a challenge to Battery Park City Authority’s (BPCA) approval of the second phase of the Battery Park City Coastal Resiliency Project. The challenge was filed by two nonprofit organizations and two residents of Battery Park City. Completing the project would require temporarily closing parts of Battery City Park to install a floodwall. The court found that BPCA did not violate the State Environmental Quality Review Act because its environmental review was not “arbitrary, capricious, or affected by an error of law.” Rather, it reflected years of engagement with residents, elected officials, community members, and consultants to account for a range of environmental impacts. Additionally, the court found that petitioners failed to provide any empirical data or expert testimony to support their contention that the division of the coastal resiliency strategy into two phases represented impermissible segmentation. The court also determined that the project did not violate the public trust doctrine because the doctrine does not apply to State parkland, and because the project did not constitute an “alienation of land for nonpark purposes.” Finally, the court dismissed the petitioners’ State constitutional claim because the New York Constitution’s Green Amendment does not provide an implied private right of action, and, even if it did, the petitioners failed to establish a violation of the amendment. Battery Alliance v. Battery Park City Authority, No. 162911/2025 (N.Y. Sup. Ct. June 29, 2026)

NEW U.S. CASES AND FILINGS

NRDC, 18 States, D.C., and New York City Challenged EPA Rollback of Refrigerant Restrictions; Five Trade Groups Challenged Portions of Rollback Rule 

On July 20, 2026, Natural Resources Defense Council (NRDC) filed a petition for review in the D.C. Circuit Court of Appeals challenging the U.S. Environmental Protection Agency’s (EPA’s) final reconsideration rule amending regulations implementing the Technology Transitions Provisions of the American Innovation and Manufacturing Act of 2020 (AIM Act). On July 21, 18 states, the District of Columbia, and New York City filed a petition for review challenging the rule. The final rule rolled back regulatory provisions that imposed restrictions on hydrofluorocarbons (HFCs) in certain intermodal refrigerated transport containers, certain chillers used for industrial process refrigeration (IPR), certain IPR equipment used to manufacture semiconductors, retail food remote condensing units, supermarket systems, cold storage warehouses, certain laboratory equipment, and residential and light commercial air conditioning and heat pump systems. NRDC’s and the states and cities’ cases were consolidated with two other pending challenges filed by trade associations: (1) a proceeding seeking review only of certain portions of the final rule addressing cold storage warehouse systems, remote condensing units in retail food refrigeration systems, and supermarket systems, and (2) a proceeding seeking review of provisions addressing remote condensing unit systems and supermarket systems and the 60-day effective date for those amended provisions. A manufacturer and installer of industrial-scale refrigeration systems and a trade association moved to intervene on behalf of EPA; they argued that no party would adequately represent their interest in seeing that regulations do not overly restrict the use of refrigerants in the cold storage sector. The manufacturer-installer and trade association also filed a petition for review challenging one subdivision of the final rule that addressed cold storage warehouse systems. A second motion to intervene to defend the final rule was filed by four trade associations “whose members share a need for continuous and reliable refrigeration, cold-chain operations, and HVAC equipment.” ALTA Refrigeration, Inc. v. EPA, No. 26-1202 (D.C. Cir., filed July 24, 2026); Massachusetts v. EPA, No. 26-1193 (D.C. Cir., filed July 21, 2026); Natural Resources Defense Council v. EPA, No. 26-1188 (D.C. Cir., filed July 20, 2026); Air-Conditioning, Heating, & Refrigeration Institute v. EPA, No. 26-1174 (D.C. Cir., filed June 25, 2026); Heating, Air-Conditioning & Refrigeration Distributors International v. EPA, No. 26-1168 (D.C. Cir., filed June 24, 2026)

Youth Plaintiffs Filed Petition for En Banc Rehearing of Ninth Circuit Decision Rejecting Challenge to Trump Energy Executive Orders

Youth plaintiffs-appellants filed a petition in the Ninth Circuit Court of Appeals requesting rehearing en banc of the court’s June 2026 decision finding that they lacked standing to challenge the constitutionality of three energy-related executive orders issued by President Trump. The plaintiffs argued that the June decision presented “questions of exceptional importance” regarding (1) whether courts can ignore uncontested factual allegations that the executive orders caused the plaintiffs’ injuries for standing purposes, (2) whether courts lack power to issue relief against allegedly unconstitutional executive orders, and (3) whether the inclusion of broad goals in an executive order alongside specific policy directives can shield the entire executive order from judicial review. The plaintiffs contended that the June decision disregarded their allegations and evidence regarding how the executive orders caused their climate change-related injuries. They also argued that the June decision was “based largely on Juliana v. United States” but failed to cite or distinguish post-Juliana precedent from the Supreme Court and the Ninth Circuit that was incompatible with the panel’s decision. They also argued that the panel decision created a circuit split, citing decisions from the D.C., First, and Fourth Circuits. Lighthiser v. Trump, No. 25-6714 (9th Cir. July 16, 2026)

Lawsuit Challenged Reissuance of Nationwide Permit for Oil and Gas Pipeline Projects

Five environmental organizations filed suit in the federal district court for the District of Columbia challenging the reissuance of Nationwide Permit 12, a general permit for oil and gas pipeline projects issued by the U.S. Army Corps of Engineers pursuant to Section 404 of the Clean Water Act. The organizations asserted violations of the Endangered Species Act (ESA), NEPA, the Clean Water Act, and the Administrative Procedure Act. Under the ESA, the complaint alleged that reissuance of the permit required programmatic ESA Section 7 consultation because the permit would allow activities that result in direct harm to listed species as well as indirect impacts associated with oil spills and climate change. Under NEPA, the complaint alleged that the Corps failed to take the requisite hard look at the significant environmental effects of the projects permitted or authorized by the permit. Center for Biological Diversity v. U.S. Army Corps of Engineers, No. 1:26-cv-02571 (D.D.C., filed July 22, 2026)

States and D.C. Sought to Intervene as Plaintiffs in Lawsuit Challenging Department of Defense “Wind Freeze”

Eighteen states and the District of Columbia (the States) filed a motion to intervene in a lawsuit challenging the U.S. Department of Defense’s decision to halt approvals for land-based wind energy projects in the United States. The States argued that this “Wind Freeze” adversely affected them, including by undermining their efforts to procure wind energy, maintain grid stability, enforce their clean energy policies, create jobs and generate tax revenue, and protect public health and the environment. The States contended that the plaintiffs in the suit represent commercial and financial interests of privately owned companies and could not adequately represent the States’ sovereign interests. Renewable Northwest v. Hegseth, No. 3:26-cv-01092 (D. Or.)

Endangered Species Act Lawsuits Challenged Decision Not to List Horseshoe Crab, Failure to Designate Critical Habitat for Queen Conch and Pearl River Map Turtle, and Failure to Act on Listing Petitions for Other Climate Change-Threatened Species

• On July 16, 2026, Center for Biological Diversity (CBD) filed a lawsuit in the federal district court for the District of Oregon to compel the U.S. Fish and Wildlife Service (FWS) to issue (1) 12-month findings under the Endangered Species Act (ESA) on CBD’s petitions to list four species and (2) a 90-day finding on CBD’s petition to list a fifth species. The complaint alleged that FWS had found that CBD’s petitions presented information suggesting that climate change might be among the threats to the Alvord chub (a freshwater fish) and the cinnamon juga, Great Basin ramshorn, and Donner und Blitzen pebblesnail (four species of freshwater snails). Regarding the fifth species, the banded juga (also a freshwater snail), CBD alleged that the species faced threats from impairment of its habitat due to water that is too warm and dissolved oxygen levels that are too low. CBD’s petitions regarding the five species were filed between February and August 2024. Center for Biological Diversity v. U.S. Fish & Wildlife Service, No. 3:26-cv-1461 (D. Or., filed July 16, 2026)
• On July 15, 2026, CBD filed a lawsuit in the federal district court for the District of Columbia challenging FWS’s failure to designate critical habitat for the Pearl River Map Turtle as required by deadlines mandated in the ESA. The Pearl River Map Turtle was listed as threatened on July 12, 2024, but FWS did not designate critical habitat concurrently or, if not determinable at that time, within one year of listing. The complaint alleged that the Pearl River Map Turtle is threatened with extinction due to degradation and loss of its habitat in the Pearl River system in Mississippi and Louisiana and that the effects of climate change such as increasing temperatures, drought, sea level rise, hurricane regime changes, and increased seasonal precipitation present additional threats. Center for Biological Diversity v. Burgum, No. 1:26-cv-02472 (D.D.C., filed July 15, 2026)
• On July 8, 2026, CBD filed a lawsuit in the federal district court for the District of Columbia challenging the National Marine Fisheries Service’s (NMFS’s) failure to designate critical habitat for the queen conch concurrently with its listing of the queen conch as threatened on February 14, 2024. The complaint alleged that NMFS found at that time that critical habitat was not then determinable but also failed to designate critical habitat within one year after that date as required by the ESA. The complaint alleged that overharvesting, pollution, habitat degradation, and climate change have placed the species in danger of extinction in the foreseeable future. Center for Biological Diversity v. Lutnick, No. 1:26-cv-02397 (D.D.C., filed July 8, 2026)
• In May, CBD filed suit in the federal district court for the District of Columbia challenging the denial of Endangered Species Act protection to the Atlantic (or American) horseshoe crab. NOAA Fisheries denied CBD’s petition to list the horseshoe crab as threatened or endangered on February 18, 2026 approximately a month and a half after CBD filed an earlier lawsuit to compel issuance of a 90-day finding on the petition. CBD voluntarily dismissed the earlier suit after the denial. The May complaint alleged that a “variety of threats are pushing Horseshoe Carbs to the brink of extinction,” including climate change and sea level rise. CBD asserted that NOAA Fisheries’ 90-day finding on its petition was arbitrary, capricious, and unlawful because it applied an “improperly heightened standard”; relied on third-party information; and arbitrarily determined there was no significant portion of the horseshoe crab’s range where listing was warranted. Center for Biological Diversity v. Soler, No. 1:26-cv-01831 (D.D.C., filed May 28, 2026); Center for Biological Diversity v. National Marine Fisheries Service, No. 1:26-cv-00008 (D.D.C.)

Sierra Club Challenged Decision by Wisconsin Department of Natural Resources to Approve Data Center Project Without Environmental Impact Statement

Sierra Club requested review by the Wisconsin Circuit Court of a decision by the Wisconsin Department of Natural Resources (DNR) to issue a Final Air Pollution Control Construction Permit and Operation Permit to a data center project without completing an environmental impact statement (EIS) under the Wisconsin Environmental Policy Act (WEPA). Sierra Club alleged that the first phase of the planned data center campus is expected to consist of four buildings occupying 672 acres of previously agricultural and open land and will require filling in 4.7 acres of wetlands. It will need 1.3 gigawatts of electrical power to operate, more than all households in Milwaukee County combined, requiring new high-voltage transmission lines and gas-fired power plants. The campus will also include 45 industrial-sized diesel generators. Around-the-clock construction on the campus began in December 2025. WEPA requires that DNR “must prepare a draft EIS, provide an opportunity for public review and comment, hold a public hearing, and prepare a final EIS responding to comments received” for any “major action significantly affecting the quality of the human environment.” Wisconsin Administrative Code chapter NR 150 details additional procedural requirements for drafting an EIS, including providing an opportunity for public review and comment and holding a public hearing. DNR did not provide an EIS for the data center project. Instead it provided an Environmental Analysis Summary and Environmental Analysis Supplement. Sierra Club alleged that DNR failed to meet its obligations under WEPA and NR 150 by not drafting an EIS and by not providing an opportunity for public comment or holding a public hearing. Sierra Club claimed that the assessment was insufficient in part because the agency failed to obtain comment from the Public Service Commission, which has jurisdiction and expertise with regard to the transmission and generation projects associated with the data center. It further alleged that DNR failed to consider climate change impacts associated with the buildout of gas-fired power plants to meet the project’s energy demands and whether those facilities are consistent with the State’s clean energy and greenhouse gas reduction goals, among other impacts. Sierra Club requested that the court reverse or remand the agency’s decision that an EIS was not required and set aside or remand the approval of the project’s Air Pollution Control Construction Permit until the agency complies with WEPA. Sierra Club v. Wisconsin Department of Natural Resources, No. 2026CV000294 (Wis. Cir. Ct., filed July 10, 2026)

California Organization Alleged CEQA Violations in Approval of Cap-and-Invest Amendments

Communities for a Better Environment (CBE), a California environmental health and justice organization, filed a petition for writ of mandate against the California Air Resources Board (CARB) and its Executive Officer in California Superior Court. CBE alleged that CARB’s May 29, 2026 approval of amendments to the State’s Cap-and-Invest program (formerly Cap-and-Trade) violated the California Environmental Quality Act (CEQA). Adopted in 2011, California’s Cap-and-Invest program aimed to reduce greenhouse gas emissions by imposing annual aggregate emissions limitations on large industrial facilities. CBE alleged that changes made to the January 2026 proposal in April 2026 (the “15-Day Changes”) would undermine California’s greenhouse gas reduction targets and divert revenue from greenhouse gas-reducing projects and ratepayer assistance funded by Cap-and-Invest auction proceeds. CBE focused particularly on the new “Manufacturing Decarbonization Incentive” (MDI), which grants free emissions allowances to industrial facilities for investments in biofuels, hydrogen, carbon capture, and related infrastructure. CBE argued that the 15-Day Changes’ increased allowances available for the MDI “fundamentally altered” the program without corresponding revisions to the environmental review or an opportunity for meaningful public comment. CBE further alleged that the Final Environmental Impact Assessment (EIA), posted only two days before CARB’s vote, failed to analyze the environmental, air quality, and cumulative impacts of the 15-Day Changes. CBE also alleged that the Final EIA lacked an adequate project description and baseline (including because it failed to disclose increasing impacts of climate change and air pollution), improperly rejected consideration of more stringent alternatives, gave conclusory responses to public comments, and rested on an unsupported statement of overriding considerations. CBE asked the court to set aside CARB’s approval of the amendments, certification of the Final EIA, and adoption of related findings; to enjoin implementation of the amendments pending CEQA compliance; and for a declaratory judgment that CARB’s actions violated CEQA; and for costs and attorneys’ fees. Communities for a Better Environment v. California Air Resources Board, No. 26STCP02498 (Cal. Super. Ct., filed July 1, 2026)

Environmental Organizations Filed CEQA Lawsuit Challenging Large Rail Facility in City of Barstow

Four environmental organizations filed a lawsuit in California Superior Court challenging the City Council for the City of Barstow’s approval of the Burlington Northern Santa Fe (BNSF) Barstow International Gateway railyard (BIG Project). Their petition alleged that the BIG Project would be largest rail facility in the country, comprising “a 5,000-acre rail and logistics facility that includes 9 million square feet of transload warehousing, an ancillary rail storage area, a block swap yard, and an intermodal facility.” The organizations alleged that the City’s environmental review under the California Environmental Quality Act (CEQA) failed to adequately disclose, analyze, and mitigate environmental impacts, including impacts on greenhouse gas emissions. Regarding greenhouse gas emissions, the organizations alleged that the environmental impact report (EIR) relied on a “fundamentally flawed” analysis of “Truck Miles Traveled” and did not address greenhouse gas emissions impacts resulting directly or indirectly from the increase in processing capacity at BNSF’s other railyards in the region or from new and changed heavy-duty truck traffic across California. The organizations contended that the EIR’s sole greenhouse gas mitigation measure was inadequate. The petition described the mitigation measure as providing that the City prepare a Climate Action Plan to align emissions targets with State law targets while conceding that the City would not achieve the reduction targets. The organizations alleged that the EIR failed to consider all feasible mitigation measures to address greenhouse gas impacts, including zero-emission line-haul locomotives, switcher locomotives, trucks, rubber-tired gantry cranes, and transport refrigeration units. The petition also alleged that the final EIR deleted a battery energy storage system from the project description, which deprived the public of an opportunity to comment on feasible ways to avoid or minimize resulting impacts such as greenhouse gas emissions. In addition, the petition alleged that the final EIR did not provide an explanation for changing the conclusions regarding the significance of greenhouse gas emissions impacts from “Less than Significant” in the draft EIR to “Potentially Significant” in the final EIR. Sierra Club v. City of Barstow, No. _ (Cal. Super. Ct., filed June 30, 2026)

NEW CASES OUTSIDE THE UNITED STATES

Canada: Investigation against the Royal Bank of Canada sought under the Competition Act

On June 10, 2022, an application seeking investigation by the Commissioner of Competition was filed against the Royal Bank of Canada (RBC), under the Competition Act. The applicants alleged that RBC engaged in greenwashing by falsely or misleadingly representing that it supports the goals of the Paris Agreement, is committed to achieving net-zero emissions in its lending portfolio by 2050, and will provide $500 billion in sustainable financing, while continuing to provide substantial financing for fossil fuel development and expansion. The Applicants argued that these representations were materially false or misleading because RBC lacked a credible plan to align its financing activities with a 1.5°C emissions pathway and because its definition of “sustainable financing” permitted financing of fossil fuel companies and projects. They requested that the Competition Bureau conduct an inquiry under section 74.01(1)(a) of the Competition Act, require RBC to withdraw the challenged representations until specified conditions were met, and impose an administrative monetary penalty.

Following the application, the Competition Bureau opened a formal inquiry into RBC’s climate-related representations in October 2022. As of mid-2026, no public decision or enforcement action appears to have been issued, and the status of the inquiry remains unresolved. Application for inquiry regarding the Royal Bank of Canada’s apparent false and misleading representations about action on climate change, while continuing to finance fossil fuel development (Canada, Competition Bureau of Canada)

Canada: Alberta challenged Canada’s environmental regulation as unconstitutionally intruding on provincial authority

The Government of Alberta initiated a constitutional reference challenging the validity of Canada’s Clean Electricity Regulations (SOR/2024-263), which aim to reduce GHG emissions from the electricity sector as part of Canada’s climate-change and net-zero strategy. Alberta argues that the regulations intrude on provincial authority over electricity generation and natural resources, while Canada maintains that the regulations are a valid exercise of federal legislative power, including the criminal law power.

In a January 8, 2026 case-management decision, the court addressed intervention applications by Climate Action Network Canada, the Pembina Institute, the David Suzuki Foundation, and Clean Energy Canada, applications to supplement the evidentiary record, and scheduling of the reference hearing. The Court granted intervenor status to the Pembina Institute, the David Suzuki Foundation, and Clean Energy Canada, denied intervenor status to Climate Action Network Canada, and allowed the David Suzuki Foundation to file a limited expert report. The final scheduled target date for the hearing of this Reference will be amended from June 2026 to Fall 2026. Reference Re Clean Electricity Regulations (Canada, Alberta Court of Appeal)

DECISIONS IN CASES OUTSIDE THE U.S.

Brazil: Court declares government agency’s interpretive order null with retrospective effect

This is a Public Civil Action with an injunction, filed by ISA, ABRAMPA and Greenpeace Brasil, against IBAMA and the Federal Union. The action aims to determine the nullity of IBAMA’s Interpretative Order 7036900/2020, which waived the need for authorization by the Agency on the export of wood products and by-products of native species. According to the previous regulation, the person interested in obtaining the export authorization of wood products would have to present, in person, at the IBAMA unit that controls the customs warehouse, a series of documents proving the legality of the goods, submitting them to inspection and release. The plaintiffs, challenging the order, argued that requesting only the Document of Forest Origin (DOF) is unsatisfactory for the correct inspection, monitoring and control of wood exports. The plaintiffs explained that the composition of the DOF is based on data entered by the interested parties themselves, and not by IBAMA, and that the Agency would not be able to intervene before the shipments of cargo go abroad.

The plaintiffs suggest that this change is part of the deconstruction of environmental public policy in Brazil, to the detriment of protective legislation. This relates to the risk of a higher incidence of illegal deforestation, especially in the Amazon, with the new order. The plaintiffs explain the relationship between the increase in deforestation and climate change, in particular the Brazilian scenario of high GHG emissions, derived from changes in land use, and the loss of carbon sinks, resulting from the suppression of native vegetation, in addition to its deleterious effects on tropical forests, with changes in the rainy season and an increase in the risk of reaching the “point of no return” of devastation of the Amazon Forest. In this sense, the plaintiffs request the suspension of the effects of Interpretative Order 7036900/2020 be determined, which waived the need for authorization for the export of wood products and by-products of native species and, definitively, requires if its nullity is determined, combined with the obligation to take all necessary measures to restore the effects of the previous regulation, regarding the requirement of authorization for the export of native wood.

In June 2020, the court granted IBAMA’s request to seal the case files, since some of the documents submitted by the agency contained enforcement strategies that needed to remain confidential to ensure the effectiveness of the actions.

The Union filed a response requesting recognition of its lack of standing as a defendant and, alternatively, the dismissal of all claims against the Union, since executive activities and environmental policing powers fall under the jurisdiction of autonomous agencies.

IBAMA also filed a response, requesting a complete dismissal of the claims made in the initial complaint. It argued that Interpretative Ruling 7036900/2020 was issued to analyze the expiration of IBAMA Normative Instruction 15/2011 regarding the need for specific authorization for the export of native forest products and byproducts in general. It maintained that, following the publication of IBAMA Normative Instruction 21/2014, which establishes the National System for Controlling the Origin of Forest Products (SINAFLOR), the previous regulation was tacitly revoked, and this change did not imply, in any way, a reduction or limitation of IBAMA’s supervisory action. It further argued that the integration between SINAFLOR and SISDOF merely fulfilled the Principle of Administrative Efficiency, providing even greater transparency to the information, and that the Export DOF was already the administrative act (license) foreseen by article 37 of the Forest Code (Law 12.651/2012), for the purposes of customs clearance of timber products and by-products of native forest species, and the fact that it is integrated into the same system (SINAFLOR) and the same module that issues the license foreseen in article 36 of the same Law does not constitute any type of legal impediment, but rather a gain in environmental management and information by the environmental regulatory body.

A judgment was issued partially granting the requests in the initial complaint, declaring the nullity of IBAMA’s Interpretative Order 7036900/2020, with retroactive effect. The court understood that the order resulted in a flagrant breach of a legal provision in the Forest Code, relating to IBAMA’s power and duty to effectively control forest products for export purposes. In deciding on the suitability of the Public Civil Action for the purposes intended by the plaintiffs, it highlighted that the Public Authority is not immune to judicial review of administrative acts and decisions that may lead to deficient environmental protection or a reduction in the levels of timber protection and control. It emphasized the need to protect the Amazon Rainforest as an ecosystem of singular importance for the country’s sustainable development and for fulfilling commitments to mitigate and adapt to the climate crisis. It also stressed that climate change is already showing unmistakable signs of its power to disrupt entire societies and economies, exacerbating inequalities and social injustices that must be combated by everyone.

IBAMA filed an appeal to partially overturn the ruling and modulate the temporal effects of the decision, declaring the nullity of Interpretative Order 7036900/2020 with ex nunc effect from May 20, 2021, the date on which the agency was formally notified of the decision issued by Minister Alexandre de Moraes in PET 8.975, which provisionally suspended the effects of the Interpretative Order.

The Union also appealed the judgment, requesting a reversal in order to uphold the preliminary objection of lack of standing, dismissing the case without prejudice solely in relation to the Union and, on the merits, to modulate the temporal effects of the decision, declaring the Interpretative Order null and void with ex nunc effect from May 20, 2021.

Consecutively, as of March 2026, the court lifted the general confidentiality of the case files, which then began to process publicly. ISA, ABRAMPA and Greenpeace v. Brazil (Brazil, Amazonas Federal Court)

Canada: Litigations were brought to challenge Alberta’s environmental assessment against the Grassy Mountain Steelmaking Coal Project

This entry concerns several litigations stemming from a joint federal-provincial impact assessment conducted under the Impact Assessment Act and Alberta’s environmental assessment regime for the proposed Grassy Mountain Steelmaking Coal Project in southwestern Alberta. In 2021, the Joint Review Panel concluded that the project was likely to cause significant adverse environmental effects that could not be justified in the public interest. In reaching that conclusion, the Panel considered numerous statutory factors, including the project’s greenhouse gas emissions, contribution to climate change, sustainability, cumulative environmental effects, and consistency with Canada’s environmental and climate objectives. Relying on the Panel’s report, the federal Minister determined that the project’s adverse effects were not in the public interest, while Alberta regulators likewise refused to authorize the mine.

The resulting litigation concerns different stages of those regulatory decisions. In Benga Mining Limited v. Canada (Environment and Climate Change), 2024 FC 231, the Federal Court reviewed the federal decision-making process. While rejecting the proponent’s substantive challenges to the Panel’s report and the Minister’s assessment, the Court allowed applications brought by the Piikani Nation and the Stoney Nakoda Nations, finding that procedural fairness had been breached when the Minister considered post-report submissions without giving the Nations an opportunity to respond. The Minister’s Decision Statement was therefore set aside and remitted for redetermination. In Northback Holdings Corporation v. Canada (Environment and Climate Change), 2025 FCA 31, the Federal Court of Appeal held that the proponent’s appeal was not rendered moot by the Federal Court’s judgment and allowed the appeal to proceed. Separately, Northback Holdings Corporation v. Alberta Energy Regulator, 2025 ABCA 186, concerns parallel challenges to the Alberta Energy Regulator’s refusal to approve the project and addresses the availability and scope of judicial review under Alberta’s statutory regulatory framework.

Although none of the courts independently evaluated the project’s greenhouse gas emissions or interpreted Canada’s climate obligations, climate change formed an important part of the statutory context underlying the litigation. The courts repeatedly referred to the impact assessment process, in which greenhouse gas emissions, climate change, sustainability, and broader environmental effects were considered as factors informing the public interest determination. Grassy Mountain Coal Project (Canada, Alberta Court of Appeal; Federal Court of Appeal)

Canada: Challenge against draft plan of subdivision dismissed after expert report on environmental studies were submitted

In 2018, William Shore appealed the Town of Georgina’s approval of a proposed draft plan of subdivision, arguing that the development failed to conform with relevant Official Plan and Secondary Plan policies concerning tree preservation and compensation. He contended that the Town had not adequately considered the ecological significance and functions of trees that would be removed, that the required replacement planting was insufficient, and that compensation should maintain the carbon sequestration capacity of the lost trees. Shore also argued that the subdivision had been approved without proper consideration of climate change and that the design failed to take sufficient advantage of passive solar-heating opportunities.

In response, the developer submitted expert planning evidence showing that environmental studies had been conducted by Beacon Environmental and reviewed by the Lake Simcoe Region Conservation Authority (LSRCA) and the Town. These studies informed tree preservation, compensation, and ecological offsetting measures incorporated into the draft plan conditions. The expert evidence further stated that climate-change considerations had been addressed through woodland protection, tree-compensation requirements, compact subdivision design, and proposed energy-efficient home construction. 

The Town and LSRCA were satisfied that the proposal complied with applicable municipal, regional, and provincial planning policies. Shore v. Town of Georgina (Canada, Local Planning Appeal Tribunal)

Canada: Challenge against local government’s decision expanding coal storage was dismissed

In 2015, Voters Taking Action on Climate Change (VTACC), an environmental advocacy organization, sought judicial review of two British Columbia government decisions relating to the expansion of a coal storage and transshipment facility operated by Texada Quarrying Ltd. (a Lafarge subsidiary) on Texada Island. The challenge arose in the context of VTACC’s broader opposition to thermal coal export infrastructure. VTACC maintained that increasing the facility’s coal-handling capacity would facilitate greater coal exports from British Columbia and ultimately contribute to increased greenhouse gas emissions when the coal was burned. The organization sought to use the permitting process to scrutinize governmental decisions that enabled the expansion of coal-export activities. 

More specifically, VTACC argued that the Chief Inspector of Mines lacked jurisdiction under the Mines Act to authorize expanded coal storage and handling activities because those activities were not sufficiently connected to mining operations and should instead have been regulated under the Environmental Management Act (EMA). VTACC also challenged the Ministry of Environment’s decision that the facility did not require an environmental permit under the EMA and alleged that procedural fairness was breached when additional materials submitted by the company were not made available for public comment.

The Court held that VTACC lacked public interest standing because the dispute concerned a site-specific permitting decision and did not raise an issue of public importance transcending the interests of those directly affected. It characterized the proceeding as a narrow review of a specific permit amendment and environmental permitting determination rather than a challenge to the province’s broader policies regarding coal development, coal exports, or climate change.

The Court nevertheless considered the merits and found that both the Chief Inspector’s permit amendment decision and the Ministry of Environment’s determination were reasonable and procedurally fair. The petition was dismissed. Voters Taking Action on Climate Change v British Columbia (Canada, Supreme Court of British Columbia)

Brazil: Federal court forwards Public Civil Action to the Supreme Federal Court, recognizing the omission of public authorities in combating Amazon deforestation

On October 8, 2020, the Institute of Amazonian Studies filed a Public Civil Action (class action) against the Federal Government of Brazil, seeking recognition of a fundamental right to a stable climate for present and future generations under the Brazilian Constitution, seeking an order to compel the federal government to comply with national climate law. The action was based on an alleged failure of the federal government to comply with its own action plans to prevent deforestation and mitigate and adapt to climate change. Plaintiffs claimed such to be a violation to national law and fundamental rights. 

After some procedural arguments on jurisdiction, the case was decided to forward in the Federal District Court of Curitiba. As part of the following proceedings, Plaintiffs sought an urgent injunctive relief, arguing that it was necessary for the Federal Government to be urgently compelled to carry out direct and effective actions to start forest restoration processes in the Legal Amazon, with the aim of reducing the damage caused to the climate system. In November 2024, the court rejected the request for interim relief, stating that while it acknowledged that the plaintiff’s arguments were credible, that procedural issues were pending. The court required the parties and the MPF to comment on them in order for the relief to be granted. In addition, it ruled that there was partial lis pendens between this action and ADPF 760 and ADO 54 and ordered that the proceedings be suspended for up to a year in order to await the progress of compliance with the judgments handed down in the aforementioned actions. Although plaintiffs filed an interlocutory appeal challenging this rejection, the decision was also upheld due to the pending Supreme Federal Court (STF) decisions on ADPF 760 and ADO 54.

In a decision dated February 2026, STF recognized the connection between the present Public Civil Action and ADPF 760 and ADO 54, ordering the forwarding of the case files to the STF. It pointed to a partial overlap of claims between the aforementioned actions, addressing the omission of public authorities in combating deforestation in the Amazon biome and the fulfillment of climate goals. It emphasized that this was not a case of lis pendens, as there was no identity of parties, since the present action was filed by the IEA, while the others were filed by political parties. Furthermore, given that ADPF 760 was recognized as a structural process, the need for the case files of the present action to be forwarded to the STF was reinforced. Institute of Amazonian Studies v. Brazil (Brazil, Paraná Federal Court)

Brazil: Minister decides not to hear an Argument for Failure to Comply with a Fundamental Precept (ADPF) related to funding for deforestation monitoring based on the applicant’s prior inaction on the same matter

On January 8, 2022, the Rede Sustentabilidade (Rede) political party filed an Argument for Failure to Comply with a Fundamental Precept (ADPF), with a request for an injunction, against the Federal Government’s lack of fund transfers to the National Institute for Space Research (INPE), which made it impossible to monitor deforestation in the Cerrado (PRODES Cerrado). The party highlighted the high percentage of deforestation in the Cerrado and the importance of the Cerrado in terms of preserving biodiversity and social aspects, as indigenous populations, quilombolas, geraizeiras, ribeirinhas, babaçueiras, and vazanteiras survive on the biome’s resources. Arguing that the federal government’s conduct violated various constitutional rights and principles and the precautionary principle, as a precautionary measure, it requested that the Federal Government prove that sufficient funds have been allocated to the PRODES Cerrado project. On a final basis, it requested a judgment upholding the action, confirming the precautionary measure, and declaring the unconstitutionality of the Federal Government’s act of making the monitoring of the Cerrado unfeasible, due to the lack of transfer of funds to INPE.

In a decision dated May 2026, Minister Nunes Marques decided not to hear the present action. He understood that, according to information provided by INPE (National Institute for Space Research), the deforestation monitoring system in the Cerrado biome had not experienced any interruptions at the time the action was filed, in 2022. He considered that, given this, the applicant was notified to comment on the persistence of the alleged situation, but remained silent. This inaction, coupled with the lack of demonstration of current violation of a fundamental precept, evidenced a lack of procedural interest and justified the dismissal of the case. ADPF 934 (Transfer of funds to PRODES Cerrado) (Brazil, Federal Supreme Court)