Climate Litigation Updates (October 9, 2026)

The Sabin Center for Climate Change Law publishes monthly summaries of developments in climate-related litigation. We also add these developments to The Climate Litigation Database on an ongoing basis. If you know of any cases we have missed, please email us at [email protected]. Thanks to JeeHyun Chung for assistance in preparing this update.

HERE ARE THE ADDITIONS TO THE CLIMATE LITIGATION DATABASE FOR UPDATE #215

FEATURED DECISIONS

Two New York Federal Courts Ruled that Clean Air Act and Foreign Affairs Doctrine Preempt New York’s Climate Superfund Law 

On August 31, 2026, in two lawsuits brought by 22 states, business and trade associations, and a coal producer, the federal district court for the Northern District of New York ruled that federal law preempts New York State’s Climate Change Superfund Act (the Act). The Act established a $75 billion Climate Change Adaptation Cost Recovery Program to fund adaptation projects in the state, to be funded by companies that engaged in fossil fuel extraction or crude oil refining from 2000 to 2024 and that are responsible for more than one billion tons of greenhouse gas emissions during that covered period. On the merits of the plaintiffs’ preemption claim, the court rejected New York’s efforts to distinguish the Act’s statutory scheme for compensation from New York City’s state law common law claims in City of New York v. Chevron Corp., in which the Second Circuit held that federal law preempted the City’s claims against fossil fuel companies for climate change-related damages. The district court further concluded that it was not necessary to determine whether the Constitution and federal common law would preempt the Act because “[e]ven if the federal interests ‘incompatible with the application of state law’ that preempted the City’s nuisance claims in City of New York do not, by themselves, justify preemption in this case,” the Climate Change Superfund Act would be preempted by the Clean Air Act. The court found that the Act was not entitled to a presumption against preemption because the statute regulated in an area governed by federal law “in the first place.” Citing City of New York, the district court further concluded that the Clean Air Act’s savings clause did not authorize the “type of state-law claims” the Climate Change Superfund Act codified. The district court also concluded that the U.S. Environmental Protection Agency’s (EPA’s) rescission of the 2009 endangerment finding for greenhouse gases under the Clean Air Act did not affect the preemption analysis, agreeing with plaintiffs that the “critical point” was that Congress delegated to EPA the decision whether to regulate carbon dioxide emissions. The court also concluded that the foreign affairs preemption doctrine would bar any cost recovery demand under the Climate Change Superfund Act against a foreign producer. West Virginia v. James, No. 1:25-cv-00168 (N.D.N.Y. Aug. 31, 2026)

On September 23, 2026, in the United States and EPA’s challenge to the Climate Change Superfund Act, the federal district court for the Southern District of New York also held that the Act was preempted under the Clean Air Act and the foreign affairs doctrine. On the merits of the Clean Air Act preemption claim, the court rejected the defendants’ argument that the Act’s compensation scheme for past greenhouse gas emissions did not regulate emissions. The court described a “backdrop” of precedent establishing that federal common law, rather than state law, traditionally governed interstate air pollution; that the Clean Air Act displaced attempts to abate greenhouse gas emissions under federal common law; and that suits asserting state common law claims to regulate interstate greenhouse gas emissions were also barred. Citing City of New York v. Chevron Corp., the court concluded that because the Climate Change Superfund Act “treads on the same ground as the federal common law governing interstate air pollution disputes,” it was only necessary to determine that the Clean Air Act did not authorize the Act to find that the Act was preempted. Again citing City of New York as controlling, the court concluded that the Clean Air Act did not authorize the Act. The court further concluded that EPA’s rescission of the Clean Air Act endangerment finding for greenhouse gases from motor vehicles did not alter this conclusion. On the merits of the foreign affairs preemption claim, the court concluded that the preemption doctrine applied because (1) the Climate Change Superfund Act “does not regulate an area of traditional state responsibility” because “[t]he harm caused by global warming ‘presents a uniquely international problem’ that is ‘not well-suited to the application of state law,” and (2) the Act “intrudes on the federal government’s foreign affairs powers” because addressing global greenhouse gas emissions is the subject of foreign policy. The court found that the U.S.’s announced intent to withdraw from the United Nations Framework Convention on Climate Change “does not make the regulation of greenhouse gases emitted from extraterritorial sources any less a matter falling within the sphere of the foreign policy of the United States.” The court therefore concluded that the Act, “as applied to foreign activities of fossil fuel producers, is field-preempted under the foreign affairs doctrine.” The court dismissed the U.S.’s remaining claims without prejudice. United States v. New York, No. 1:25-cv-03656 (S.D.N.Y. Sep. 23, 2026)

Netherlands: Amsterdam District Court allows case against ING Bank to proceed 

On March 28, 2025, Milieudefensie served a formal summons to ING Bank, initiating a civil lawsuit before the Amsterdam District Court. The case follows a notice of liability issued on January 19, 2024, and a final demand letter on January 16, 2025. ING responded to both letters but did not meet the group’s demands. With over 30,000 co-claimants and 100,000 members, Milieudefensie claims standing under Dutch law to pursue collective environmental and human rights claims.

Milieudefensie alleges this conduct violates the societal duty of care under Article 6:162 of the Dutch Civil Code, drawing on precedent (Urgenda v Netherlands, Milieudefensie v. Shell), climate science (IPCC, IEA), and soft-law instruments (UNGPs, OECD Guidelines) to argue that ING’s failure to adopt effective emissions-reduction policies is tortious. The case relies on ING’s role financing both direct and scope-3 facilitated emissions it fails to adequately report or reduce, and on the endangerment doctrine, highlighting ING’s long-standing knowledge of climate risk, its capacity to act, and the foreseeable harm from inaction.

Milieudefensie asks the court to compel ING to take the following actions:

1. Halve its total emissions by 2030, and continue reducing thereafter, in line with the IPCC’s 1.5°C pathway.
2. Reduce emissions in eight major sectors it finances (e.g., steel, aviation) in line with the International Energy Agency’s Net Zero Emissions (NZE) scenario.
3. Cease all financing and investment in companies starting new oil and gas projects.
4. Require all large corporate clients to submit credible, science-based climate plans.

These demands rest on the argument that absolute, not merely intensity-based, emissions reductions are necessary to meet ING’s legal and human rights obligations, grounded in IPCC carbon-budget data showing global CO₂ emissions must fall at least 48% by 2030 and reach net-zero by 2050 for a 50% chance of staying within 1.5°C, and in human rights law — including the KlimaSeniorinnen v. Switzerland judgment — protecting the rights to life, health, and a healthy environment.

Milieudefensie claims that ING’s “Terra approach” and other existing policies are inadequate because:

• They rely primarily on intensity targets instead of absolute reductions;
• They exclude 70% of ING’s financed emissions and all facilitated emissions;
•  ING continues to support fossil fuel companies, including those expanding oil and gas production;
•  ING lacks absolute sector-specific targets;
•  Executive remuneration is not linked to emissions reductions;
•  ING’s engagement policy prioritizes financial risk over climate harm.

ING ranks among the top 30 global fossil fuel financiers, having facilitated over €106 billion in such investment since the Paris Agreement. Anticipating an “effectiveness” defense, Milieudefensie argues, citing Urgenda, Shell, KlimaSeniorinnen, and other precedent, that partial responsibility suffices for tortious liability and that holding ING accountable can have a systemic effect on markets and policy.

On September 9-10, 2026, the Amsterdam District Court ruled that Milieudefensie’s claims against ING are admissible, allowing the case to proceed. The court rejected ING’s argument that the claims should be dismissed because another bank would simply replace ING’s financing of polluting companies if ING reduced it. This was a procedural ruling on admissibility only; the court has not yet addressed the merits of Milieudefensie’s claims. A hearing on the merits is expected in Spring 2027. Milieudefensie v. ING Group and ING Bank(Netherlands, Amsterdam District Court)

U.S. DECISIONS AND SETTLEMENTS

Tenth Circuit Said Corps of Engineers Gave Sufficient Consideration to Climate Change’s Effects on Feasibility of Project to Increase Reservoir’s Holding Capacity

The Tenth Circuit Court of Appeals reversed a district court’s decision that the U.S. Army Corps of Engineers violated the Clean Water Act and the National Environmental Policy Act (NEPA) when it issued a permit for a project to increase the holding capacity of a reservoir northwest of Boulder, Colorado. The project was proposed by the Board of Water Commissioners of the City and County of Denver (Denver Water) to prevent potential future water shortages. The district court allowed Denver Water to finish construction of a higher dam but enjoined Denver Water from enlarging and diverting water to the reservoir. The Tenth Circuit rejected Denver Water’s contention that because the activity authorized by the Corps permit was already complete, the appeal was constitutionally moot. The court found that the plaintiffs’ alleged procedural, aesthetic, recreational, and scientific harms could still be partially remedied by remand to the Corps. The Tenth Circuit found it was not necessary to address prudential mootness because the Clean Water Act and NEPA claims failed on the merits under the Administrative Procedure Act’s “deferential arbitrary-and-capricious standard,” which the Tenth Circuit said “carries even more deference” in the context of a NEPA claim. On the merits of the claims, the court rejected the plaintiffs’ arguments that the Corps defined the project’s purpose too narrowly and that the analysis of the costs of alternatives and of climate change’s effects on feasibility (due to reduced and earlier peak stream flows) was arbitrary and capricious. Regarding climate change, the court found that the rejection of a quantitative model to measure stream flow reductions resulting from climate change was within the agency’s discretion. The Tenth Circuit concluded that the Corps “made a judgment, based on its scientific and technical expertise, that existing scientific research did not show a clear link between climate change and decreased firm yield to the Reservoir” and that the record “thus demonstrates that the Corps considered and meaningfully evaluated whether climate change would … render the project impracticable.” In addition, the Tenth Circuit found that the Corps “meaningfully evaluated” the quantitative models and gave “a reasonable explanation for the models’ unreliability.” The Tenth Circuit also declined to substitute its own judgment for that of the Corps regarding the reliability of a scientific study on Colorado River water availability. Save the Colorado v. Graham, No. 25-1137 (10th Cir. Sep. 15, 2026)

Federal Court Said Michigan Lacked Standing for Federal Antitrust Claims Alleging Fossil Fuel Defendants Conspired to Suppress Renewable Energy

The federal district court for the Western District of Michigan ruled that Michigan lacked standing for federal antitrust claims against four fossil fuel companies and American Petroleum Institute (API). The court described Michigan’s case as claiming that the fossil fuel companies in the 1970s “agreed, through API, to suppress renewable energies to maintain supracompetitive prices in the transportation and primary energy markets,” allegedly resulting in many harms to Michigan and its residents, including “overpriced energy, a lack of options in the energy market, increased insurance premiums for households and depressing home values, and increased costs to implement measures mitigating the negative externalities of fossil fuel use.” The court concluded that Michigan plausibly alleged only one “antitrust injury” under the Clayton Act: overcharges for energy in the transportation and primary energy markets. The court found that Michigan could not allege that renewable energy output reduction was an antitrust injury because this output reduction was not in the transportation and primary energy markets Michigan defined in its complaint. The court also found that reduction in product variety and innovation would not independently qualify as an antitrust injury. In addition, the court said Michigan conceded that other alleged harms would not independently qualify as antitrust injuries though Michigan contended that consequential damages could be recovered for those other harms. The court rejected the defendants’ contention that Michigan made only conclusory allegations regarding overcharges. Although the court concluded that the alleged energy overcharges would qualify as an antitrust injury, the court found that Michigan failed to plausibly allege the proximate causation element of antitrust standing. First, the court concluded that Supreme Court precedent barred recovery for damages as an indirect purchaser from the fossil fuel companies since the alleged conspiracy involved trade in the wholesale markets, not in the retail markets in which Michigan and its residents made purchases. Second, the court found that Michigan could not recover damages for any direct purchases from the companies or from retailers owned by the fossil fuel company defendants because proximate cause factors such as “the indirectness of the injury, the uncertain causal chain, and the existence of other potential plaintiffs” outweighed factors in favor of proximate cause. The court also found that “the tenuous causal connection … similarly cuts against proximate cause for an injunction.” The court dismissed the federal antitrust claim with prejudice and declined to exercise supplemental jurisdiction over Michigan state law claim under the Michigan Antitrust Reform Act. People of the State of Michigan v. BP p.l.c., No. 1:26-cv-00254 (W.D. Mich. Sep. 22, 2026)

BP, Chevron, Phillips 66, and Shell Defendants Voluntarily Dismissed from Climate Change Wrongful Death Action; Exxon and Transmontaigne Remain as Defendants

On September 16, 2026, BP, Chevron, Phillips 66, and Shell defendants and the plaintiff in a climate change wrongful death lawsuit stipulated and jointly moved for dismissal of all claims against these defendants. The court issued orders dismissing the defendants on September 17. The remaining defendants are Exxon Mobil Corporation, ExxonMobil Oil Corporation, and Transmontaigne Partners LLC. 

Earlier in September, all defendants notified the Washington Superior Court that they would seek discretionary review by the Court of Appeals of the Superior Court’s denial of their joint motion to dismiss for failure to state a claim. Leon v. Exxon Mobil Corp., No. 25-2-15986-8 SEA (Wash. Super. Ct. Sep. 17, 2026)

ConocoPhillips Defendants Dismissed from Tribes’ Climate Cases on Personal Jurisdiction Grounds; No Leave to Amend

In the Shoalwater Bay and Makah Indian Tribes’ state-law suits against fossil fuel industry defendants, the Washington Superior Court granted ConocoPhillips and ConocoPhillips Company’s (together ConocoPhillips’s) motion to dismiss the Tribes’ amended complaints for lack of personal jurisdiction. The court previously dismissed the Tribes’ complaints against ConocoPhillips on April 29, 2026, finding that the complaints only pled facts before 2012, which was insufficient for the exercise of jurisdiction over the claims. Regarding the amended complaint, the court found that the plaintiffs did not allege purportedly deceptive statements regarding climate change by ConocoPhillips that targeted Washington. The court also declined to impute subsidiaries’ forum contacts to ConocoPhillips. In addition, the court reiterated that pre-2012 contacts did not relate to the plaintiffs’ claims, found that the plaintiffs failed to allege facts tying a single ConocoPhillips office to their claims, and further found that, even if alleged contacts were not time-barred or if subsidiary contacts could be imputed to ConocoPhillips, “contacts consisting of crude-oil deliveries and gas-station and refinery operations” did not relate to the Tribes deception-based claims. The court dismissed the complaints without leave to amend. Shoalwater Bay Indian Tribe v. Exxon Mobil Corp., No. 23-2-25215-2 (Wash. Super. Ct. Sep. 4, 2026) 

Massachusetts State Court Denied Exxon’s Motion to Compel Production of Privileged Documents in Public Records Act Suit Seeking Department of Environmental Protection Records

In a Massachusetts Public Records Act (PRA) case brought by Exxon Mobil Corporation (Exxon) and a lawyer who submitted a PRA request to the Massachusetts Department of Environmental Protection (Mass DEP) on Exxon’s behalf, a Massachusetts Superior Court denied a motion by the plaintiffs to compel production of documents withheld as privileged. The lawyer submitted the request in January 2025 for records related to Mass DEP regulations under the Global Warming Solutions Act related to Executive Office carbon dioxide emissions. The parties agreed that the requested records overlapped, “at least in part,” with discovery requests made by Exxon and denied by the court in Commonwealth v. Exxon Mobil Corp., in which Massachusetts alleges that Exxon deceived investors and consumers regarding its products’ role in causing climate change. Mass DEP initially denied Exxon’s PRA request on the grounds that Exxon impermissibly sought to circumvent the order denying discovery. After the PRA suit was filed, Mass DEP “changed course and produced what it maintains are all records responsive.” In a March 2026 decision, the court deferred a decision on Mass DEP’s motion to dismiss and allowed limited discovery on whether “there is any reason to believe that there are documents responsive” to Exxon’s request that Mass DEP had not produced. In the order denying the plaintiffs’ motion to compel, the court said the plaintiffs failed to show that communications on the privilege log concerned the scope of Mass DEP’s initial search for documents or the existence or lack of existence of additional documents. The court also agreed with Mass DEP that the agency did not waive privilege by initially relying on the discovery order as a reason for denying the PRA request. The court also found that documents were shielded from production by attorney-client privilege or the work product doctrine. Exxon Mobil Corp. v. Massachusetts Department of Environmental Protection, No. 2584CV00863-C (Mass. Super. Ct. Sep. 11, 2026)

Ninth Circuit Affirmed Dismissal of Challenge to Washington State Energy Code

The Ninth Circuit Court of Appeals affirmed the dismissal on sovereign immunity grounds of a lawsuit challenging the Washington State Energy Code, which the plaintiffs argued was preempted by federal law. The Ninth Circuit found that the plaintiffs challenging the Energy Code failed to establish that the individual defendants—the Washington Attorney General and the members of the State Building Code Council—had “some connection with the enforcement” of the Energy Code that would overcome Washington’s assertion of sovereign immunity. Rivera v. Sami, No. 25-2134 (9th Cir. Sept. 9, 2026)

Second Circuit Denied Rehearing En Banc of Decision that Federal Law Did Not Preempt New York State and New York City Building Electrification Requirements

On August 26, 2026, the Second Circuit Court of Appeals denied petitions for rehearing en banc of its opinion holding that the Energy Policy and Conservation Act (EPCA) did not preempt New York State and New York City building electrification requirements. Both petitions argued that rehearing en banc was warranted to rectify the circuit split created by the panel’s decision, which rejected the Ninth Circuit’s interpretation of California Restaurant Association v. City of Berkeley and also contradicted the federal government’s interpretation of EPCA. The petitions also argued that the panel decision was wrong because “EPCA’s plain text preempts the challenged bans because they effectively impose energy conservation standards that cap covered appliances’ energy use at zero.” The deadline for filing a petition for writ of certiorari in the U.S. Supreme Court is November 24, 2026. Association of Contracting Plumbers of the City of New York v. City of New York, No. 25-977 (2d Cir. Aug. 26, 2026); Mulhern Gas Co., Inc. v. Mosley, No. 25-2041 (2d Cir. Aug. 26, 2026)

Eighth Circuit Ruled that District Court Erred in Applying Upward Departure in Sentencing Guidelines for Climate Activist

The Eighth Circuit Court of Appeals affirmed the convictions of an individual who pleaded guilty to two counts of destruction of an energy facility but vacated his sentence and remanded for resentencing, finding that there was procedural error in determining the advisory sentencing guideline range. The defendant’s guilty plea followed incidents when shots were fired into electrical substations in North Dakota and South Dakota in 2023 and 2022; the district court sentenced him to 150 months’ imprisonment on each count, to be served consecutively. The Eighth Circuit ruled that the district court properly rejected a motion to suppress evidence and found that the defendant did not establish a breach of the plea agreement. The Eighth Circuit concluded, however, that the evidence did not support the district court’s finding that the defendant acted with “a terrorist motive … to intimidate or coerce a civilian population,” which resulted in the upward departure in the advisory sentencing guideline range. The Eighth Circuit wrote that “[e]fforts to intimidate or coerce an energy company may ultimately affect a civilian population, but they are not the same as efforts to intimidate or coerce the civilian population itself.” The Eighth Circuit also noted that the government had suggested that the defendant “hoped for others to ‘rise up’ and join his climate activism,” but the Eighth Circuit concluded that “a motive to recruit followers is not a motive to intimidate or coerce.” The Eighth Circuit noted that there was no threat to commit violence against a civilian population and that it was “undisputed” that the defendant targeted substations “in remote, unpopulated areas during the middle of the night when there were no people around.” The court found that it would “stretch” the language “beyond its natural meaning to accept on this record that [the defendant’s] motive was ‘to intimidate or coerce a civilian population’” and therefore concluded there was error in calculating the advisory guideline range. United States v. Smith, No. 25-1516, 25-1517 (8th Cir. Aug. 31, 2026)

D.C. Circuit Rejected Challenges to FERC Authorization for LNG Export Terminal in Louisiana

The D.C. Circuit Court of Appeals denied petitions for review challenging the Federal Energy Regulatory Commission’s (FERC’s) authorization for the siting, construction, and operation of a liquefied natural gas (LNG) export terminal on the Calcasieu Ship Channel in Cameron Parish, Louisiana, and a related 85-mile interstate natural gas pipeline. Under the Natural Gas Act (NGA), the D.C. Circuit found that FERC’s interpretation of Section 3’s “public interest” determination not to require a balancing of a project’s benefits against potential harms was not arbitrary or unlawful. The court also rejected the petitioners’ contention that FERC did not give proper weight to the project’s harms, including effects on climate change. The court described the argument that FERC “simply dismissed the project’s contributions to climate change” as “without merit,” noting that FERC provided information about the project’s estimated greenhouse gas emissions and their social cost but declined to characterize the emissions as significant or insignificant because “there currently are no accepted tools or methods” for such a determination. The court was not persuaded by the petitioners’ contention that FERC “should have done more to explain why the project’s greenhouse gas emissions did not warrant the denial of the project,” noting that the court had previously approved similar FERC analyses in other cases. The court also found that the petitioners did not establish that the record showed the terminal would not be consistent with the public interest and upheld FERC’s determination under Section 7 of the NGA that the pipeline “is or will be required by the present or future public convenience and necessity.” Under NEPA, the D.C. Circuit cited the “substantial judicial deference required in NEPA cases” and rejected the petitioners’ arguments that FERC failed to adequately evaluate effects on air quality and harms to the commercial fishing industry. For a Better Bayou v. Federal Energy Regulatory Commission, No. 24-1291, 24-1292, 25-1157 (D.C. Cir. Aug. 25, 2026)

Two Federal District Courts Vacated EPA’s Termination of Solar for All Program

On September 18, 2026, the federal district court for the District of Rhode Island vacated EPA’s August 2025 termination of Solar for All (SFA), a $7 billion grant program established under the Inflation Reduction Act’s Greenhouse Gas Reduction Fund. The plaintiffs were “downstream beneficiaries” of SFA, including solar energy companies, an individual who applied to receive roofing and solar paneling services under an SFA program, a labor union that helped to develop an implementation plan for an SFA program, and nonprofits that were SFA subgrantees or otherwise benefited from SFA. The court found that at least one of these plaintiffs (a solar energy company) had standing to challenge the “programmatic decision” to terminate SFA. The court also rejected other jurisdictional defenses, including the defendants’ argument that the plaintiffs’ claims were challenges to grant terminations that could only be brought in the Court of Federal Claims pursuant to the Tucker Act. The court also rejected arguments that the plaintiffs challenged a decision that was not a final agency action and that was committed to agency discretion. On the merits, the court found that the defendants acted contrary to the intent of the One Big Beautiful Bill Act, which repealed the Greenhouse Gas Reduction Fund statutory provision and rescinded only “unobligated balances of amounts made available to carry out that section.” The court concluded that “Congress’s clear intent was that EPA continue to administer the already obligated SFA grants” and that the termination decision therefore was contrary to law and in excess of the defendants’ statutory authority in violation of the Administrative Procedure Act. The court did not reach the plaintiffs’ constitutional claims. The court further concluded that vacatur of the termination decision was the appropriate remedy and that a permanent injunction was not warranted. Rhode Island AFL-CIO v. EPA, No. 1:25-cv-00510 (D.R.I. Sep. 18, 2026)

On September 22, 2026, in a lawsuit filed by Harris County, Texas, the recipient of a $249.7 million SFA grant, the federal district court for the District of Columbia also vacated EPA’s termination of the Solar for All program. The court rejected the defendants’ argument that under the Tucker Act, exclusive jurisdiction over Harris County’s claims was in the Court of Federal Claims. The district court found that Harris County’s claims were not in essence contractual because the rights asserted by Harris County “arise from statute rather than from the terms of its grant agreement, and the relief it seeks is neither damages nor specific performance.” In particular, the court described Harris County’s claims as a challenge to EPA’s “policy-level determination” that it was “no longer legally permissible” to operate the SFA program after the One Big Beautiful Bill Act (OBBBA) repealed the Inflation Reduction Act provision that created the Greenhouse Gas Reduction Fund pursuant to which SFA was established. The court also rejected the defendants’ argument that Harris County’s injury—lost grant funds—was not redressable and the County therefore did not have standing. The court found that even though the court could not grant relief restoring the funding, “setting aside the decision would remove [a] barrier to relief.” The court also found that EPA’s decision to terminate SFA was a final agency action subject to review under the Administrative Procedure Act (APA). On the merits of the APA claim, the court found that statutory text and the legislative record confirmed that Congress declined to rescind obligated funds in the OBBBA, and that EPA’s termination of SFA therefore exceeded its statutory authority and was arbitrary and capricious. The court granted summary judgment to the defendants on Harris County’s ultra vires claim, finding that it was duplicative of the APA claim, and on the County’s constitutional claims based on the Appropriations and Presentment Clauses. The court said the County’s constitutional claims were an “attempt to assert non-statutory rights to vindicate separation-of-powers principles” and that there was no cause of action to bring such “freestanding constitutional claims.” The court concluded that vacatur of EPA’s “policy-level determination” was the appropriate remedy, declining to limit the vacatur’s applicability to the County’s grant. The court denied without prejudice the County’s request for an injunction. Harris County v. EPA, No. 1:25-cv-03646 (D.D.C. Sep. 22, 2026)

Oregon Federal Court Enjoined Releases of Summer Steelhead in Oregon River

After ruling in January 2025 that a 2019 biological opinion for hatchery release of summer steelhead into the North and South Santiam Rivers was invalid, the federal district court for the District of Oregon on September 14, 2026 granted conservation groups’ motion for interim relief barring the release of summer steelhead into the North Santiam River while the National Marine Fisheries Service issues a revised biological opinion that considers effects on winter steelhead. The biological opinion must address defects identified by the court in January 2025, including the failure to consider climate change effects “on top of adverse summer steelhead and other effects.” In the September 2026 order, the court found that the court made the requisite showing of irreparable harm absent the interim injunctive relief. The court’s findings included its conclusion that a model relied on by the Oregon Department of Fish and Wildlife (which conducts the hatchery releases) to conclude that winter steelhead extinction risk was low was unreliable, including because the model did not account for climate change over the next 100 years. Willamette Riverkeeper v. National Marine Fisheries Service, No. 6:21-cv-00034 (D. Or. Sep. 14, 2026)

Federal District Court Vacated EIS for New Gas Plant in Tennessee; TVA Appealed and Sought Stay

On August 31, 2026, the federal district court for the Eastern District of Tennessee issued a sealed memorandum and judgment order that vacated the Tennessee Valley Authority’s (TVA’s) environmental impact statement (EIS) and record of decision for replacement of a coal-fired power plant with a natural gas-fired plant at the Kingston plant in eastern Tennessee. In motions in the district court and the Sixth Circuit Court of Appeals to stay the district court’s order, TVA argued that it was likely to succeed on the merits in its appeal of the district court’s rulings that TVA failed to consider a reasonable range of alternatives; that TVA violated NEPA timing requirements by precommitting to its decision before commencing the NEPA process; and that vacatur was the appropriate remedy because the errors were “fundamental to the analysis.” TVA also argued that stopping work on the project would result in irreparable harm to TVA and public, including due to risk of disruption to the supply of electricity. Appalachian Voices v. Tennessee Valley Authority, No. 3:24-cv-00411 (E.D. Tenn. Aug. 31, 2026)  

D.C. Federal Court Granted Preliminary Injunction in California’s Challenge to EPA Reclassification of Clean Air Act Preemption Waivers

The federal district court for the District of Columbia granted California’s motion for a preliminary injunction in California’s lawsuit challenging the U.S. Environmental Protection Agency’s (EPA’s) reclassification of Clean Air Act preemption waivers from orders to rules, which made them subject to disapproval pursuant to the Congressional Review Act (CRA). The court also denied intervenor-defendants American Fuel & Petrochemical Manufacturers and American Petroleum Institute’s motion to dismiss. On September 2, 2026, the court issued a decision granting the injunction with respect to four waivers granted between 2009 and 2024, including California’s first greenhouse gas emissions standards for new motor vehicles, which applied to model year 2009 and subsequent model years. EPA announced on June 12, 2026 that it had determined that the four waivers were rules under the CRA and had transmitted them to Congress. On September 12, the court granted a preliminary injunction with respect to two additional waivers that EPA announced it had reclassified on July 22, 2026. In the September 2 opinion, the court rejected EPA’s contention that because “the only action taken—the determination that the waivers are rules—was embodied in the report submitted to Congress,” there was no reviewable action under the Administrative Procedure Act (APA). The court then concluded that the CRA did not bar judicial review of California’s challenge to the reclassification of the waivers, finding that although the reclassification might be a “prerequisite for another decision to submit the newly-designated ‘rule’ to Congress, only the latter decision is shielded” from judicial review by the CRA. The court also concluded that EPA’s reclassification decisions were final agency actions subject to judicial review under the APA. The court found that California had shown a likelihood of success on the merits on its claims that the reclassifications were arbitrary and capricious “because EPA not only supplies no explanation for this abrupt change in long-standing policy but also denies that the fact that a change in the classification of the waivers occurred at all.” The court also found that California was likely to succeed on the claim that the reclassifications exceeded EPA’s statutory authority. In the event that APA review should not be available, the court found a likelihood that California established that the reclassifications were ultra vires. In addition, the court found that California demonstrated irreparable harm and that the merged factors of the balance of the equities and the public interest favored California. The federal defendants and intervenor-defendants appealed the district court’s orders, and the federal defendants filed a motion to stay pending appeal. California has also filed petitions for review in the Ninth Circuit Court of Appeals in August 2026 to protect its right to judicial review in the event that the district court is found to lack jurisdiction. California v. EPA, No. 1:26-cv-02185 (D.D.C. Sep. 2, 2026 and Sep. 12, 2026)

Washington High Court Affirmed Invalidation of Ballot Initiative that Addressed Natural Gas Access and Other “Distinct” Subjects

The Washington Supreme Court affirmed on narrower grounds a trial court’s invalidation of Initiative 2066 (I-2066), a ballot initiative approved by Washington voters in November 2024. I-2066 included several categories of legislative actions, including requirements to ensure consumers had access to natural gas, regulations of the goals and standards governing new construction (such as removing a goal of zero greenhouse gas emission homes and buildings by 2031), restrictions on local government entities’ ability to restrict use of gas for heating or appliances, and repeals of certain provisions of the State’s Decarbonization Act. The Supreme Court held that I-2066 violated the Washington Constitution’s “single subject” requirement because the initiative regulated “several discrete subjects” with provisions “with substantially distinct regulatory effects” such as “requiring statewide natural gas access and use, limiting local authority over air quality standards, amending statewide building codes, and repealing the Decarbonization Act’s severability clause.” The court rejected the contention that I-2066 was “omnibus legislation” that permissibly combined diverse provisions to address a single problem in a comprehensive way. The court further concluded that it was not possible to sever the impermissible provisions of I-2066 and therefore held I-2066 unconstitutional in its entirety. Three justices dissented and would have ruled that I-2066 satisfied the “low bar” of the single subject requirement because all but one provision “relate to the general subject of protecting consumers’ access to natural gas.” The dissenting justices would have upheld I-2066 but would have severed that provision as well as three other sections that “silently amend[ed] existing law” in violation of the Washington Constitution. Climate Solutions v. State, No. 104240-0 (Wash. Sep. 17, 2026)

In Climate Washing Action Against Beef Producer, D.C. Court Denied Defendants’ Anti-SLAPP Motion to Dismiss

The D.C. Superior Court denied the beef producer JBS USA Food Co. (JBS USA) and its parent corporation’s motion to dismiss a climate washing action under the D.C. Anti-SLAPP (Strategic Litigation Against Public Participation) Law. The plaintiff, Mighty Earth, alleged, among other things, that JBS made false and misleading net zero claims that failed to account for Scope 3 emissions associated with the parent corporation’s value chain. The court found that most of JBS USA’s challenged statements were “representations of fact made for the purpose of promoting, securing, or completing commercial transactions in JBS’s good or services, and that the intended audience is an actual or potential customer.” The statements therefore were exempt from anti-SLAPP protection. Statements that did not qualify for this exemption from anti-SLAPP protection were related to sustainability-linked bonds; the court found that these statements were primarily related to protecting commercial interests and not protected by the anti-SLAPP law. Mighty Earth v. JBS USA Food Co., No. 2025-CAB-6549 (D.C. Super. Ct. Sep. 10, 2026)

U.S. NEW CASES AND FILINGS

Supreme Court Review Sought on Dormant Commerce Clause Question in Case Regarding Washington Climate Commitment Act Implementation

After the Ninth Circuit Court of Appeals rejected a dormant Commerce Clause challenge to the Washington State Department of Ecology’s (Ecology’s) allocation of compliance allowances for implementation of the Washington Climate Commitment Act’s decarbonization requirements, the owner-operator of an in-state power plant that sold power to out-of-state customers filed a petition for writ of certiorari in the U.S. Supreme Court. Ecology’s allocation system provided no-cost allowances for greenhouse gas emissions associated with electricity provided to Washington utility customers and required that allowances be purchased at auction for electricity sent out of state. The certiorari petition presented the question of whether a 1997 Supreme Court precedent exempted a state from dormant Commerce Clause scrutiny “when state law imposes different burdens on the same product based on whether product is sold in state or out of state.” PacifiCorp v. Sixkiller, No. 26-318 (U.S., filed Sep. 4, 2026).

Public Health and Environmental Groups Filed First Challenge to EPA’s Repeal of Carbon Standards for Power Plants; States and Local Governments Filed Second Suit

On September 17, 2026, six public health and environmental organizations filed a petition for review challenging the U.S. Environmental Protection Agency’s final rule entitled “Partial Repeal of the Carbon Pollution Standards for Fossil Fuel-Fired Electric Generating Units.” The rule repealed emission guidelines adopted in 2024 for existing fossil fuel-fired steam generating units, as well as carbon capture and sequestration/storage (CCS)-based standards for coal-fired steam generating units undertaking a large modification and the CCS-based standards for new base load stationary combustion turbines. American Lung Association v. EPA, No. 26-1238 (D.C. Cir., filed Sep. 17, 2026)

On October 1, New York and 20 other states, the District of Columbia, Chicago, the City and County of Boulder, and New York City filed a petition for review challenging the repeal. The D.C. Circuit consolidated their case with the public health and environmental organizations’ case. New York v. EPA, No. 26-1259 (D.C. Cir., filed Oct. 1, 2026)

States and Local Governments Challenged “Significant Reset” of Fuel Economy Standards

On October 2, 2026, California, 20 other states, the District of Columbia, Chicago, Los Angeles, the City and County of Denver, New York City, and the City and County of San Francisco filed a petition for review in the First Circuit Court of Appeals challenging the National Highway Traffic Safety Administration’s (NHTSA’s) final rule entitled “Safer Affordable Fuel-Efficient Vehicles Rule III for Model Years 2022 to 2031 Passenger Cars and Light Trucks,” which NHTSA described as a “significant reset” that involved “substantially recalibrating the Corporate Average Fuel Economy (CAFE) program to bring the program into compliance with the law and to remove previous regulatory distortions which have induced manufacturers to make design decisions that have neither aligned with market demand and the needs of American families nor have delivered the consistent improvements in the fuel economy performance of manufacturer fleets, as Congress intended.” Among other changes, the amended standards did not consider the imputed fuel economy performance of electric vehicles or the electric operation of plug-in hybrid vehicles. California v. National Highway Traffic Safety Administration, No. 26-2120 (1st Cir., filed Oct. 2, 2026)  

New Jersey County Filed State-Law Suit to Hold Fossil Fuel Defendants Liable for Climate Change Harms 

Middlesex County, New Jersey, filed a lawsuit in New Jersey Superior Court alleging that the actions of the defendant fossil fuel companies and American Petroleum Institute were a substantial factor in causing anthropogenic climate change. The complaint alleged that the County had seen “some of the worst consequences of climate change in recent years,” including “rising temperatures, intense precipitation events, destructive floods and coastal storms, and frequent episodes of drought conditions.” The complaint alleged that these conditions resulted in deaths, property damage, and economic disruption in the County. The complaint alleged that the defendants caused these adverse effects by their conduct “in manufacturing, marketing, distributing, and profiting from the sale of fossil fuels.” This alleged conduct included the defendants’ extraction, marketing, and sale of fossil fuels with knowledge that use of the fuels causes global warming, as well as the defendants’ participation in “coordinated campaigns to deceive the public about the known and foreseeable threats their fossil fuels posed to the climate in order to mislead consumers and turn public opinion against actions to restrict their extraction, production, and sale of fossil fuels.” The County asserted common law claims of public nuisance, private nuisance, trespass, and negligence. The County also asserted that the defendants violated the New Jersey Consumer Fraud Act (NJCFA). The relief requested included compensatory, consequential, and punitive damages; treble damages under the NJCFA; an order compelling the defendants to abate the nuisance and to pay the costs of abatement; injunctive relief barring defendants from engaging in trespass; and attorneys’ fees and costs. Middlesex County v. Exxon Mobil Corp., No. MID-L-006502-26 (N.J. Super. Ct., filed Sep. 30, 2026)

States Filed Suits Challenging Lawfulness of Trump Administration’s Cancellations of Offshore Wind Leases Via Settlements

States have filed five lawsuits challenging federal settlements with offshore wind developers pursuant to which the developers agreed to the termination of their offshore wind leases and to invest the amounts paid for the leases in eligible “conventional energy projects” such as “liquefied natural gas” and “non-renewable based electricity” in exchange for payments of the same amount. The first lawsuit was filed by a coalition of Northeastern states in June 2026 and concerned an 84,000-acre lease in the New York Bight acquired by Attentive Energy LLC in 2022. Four additional lawsuits were filed in August and September 2026.

Two of the new lawsuits concerned leases in the Pacific Ocean off the California coast. On August 28, 2026, California filed a lawsuit challenging the cancellation of Golden State Wind LLC’s 80-418-acre lease approximately 22 miles off California’s central coast. On September 22, 2026, California filed a suit challenging the cancellation of Invenergy California Offshore LLC’s 80-418-acre lease, also located approximately 22 miles off California’s central coast. In both cases, California asserted that the lease cancellation was arbitrary and capricious, including because the defendants did not provide a reasoned explanation, instead relying on the “bare invocation of ‘national security issues,’” and because the defendants failed to justify their changes in position; failed to consider or weigh California’s financial, environmental, and sovereign reliance interests, which included investment of over $100 million to support offshore wind development in support of economic growth, new jobs, and progress toward clean energy and climate policy goals; and failed to consider alternatives or to provide a “genuine justification” for cancellation. In addition, California asserted violations of the Outer Continental Shelf Lands Act, including its limits on compensation for lease cancellation, and the Coastal Zone Management Act. California also asserted that cancellation of the lease constituted a major federal action that should have undergone review under the National Environmental Policy Act. The complaints also asserted that the settlement agreements presented “multiple abuses of federal appropriations process,” including violation of the Judgment Fund Act, the Administrative Procedure Act, the Antideficiency Act, the Purpose Statute, and the Miscellaneous Receipts Act, as well as the separation of powers doctrine and the Spending and Appropriations Clauses of the Constitution. In addition, California asserted that the lease cancellations and settlement agreements were ultra vires actions. California v. U.S. Department of the Interior, No. 3:26-cv-09123 (N.D. Cal., filed Aug. 28, 2026); California v. U.S. Department of the Interior, No. 4:26-cv-10778 (N.D. Cal., filed Sep. 22, 2026)

New York, New Jersey, and six other Northeastern states filed two lawsuits on September 22, 2026, one in the Eastern District of New York and the other in the District of Maine. The lawsuit in the Eastern District of New York challenged the cancellation of Bluepoint Wind, LLC’s 71,000-acre lease in the New York Bight. The lawsuit in the District of Maine challenged three leases awarded to Invenergy Wind Offshore LLC and Invenergy NE Offshore Wind LLC, one in the New York Bight and two in the Gulf of Maine. The complaints alleged harms to New York’s energy interests, economic interests, climate goals and economic and public health interests and New Jersey’s energy interests and also alleged that the cancellation of the leases would harm other plaintiff states’ energy, economic, climate, public health, and environmental interests. The states asserted that the lease cancellations were arbitrary and capricious because the defendants failed to provide a reasoned explanation, failed to explain their change in position or account for the states’ reliance interests; failed to address alternative means of achieving their objectives; and failed to provide a “genuine justification” for cancellation. The complaint asserted that cancellations of the leases constituted a major federal action subject to NEPA and that the cancellations violated the Outer Continental Shelf Lands Act. In addition, the states asserted that the settlement agreements violated the Judgment Fund Act, Antideficiency Act, Purpose Statute, and Miscellaneous Receipts Act, and exceeded statutory authority. The states also asserted that the settlement agreements were unconstitutional because they violated the Spending and Appropriations Clauses and the separation of powers doctrine. They also asserted a claim that the settlement agreements were ultra vires. New York v. U.S. Department of the Interior, No. 1:26-cv-05851 (E.D.N.Y., filed Sep. 22, 2026); New York v. U.S. Department of the Interior, No. 2:26-cv-00453 (D. Me., filed Sep. 22, 2026); 

Solar for All, Environmental and Climate Justice Grantees Filed Breach of Contract Actions Against U.S.

In September 2026, at least three lawsuits were filed in the U.S. Court of Federal Claims asserting that the U.S. Environmental Protection Agency breached grant agreements for programs established under the 2022 Inflation Reduction Act (IRA). 

Two of the lawsuits asserted that EPA breached Solar for All grant agreements. In one suit, Clean Energy Fund of Texas—a nonprofit organization “created to serve Texans through affordable, low-interest financing, helping homeowners, businesses, and community organizations install green energy and energy efficiency solutions”—sought money damages resulting from EPA’s alleged breach of a $156,120,000 Solar for All grant agreement. In the other case, Indiana Community Action Association Inc.—“a statewide not-for-profit membership corporation serving all of Indiana’s 92 counties” that has “an organizational mission to help the state’s 22 Community Action Agencies … address conditions of poverty”—sought money damages for EPA’s breach of a $117,470,000 Solar for All grant. In each case, the plaintiff alleged that EPA’s unilateral termination of the grant agreement on August 8, 2025 was “a clear, unambiguous, and material breach” of the agreement. Each complaint noted that EPA “purportedly acted based on its misguided understanding” of the One Big Beautiful Bill Act (OBBBA), which repealed the IRA provision creating the Greenhouse Gas Reduction Fund under which the Solar for All program was created. Each plaintiff alleged that OBBBA only repealed unobligated balances and that, because EPA had fully obligated the plaintiff’s Solar for All funds prior to OBBBA’s enactment, the grant funds were not rescinded. Each complaint asserted breach of contract and breach of the duty of good faith and fair dealing, as well as a claim that removal of monies from the account that held the plaintiff’s grant funds constituted an illegal exaction in violation of the Due Process Clause of the Fifth Amendment. In the alternative, each plaintiff asserted an unconstitutional taking claim. Clean Energy Fund of Texas v. United States, No. 1:26-cv-01354 (Fed. Cl., filed Sep. 14, 2026); Indiana Community Action Association Inc. v. United States, No. 1:26-cv-01376 (Fed. Cl., filed Sep. 17, 2026)

In the third case, a North Carolina nonprofit corporation sought money damages for EPA’s breach of a grant agreement for funds awarded pursuant to the Community Change Grants program that implemented the IRA’s Environmental and Climate Justice Program. The complaint alleged that the grant agreement obligated $3,103,648 to the plaintiff in December 2024 and that EPA unilaterally terminated the agreement on May 2, 2025, “claiming that ‘the objectives of the award are no longer consistent with EPA funding priorities.’” The plaintiff asserted breach of contract and breach of the duty of good faith and fair dealing. MDC, Inc. v. United States, No. 1:26-cv-01413 (Fed. Cl., filed Sep. 23, 2026)

Lawsuits Sought U.S. Fish and Wildlife Service Actions to Protect Climate Change-Threatened Butterfly, Turtles, and Migratory Shorebird

• Failure to Issue Final Listing Rule for Nonmigratory Butterfly. WildEarth Guardians filed a lawsuit in the federal district court for the District of Columbia to compel the U.S. Fish and Wildlife Service (FWS) to issue a final listing rule for the regal fritillary, which the complaint described as a “large, nonmigratory butterfly once common to our nation’s tallgrass prairie habitats.” The complaint alleged that, “largely due to cropland conversion,” the butterfly “has been relegated to small, isolated fragments of degraded habitat, with conditions expected to worsen over the coming years from climate change-driven droughts.” The complaint alleged that FWS proposed listing the eastern regal fritillary as endangered and the western regal fritillary as threatened in August 2024 more than 10 years after WildEarth Guardians petitioned for the listing of both subspecies under the Endangered Species Act. The complaint alleged that the proposed rule listed multiple threats to the subspecies, “with each threat exacerbated by the ongoing and projects impacts of climate change and drought.” The complaint alleged that the final listing determination was due August 6, 2025. The court asked the court to compel FWS to publish a final listing determination by a date certain. WildEarth Guardians v. Burgum, No. 1:26-cv-03215 (D.D.C., filed Sep. 15, 2026)
• Failure to Issue Final Listing Rule for Pond Turtles. Center for Biological Diversity, Friends of the Columbia Gorge, and Klamath-Siskiyou Wildlands Center filed a lawsuit in the federal district court for the District of Oregon challenging the U.S. Fish and Wildlife Service’s failure to issue final listing rules for the northwestern pond turtle and southwestern pond turtle after issuing a proposed rule to list both pond turtle species as threatened on October 3, 2023. The complaint alleged that the proposed listing rule cited various threats to the pond turtles, including habitat loss, degradation and modification, predation, competition, and the effects of climate change. The complaint alleged that the Endangered Species Act required FWS to issue final listing rules by October 3, 2024. Center for Biological Diversity v. U.S. Fish & Wildlife Service, No. 3:26-cv-1866 (D. Or., filed Sep. 9, 2026)
• Failure to Designate Critical Habitat for Migratory Shorebird. Center for Biological Diversity filed a lawsuit in the federal district court for the District of Columbia to compel the U.S. Fish and Wildlife Service to designate critical habitat for the Rufa Red Knot, which FWS listed as threatened in 2014. The Endangered Species Act provides that critical habitat must be designated concurrently with the listing of a species as threatened or endangered and allows an extension of up to one year when critical habitat is not determinable at the time of listing. The complaint described the Red Knot as a “migratory shorebird known for its migrations with nonstop flights across great distances and named for its rusty plumage during spring migration” from as far south as the southern tip of South America to breeding grounds in the Arctic. The complaint alleged that “a variety of factors” threaten the Red Knot with extinction, including habitat destruction and modification from sea level rise and coastal development and disasters such as hurricanes and oil spills. Center for Biological Diversity v. Nesvik, No. 1:26-cv-03048 (D.D.C., filed Sep. 1, 2026)

Tribe and Environmental Organizations Challenged Logging Project in Tongass National Forest

The Ketchikan Indian Community, Center for Biological Diversity, and Southeast Alaska Conservation Council filed a lawsuit in the federal district court for the District of Alaska challenging the U.S. Forest Service’s authorization of the South Revillagigedo Integrated Resource Project (South Revilla Project or Project) in the Tongass National Forest. The complaint alleged that the authorization would allow “extensive logging across thousands of acres” of “up to 83 million board feet (MMBF) of trees, the majority old growth.” The complaint alleged that the trees, roots, and soil of the Tongass “function as carbon sponges, absorbing and storing 20 percent of all carbon stored in the National Forest System, serving as a critical resource in the fight against climate change,” and that the South Revilla Project’s environmental effects would include exacerbation of climate change by emitting greenhouse gases and releasing stored carbon. The complaint alleged that the Forest Service was unlikely to offer the whole project as described in the final environmental impact statement because doing so would result in negatively appraised timber sales that the Forest Service is prohibited from advertising. The plaintiffs contended that because the Forest Service did not analyze other sale configurations, it failed to undertake the balancing of multiple uses required by the National Forest Management Act (NFMA) and the Multiple Use and Sustained Yield Act and also failed to properly assess whether restrictions on subsistence uses are necessary under the Alaska National Interest Lands Conservation Act. In addition, the plaintiffs asserted that the Project did not comply with NFMA requirements to “provide for diversity of plant and animal communities,” including Queen Charlotte goshawks. Ketchikan Indian Community v. U.S. Forest Service, No. 1:26-cv-00017 (D. Alaska, filed Aug. 27, 2026)

Lawsuit Challenged CEQA Review for Modernization Project at Fossil Fuel Power Plant in Los Angeles

Center for Biological Diversity (CBD) filed a California Environmental Quality Act (CEQA) lawsuit against the City of Los Angeles and Los Angeles Department of Water and Power (LADWP), alleging that the environmental impact report (EIR) they prepared in connection with the Scattergood Generating Station Units 1 and 2 Green Hydrogen-Ready Modernization Project was “flawed and unlawful.” CBD alleged that rather than replacing the existing fossil fuel-fired facility with renewable energy capacity after the current facility is required to close in 2029, LADWP instead chose to build a new fossil fuel-fired facility. The petition described the plan for the new facility to be partially fueled by hydrogen as a “chimera” that the EIR did not analyze. Other alleged shortcomings in the EIR included failure to adequately analyze cumulative impacts of related modernization projects at other electric generation facilities; improper dismissal of energy storage and demand management alternatives; and failure to evaluate greenhouse gas emissions from the project. Center for Biological Diversity v. City of Los Angeles, No. __ (Cal. Super. Ct., filed Aug. 31, 2026) 

Nebraska Filed Lawsuit Alleging that Company’s Climate Risk Scores for Properties Provided “Faulty Information”

The State of Nebraska filed a lawsuit under its Consumer Protection Act and Uniform Deceptive Trade Practices Act against First Street Technology, Inc. (First Street), a public benefit corporation whose business includes use of models to provide climate risk scores for individual properties. The complaint alleged that “Nebraskan home buyers have relied on First Street’s climate risk financial models to inform their decision on whether to buy a particular home” but that the models in many instances provided “faulty information” that “misled home buyers into thinking that, because of climate change, a particular home is a riskier purchase than it actually is.” The complaint stated that Nebraska “understands prediction models inherently will include error” but asserted that “First Street’s conduct rises to the level of unlawfulness by inducing consumer reliance on fundamentally flawed prediction models without communicating such limitations.” The complaint alleged that First Street’s models “suffer from at least two significant biases” that the company did not disclose to consumers. First, the complaint alleged that “the degree and extent to which climate change will increase loss events into the future is an inherently speculative endeavor on which climate experts and other climate modelers disagree” but that First Street did not disclose the disagreement. Second, the complaint alleged that First Street’s position as a “for-profit participant in a market that exists on the assumption that climate change has sufficiently destabilized existing climate and weather models such that new models are needed” gave First Street “a clear pecuniary incentive to overstate the effects of climate change and to understate the relevance of existing models.” Nebraska requested injunctive relief, civil penalties, restoration “to every person any money acquired by First Street” as a result of their violations of the Consumer Protection Act and the Uniform Deceptive Trade Practices Act, and costs and attorney fees. State of Nebraska v. First Street Technology, Inc., No. CI 26-_ (Neb. Dist. Ct., filed Aug. 27, 2026)

Lawsuit Challenged Semiconductor Manufacturing Project Permits’ Compliance with New York Climate Law

A lawsuit filed in New York Supreme Court challenged the New York State Department of Environmental Conservation’s (NYSDEC’s) issuance of air and water permits for components of a semiconductor manufacturing project in Onondaga County. An earlier lawsuit challenging the Onondaga County Industrial Development Agency’s State Environmental Quality Review Act determinations is also pending in New York Supreme Court. The petitioners challenging the permits asserted that NYSDEC’s issuance of a Clean Air Act Title V permit for the project failed to satisfy the requirements of Section 7(2) of the Climate Leadership and Community Protection Act (CLCPA) because NYSDEC’s justifications for the permit did not identify “real, quantifiable, permanent, verifiable, and enforceable” mitigation measures and instead “rely only on funding for unidentified future projects, without established selection criteria, quantified emissions reductions, or any assurance that the funded projects will mitigate the Project’s [greenhouse gas] emissions.” DEC also asserted that issuance of the Title V permit was arbitrary and capricious for failing to adequately evaluate and control emissions, including by failing to resolve issues regarding potential sulfur hexafluoride emissions. The petitioners also asserted that NYSDEC’s CLCPA Section 7(2) determination for the water discharge permit failed to identify enforceable mitigation and instead required Onondaga County to prepare a future CLCPA mitigation plan. The petition also asserted failures to address air emissions and water discharges of per- and polyfluoroalkyl substances. Neighbors for a Better Micron v. New York State Department of Environmental Conservation, No. 909009-26 (N.Y. Sup. Ct., filed July 31, 2026)

Texas Filed Suit Asserting that Proxy Advisory Firm’s ESG Initiatives Violated State Consumer Protection and Deceptive Trade Practices Law

Approximately eight weeks after filing a consumer protection and deceptive trade practice lawsuit against the proxy advisor Institutional Shareholder Services, Inc., Texas Attorney General Ken Paxton filed suit against proxy advisor Glass, Lewis & Co. (Glass, Lewis), alleging that the company “prioritizes its own environmental, social, and governance (‘ESG’) agenda over the fiscal well-being of its clients” in violation of the Texas Deceptive Trade Practices Act-Consumer Protection Act (DTPA). The complaint alleged that Glass, Lewis’s “Benchmark” analyses, which the complaint described as “supposedly the most objective and ideologically neutral of all the company’s sets of proxy voting guidelines,” in fact “incorporate financially imprudent ideologies without providing empirical support for their ESG-focused goals.” For example, with respect to climate change, the complaint alleged that the Benchmark guidelines reflect Glass, Lewis’s view of “climate risk as a material risk for all companies.” The complaint alleged that Glass, Lewis’s “ESG-focused initiatives are distinctly different from current financial market trends” and “stand in contrast to current political trends” such as the U.S.’s withdrawal from the Paris Agreement and EPA’s rescission of the endangerment finding for greenhouse gases. Texas asserted that Glass, Lewis violated the DTPA through its false, misleading, or deceptive acts and its failure to disclose that its ESG initiatives are not it its clients’ best financial interests. Texas requested a temporary restraining order, temporary injunction, permanent injunction, civil penalties, reasonable attorney fees, litigation expenses, and costs. State v. Glass, Lewis & Co., LLC, No. 471-04895-2026 (Tex. Dist. Ct., filed July 13, 2026)

GLOBAL NEW CASES

Argentina: Class action filed against a law amending the Minimum Environmental Standards for the Preservation of Glaciers and the Periglacial Environment

On May 5, 2026, a broad coalition of actors—including individuals who are members of citizen assemblies from various provinces across the country, together with civil society organizations such as the Argentine Association of Environmental Lawyers (Asociación Argentina de Abogados/as Ambientalistas, AAdeAA), FARN, Greenpeace Argentina, Amnesty International, CELS, and CEPA—filed a collective amparo action before the Federal Court of Santa Rosa (La Pampa) against the National Government, seeking a declaration that Law No. 27,804 is unconstitutional and requesting an interim injunction ordering the immediate suspension of its application throughout the country.

Law No. 27,804, enacted on April 8, 2026, substantially amended Law No. 26,639 on Minimum Environmental Standards for the Preservation of Glaciers and the Periglacial Environment. Its main amendments consisted of: restricting the scope of protection by requiring glaciers to perform specific hydrological functions in order to fall under legal protection; transferring to provincial authorities the power to determine which glaciers and periglacial environments are to be protected, thereby displacing the scientific role previously assigned to the Argentine Institute of Snow Research, Glaciology and Environmental Sciences (Instituto Argentino de Nivología, Glaciología y Ciencias Ambientales, IANIGLA) under the former legislation; replacing the absolute prohibition on extractive activities in glacier areas with a prohibition subject exclusively to the provincial authorities’ assessment of whether the activity “significantly alters” the ecosystem; and distorting the purpose of an instrument such as environmental impact assessment—effectively turning it into a means of authorizing all types of activities in this environment—and establishing strategic environmental assessment as an option available to provincial authorities.

The complaint sets out four grounds of unconstitutionality. First, it argues that the law violates the principle of environmental non-regression and progressive realization, as enshrined in Article 41 of the National Constitution and the Escazú Agreement, by manifestly reducing the level of protection previously attained. Second, it argues that the law dismantles the system of minimum environmental standards by delegating to the provinces the power to define the protected subject matter, thereby enabling what the plaintiffs refer to as “environmental dumping” among jurisdictions. Third, it contends that the law is incompatible with the MERCOSUR-EU Interim Trade Agreement, which entered into force on the same day that the Senate granted the bill preliminary approval and expressly prohibits weakening environmental protection standards in order to promote investment. Fourth, it argues that the legislative process was invalid because it failed to comply with the mandatory public participation standards established by the Escazú Agreement: the public hearing held in the Chamber of Deputies allowed fewer than 0.4% of the more than 102,000 registered participants to take part, under unreasonable deadlines and arbitrary selection criteria.

The complaint also incorporates climate-related arguments, contending that the weakening of protection for glaciers and periglacial environments is inconsistent with Law No. 27,520 on Climate Change Adaptation and Mitigation, the Paris Agreement, and the commitments undertaken by Argentina in its First Biennial Transparency Report to the UNFCCC. It also invokes Advisory Opinion No. 32/2025 of the Inter-American Court of Human Rights, which recognized the right to a healthy climate as an autonomous right and established that States must refrain from adopting regressive measures in climate and environmental matters. As of September 2026, the case remains pending. Greenpeace Argentina et al. v. Argentina (Argentina, Federal Court of Santa Rosa)

Argentina: NGOs challenge the national and state governments on their obligation regarding the risk of wildfire and associated greenhouse gas emissions

In 2026, Asociación Foro Ecologista de Paraná and Asociación Argentina de Juristas filed a lawsuit against the National Government and the provinces of Chubut, Santa Cruz, Río Negro, Neuquén, and La Pampa, in connection with several forest fire events that occurred in Patagonia. The main objective of the lawsuit is to require the defendants to adopt the necessary measures to prevent and mitigate the risk of forest fires and extreme climate events in Defendant provinces, within the framework of the development of an Interjurisdictional Climate and Wildfire Risk Management Plan. In addition, the plaintiffs request the production of technical information concerning the impact of the forest fires that occurred in Patagonia on carbon sinks, as well as an estimate of the greenhouse gas emissions resulting from these events, among other matters. Finally, they request that glaciers and the periglacial environment be recognized as rights-bearing entities, entitled to autonomous legal protection.

The lawsuit addresses the issue of forest fires in Patagonia as a matter of climate change adaptation, resulting from prolonged droughts, intense heat waves, and extreme winds, in a context characterized by a lack of public policies for adaptation and prevention. In this context, the plaintiffs emphasize the importance of protecting glaciers and water basins because of the ecosystem services they provide in relation to wildfire risk. At the same time, the lawsuit highlights the emissions generated by these events and the destruction of carbon sinks, which may affect the international commitments undertaken by the country. Argentine Association of Jurists et al v. Argentina et al (Argentina, Supreme Court of Argentina)

Argentina: NGOs challenge an offshore oil project as lacking proper environmental assessment

On September 1, 2026, the Asociación Civil de Abogados, Abogado/as y Profesionales Ambientalistas (AAdeAA), and the Centro de Ex Combatientes Islas Malvinas La Plata (CECIM) filed a preventive collective environmental damage action against Rockhopper Exploration PLC and Navitas Petroleum Development and Production Limited before the Federal Court of Río Grande. Plaintiffs seek to prevent the development of the “León Marino” (Sea Lion) offshore oil project, located approximately 220 kilometers north of the Malvinas Islands (Falkland Islands), on areas of the continental shelf over which Argentina claims sovereignty.

Plaintiffs allege that the large-scale offshore oil project is proceeding without an environmental impact assessment or authorization from the competent Argentine authorities and poses serious risks to marine and coastal ecosystems. They invoke, among other provisions, Argentina’s General Environmental Law, Law No. 27,520 on Global Climate Change Adaptation and Mitigation, the UNFCCC, and the Paris Agreement. The complaint argues that the project would exacerbate climate change through greenhouse gas emissions and alleges that its development would generate approximately 9 million metric tons of CO2, with more than 100 million metric tons of CO2 resulting from combustion of the oil produced. Plaintiffs also invoke the human right to a healthy environment, a fundamental right to a healthy climate, and the rights of Nature.

On September 16, 2026, Judge Mariel E. Borruto granted a precautionary measure ordering Defendants to refrain from materially implementing the project, including drilling, installation of permanent subsea and production infrastructure, commencement of commercial hydrocarbon extraction, and related terrestrial and port works. The suspension remains in effect until the environmental impact assessment procedure required by Argentine law is conducted and the competent authority issues a decision, or until otherwise ordered by the court.

In granting interim relief, the court applied the preventive and precautionary principles and found that the plaintiffs were not required at this stage to establish with certainty that environmental damage would occur. The court also relied on Inter-American Court of Human Rights Advisory Opinions OC-23/17 and OC-32/25, emphasizing the autonomous and collective dimensions of the right to a healthy environment and the protection of ecosystems and present and future generations in the context of climate change. 

As of September 2026, the underlying preventive action remains pending. Centro de Ex Combatientes Islas Malvinas La Plata (CECIM) et al. v. Rockhopper Exploration PLC et al. (Argentina, Federal Court of Río Grande)

Brazil: An association representing the energy industry challenges the federal government and its agencies about the legality of a recent Capacity Reserve Auction

On May 8, 2026, the Brazilian Association of Unions and Associations Representing the Energy Industries (ABRAENERGIAS) filed a Public Civil Action (ACP) with a request for urgent relief against the Federal Government, the Ministry of Mines and Energy (MME), the National Electric Energy Agency (ANEEL), the Energy Research Company (EPE), and the National System Operator (ONS). Plaintiff argues that the Capacity Reserve Auctions in the form of Power (LRCAPs 2026) were structured in violation of the principles of legality, motivation, tariff moderation, administrative efficiency, and free competition, due to alleged irregularities in the definition of contracted power demand, the formation of ceiling prices, and the regulatory modeling of the auctions. It alleges that the auctions resulted in the contracting of an excessive volume of power, with the potential to generate billions in tariff impacts on consumers and favor market concentration in certain economic agents. It also argues that the adopted model favored the contracting of thermoelectric power plants fueled by fossil fuels to the detriment of less expensive and more environmental alternatives. This, in turn, would contribute to increased greenhouse gas emissions and the worsening of climate change, contradicting the energy transition and decarbonization commitments undertaken by the country. 

Relying on the above arguments, Plaintiff requested an urgent injunction to suspend the approval of the auction results and the signing of the respective Reserve Capacity Contracts (CRCAPs), as well as a declaration of nullity of the administrative and regulatory acts related to the LRCAPs 2026. In the preliminary ruling, however, the Court denied the plaintiff’s request for urgent relief. The Court reasoned that the controversy involves a matter of high technical and regulatory complexity related to the LRCAPs 2026 and that, at that procedural stage, there were insufficient elements to rebut the presumption of legitimacy of the challenged administrative acts. It also highlighted that any suspension of the bidding processes could have significant systemic, regulatory, and operational impacts, recommending greater caution and prior input from the public entities before a thorough examination of the issue. ABRAENERGIAS vs. União Federal e outros (Regulatory flaws in the 2026 energy capacity reserve auctions) (Brazil, Federal District Court)

Brazil: Environmental organizations seek to undo Securities and Exchange Commission’s resolution that revoked its previous environmental commitment

On June 8, 2026, the Institute of Collective Law (IDC) and the Association for Inclusive Sustainable Solutions (SIS) filed a Public Civil Action (ACP) with a request for urgent relief against the Securities and Exchange Commission (CVM), challenging CVM Resolution 244/2026, which revoked the mandatory sustainability disclosure requirements previously set out in CVM Resolution 193/2023.

Plaintiffs argue that the earlier rule reflected scientific consensus that climate change carries concrete financial risks, and that Brazil had adopted the ISSB/IFRS S1 and S2 sustainability-reporting standards accordingly, with mandatory compliance from 2026 onward. They contend that Resolution 244/2026 revoked these requirements without adequate technical justification, a regulatory impact analysis, or support from CVM’s own technical area, which had previously recognized the measure’s importance for market transparency, climate-risk management, and alignment with international practice. Plaintiffs argue the rollback weakens access to information on climate and social risks, undermining investors’ ability to price those risks and direct capital toward a low-carbon economy, and that it violates Brazil’s commitments under the Paris Agreement and the Mercosur-EU Partnership Agreement, compromising capital-market integrity and instruments such as the Brazilian Greenhouse Gas Emissions Trading System (SBCE).

Plaintiffs seek urgent relief suspending Resolution 244/2026 and restoring the CVM Resolution 193/2023 disclosure requirements, and, on the merits, a declaration of nullity for defects in motivation and procedure or, alternatively, an order compelling CVM to conduct a public consultation and Regulatory Impact Analysis, with suspension of the Resolution’s effects during that process. IDC and SIS vs. Comissão de Valores Mobiliários (Nullity of CVM Resolution 244/2026) (Brazil, Rio de Janeiro Federal Court)

Brazil: Federal Prosecutors challenge the Brazilian environmental agency of its preliminary license for fossil fuel production in Santos Basin

In June 2026, the Federal Public Prosecutor’s Office (MPF) and the São Paulo Public Prosecutor’s Office (MPSP) filed a Public Civil Action against IBAMA and Petrobras seeking suspension and annulment of Preliminary License No. 672/2025, granted for Stage 4 of the Pre-Salt Santos Basin oil and gas project.

Plaintiffs argue that the climate emergency is already generating widespread harm and that Brazil’s Paris Agreement commitments and net-zero-by-2050 goal are incompatible with new fossil fuel extraction, given the energy sector’s large share of national emissions. They contend the license’s environmental viability was never adequately demonstrated, citing insufficient consideration of greenhouse gas emissions, including scope 3, and Petrobras’s failure to meet IBAMA’s own technical requirements on climate monitoring, mitigation, and adaptation. They argue the license violated due environmental process, the right to a stable climate, the precautionary and polluter-pays principles, climate justice, and intergenerational rights, invoking IACHR Advisory Opinion 32/2025 and the ICJ’s 2025 climate Advisory Opinion.

Plaintiffs sought urgent suspension of the license until IBAMA’s requirements are met, or, alternatively, a bar on any Installation License until compliance is shown; on the merits, they seek annulment of the license and an order barring IBAMA from issuing a new preliminary or installation license for the project until compliance is proven. MPF and MPSP vs. Petrobras and IBAMA (Stage 4 of the Pre-Salt) (Brazil, Sao Paulo Federal Court)

Brazil: Workers’ unions sue wind power plants for causing negative impacts on the inhabitants of the region

In May 2025, the Federation of Rural Workers, Farmers and Family Farmers of Rio Grande do Norte (FETARN), the Unified Workers’ Central-RN (CUT-RN), and the Rural and Urban Assistance Service (SAR) filed a Public Civil Action against Voltalia Energia do Brasil Ltda. and Voltalia S/A over the impacts of wind power development on residents of Serra do Mel, which hosts 40 wind farm projects, 36 of them operational. Plaintiffs argue Defendants are responsible for the resulting socio-environmental impacts and seek full reparation for homogeneous and collective damages.

Plaintiffs request urgent relief suspending new projects, an environmental impact assessment, relocation of towers near residences, and psychological and medical support for affected residents; on the merits, they seek collective moral damages of at least R$106,425,000, individual moral damages of R$100,000 per affected person, rebalancing of lease agreements to cap leases at 50% of the property, and further individual damages for excessive contract burdens, among other relief.

The Public Defender’s Office of Rio Grande do Norte, through its Group for Action for a Just Energy Transition (GATEJ), sought to join as custos vulnerabilis on behalf of affected communities. Citing the Federal Constitution, international treaties, and IACHR Advisory Opinion 32/2025, it argued that the right to a clean and safe climate requires compatibility between renewable energy promotion and human rights, effective community participation, free and informed consultation, and corporate and state due diligence, and sought a role monitoring the case and fostering extrajudicial remedies.

Defendants argue their environmental licensing was regular and properly assessed climate impacts, that the suit does not reflect majority community sentiment, and that an adverse outcome would harm the local economy. They contend the project advances the energy transition and climate justice, consistent with national and international policy, and invoke IACHR Advisory Opinion 32/2025 as calling for harmonizing development and environmental protection. They argue no concrete damage or imminent risk justifies suspension and seek dismissal of the action and revocation of any injunction. FETARN and others vs. Voltalia Energia do Brasil Ltda. and Voltalia S/A (Socio-environmental impacts of the Serra do Mel Wind Farms) (Brazil, Rio Grande do Norte State Court)

Brazil: The Federal Public Prosecutor’s Office challenges new municipal regulations that relax the use of preservation areas

In December 2025, the Federal Public Prosecutor’s Office (MPF) filed a Public Civil Action against the Municipality of Natal, the Natal City Council, IDEMA, and the Rio Grande do Norte Legislative Assembly to protect Permanent Preservation Areas along Natal’s coastal strip, including dunes, sandbars, and coastal plains that serve as natural barriers against erosion and sea-level rise.

The MPF argues that a recently approved set of municipal and state regulations—including the Natal Master Plan, Municipal Law 7,801/2024, State Law 12,079/2025, and related instruments—improperly relaxed land-use restrictions, allowing residential development in previously non-buildable, ecologically sensitive areas, in violation of the Forest Code, the Atlantic Forest Law, and the National Coastal Management Plan. Citing studies from the Federal University of Rio Grande do Norte and its own technical unit, the MPF argues this intensifies erosion and flood risk amid the climate emergency, and that the legislative process failed to consult affected traditional communities as required by ILO Convention 169, compromising assessment of impacts along a coastline that includes recognized traditional-community territories.

The MPF seeks, as a preliminary measure, suspension of the contested provisions and related environmental permits and an order barring further acts that disregard the Coastal Road’s protected status; on the merits, it seeks annulment of the regulations and permits issued without proper environmental impact assessment, and development of a joint Environmental Protection and Management Plan for the Natal coastal strip addressing erosion mitigation and adaptation. Ministério Público Federal vs. Município de Natal and others (Environmental legislation and licensing on the Natal Coastal Highway)(Brazil, Rio Grande do Norte Federal Court)

Brazil: Trade unions challenge the federal government’s compliance in carrying out the Capacity Reserve Auction 2026

On May 18, 2026, the Federation of Industries of the State of Ceará (FIEC) and the Union of Energy and Services Industries of the Electric Sector of Ceará (SINDENERGIA) filed a Public Civil Action with a request for urgent relief against the Federal Government, ANEEL, EPE, and ONS, challenging the 2026 Capacity Reserve Auction (LRCAP). Plaintiffs allege the auction, estimated to cost over R$500 billion, compromises competitiveness and economic rationality, shows methodological inconsistencies, and is inconsistent with environmental protection and Brazil’s climate commitments by prioritizing fossil-fuel thermoelectric sources, such as coal, over more efficient and sustainable alternatives, in alleged violation of Article 225 of the Federal Constitution and the National Policy on Climate Change. 

Plaintiffs sought an urgent injunction suspending approval, award, and formalization of the resulting Capacity Reserve Power Contracts or, alternatively, suspending acts related to thermoelectric products, and, on the merits, a declaration of nullity of the administrative and regulatory acts related to LRCAP 2026.

In its preliminary ruling, the 1st Federal Court of Ceará granted urgent relief, suspending approval of the LRCAP 2026 results and the signing of the related contracts, finding the amounts involved could compromise the financial stability of companies and families, and transferred the case to the 6th Court of the Federal District as connected to a related action. 

The 6th Court of the Federal District subsequently dismissed the preliminary injunction request and declared the earlier provisional decision null and void. FIEC and SINDENERGIA vs. União Federal and others (Irregularities in Energy Capacity Reserve Auctions) (Brazil, Ceará Federal Court)

Brazil: The Federal Public Prosecutors seek to nullify a state decree that authorizes the reduction of legal preserve in the Amazon forest

In June 2026, the Federal Public Prosecutor’s Office (MPF) filed a public civil action with a request for urgent relief, against the State of Amazonas to challenge the validity of State Decree 52.216/2025, which authorizes the reduction of the minimum Legal Reserve percentage from 80% to up to 50% in certain areas of the Legal Amazon. 

According to the MPF, the decree is incompatible with the international commitments undertaken by Brazil, especially the United Nations Framework Convention on Climate Change, the Paris Agreement, the Convention on Biological Diversity, and the Kunming-Montreal Global Biodiversity Framework. By favoring increased deforestation, greenhouse gas emissions, and biodiversity loss, the MPF argues that the flexibility brought about by the regulation violates the duty of progress and the prohibition of environmental regression. It argues that several federal technical bodies and scientific institutions – such as INPE, IBAMA, ICMBio, INPA, and MMA – have concluded that the regulation compromises the fulfillment of Brazilian goals, such as those foreseen in Brazil’s NDC, in addition to bringing the Amazon closer to its tipping point and fragmenting habitats of endangered species. Based on the principle of conventionality control, the MPF defends the invalidity of the flexibility introduced by the Decree, since international treaties bind all federative entities and prevent the issuance of internal regulations incompatible with their obligations. States cannot invoke its domestic law to disregard international commitments, especially those aimed at protecting the human right to the environment. 

In the form of a preliminary injunction, the MPF requests the immediate suspension of the decree’s effectiveness, preventing further reductions in Legal Reserve areas and suspending administrative procedures based on the regulation. On the merits, the request seeks a declaration of unconstitutionality and absolute nullity, with retroactive effects, as well as the reinstatement of the minimum 80% Legal Reserve percentage and the invalidation of any reductions granted based on the decree. Ministério Público Federal vs. Estado do Amazonas (Legal Reserve in the Amazon) (Brazil, Amazonas Federal Court)

Brazil: State public prosecutor sues individuals for deliberately organized deforestation in the rural area of Machadinho D’Oeste

On June 17, 2026, the Public Prosecutor’s Office of the State of Rondônia (MPRO) filed a Public Civil Action against Marli Matos de Oliveira, Angelica de Oliveira Quintino, and Luis Paulo Gonçalves Carvalho, regarding the deforestation of 1,271.535 hectares of native vegetation in the Amazon biome—equivalent to approximately 1,700 soccer fields—in three contiguous rural lots of Seringal Assunção, in the rural area of Machadinho D’Oeste (RO). The deforestation allegedly took place between 2020 and 2023. 

It is alleged that, according to civil investigations initiated within the scope of IBAMA’s “Operation Remote Control – P4,” Defendants would be jointly and severally liable for the deforestation of native vegetation in the area in question. Respectively, deforestation of 407,708 hectares was evidenced in lot 5; 427,908 hectares in lot 7; and 435,919 hectares in lot 8. It should be noted that the process of destroying native vegetation through clear-cutting and continuous polygons, without any environmental authorization, over several years, and with the subsequent preparation of the land for agricultural activities, exposes a deliberately organized activity aimed at transforming land use, seeking to enable the productive exploitation of illegally deforested areas. 

Furthermore, Plaintiff argues that, in accordance with the principle of full environmental reparation, the guidelines of the National Council of the Public Prosecutor’s Office (CNMP), the valuation guide of the Brazilian Association of Members of the Public Prosecutor’s Office for the Environment (ABRAMPA), and the methodology of the Special Environmental Action Group (GAEMA/MPRO), the multiple dimensions and implications of the observed damage must be considered—that is, not only the main, interim, and residual damage, but also (i) the collective moral environmental damage, due to the violation of fundamental principles, especially the diffuse right to an ecologically balanced environment, and (ii) the autonomous climate damage, due to the climatic impact of CO2 release and the decrease in the natural capacity for CO2 sequestration in the area. For the measurement and quantification of climate damage, based on an opinion from the Technical Analysis Center of the MPRO (Public Prosecutor’s Office of Rondônia), the value of US$ 5 per ton of CO2 released is adopted, with an average stock of 550.5 tons of CO2 per hectare of Amazon rainforest. The three rural properties caused significant autonomous climate damage, estimated at US$ 3,499,695.34 and R$ 17,498,476.69. The material environmental damage was estimated at R$ 75,756,708.60. 

Therefore, Plaintiffs requests, as a preliminary measure, the freezing of the defendants’ assets, the cessation of any use or exploitation of the areas, and the maintenance of the IBAMA embargoes; and on the merits, their joint and several liability for environmental recovery obligations (PRAD), under penalty of equivalent compensation, and the payment of compensation for the various dimensions of environmental damage, including climate damage, totaling R$ 93,255,185.29. MPRO vs Marli Matos de Oliveira and others (Autonomous climate damage and illegal deforestation in Machadinho do Oeste)(Brazil, Rondônia State Court)

Brazil: The Federal Public Prosecutor claims an electric power distributor responsible for a forest fire and for the resulting emission of greenhouse gas

In June 2026, the Federal Public Prosecutor’s Office (MPF) filed a Public Civil Action against Energisa Mato Grosso – Distribuidora de Energia SA over a large-scale August 2024 fire in the Serra das Araras Ecological Station (ESEC), a fully protected conservation unit in Mato Grosso. The MPF alleges that one of the fire’s ignition points originated in the right-of-way of Defendant’s medium-voltage power grid, where technical and expert evidence points to a failure of preventive maintenance and missing firebreaks and vegetation pruning, allowing dry branches to contact the wiring and spark a fire on a day of low humidity and strong winds. The Protected Area Management Plan had flagged the unit’s vulnerability to externally caused fires and recommended preventive maintenance and surveillance along the power lines. 

The MPF estimates the fire devastated roughly 4,500 hectares directly, and about 104,592 hectares when combined with related ignition points nearby, and says Defendant declined a proposed Conduct Adjustment Agreement (TAC), arguing there were no grounds for liability. 

The MPF grounds liability in Article 225 of the Federal Constitution and IACHR Advisory Opinions 23/2017 and 32/2025, which call for precautionary measures and enhanced due diligence by states and private actors in the climate crisis. It argues the fire caused both local damage to fauna, flora, and human health and diffuse climate damage from GHG release and the loss of carbon sinks, to be valued using the CNJ’s environmental-damage calculator. 

A Federal Police expert report confirmed an electrical origin consistent with an electric arc and put direct environmental damage at R$11,917.76 per hectare (R$53,629,920 total for 4,500 hectares) and the CO2 emissions’ monetary value at R$29,472,329.76, to be split among ICMBio, IBAMA, the Mato Grosso Military Fire Department, and regional universities studying fire impacts on the Cerrado and Pantanal. 

Citing heightened fire risk from high temperatures and El Niño, the MPF sought an urgent order requiring Defendant to present and implement, within 30 days, an emergency preventive-maintenance plan for the grid bordering the Ecological Station. On the merits, it seeks R$53,629,920 in material damages, R$26,814,960 in diffuse moral damages (50% of the material damages), R$29,472,329.76 in climate damages, and a continuing vegetation-maintenance plan for the power-line easement. Ministério Público Federal vs Energisa Mato Grosso - Distribuidora de Energia S.A (Fire at the Serra das Araras Ecological Station) (Brazil, Mato Grosso Federal Court)

Brazil: The Federal Public Prosecutor sues federal and state governments for the failure to establish the Tapajós River Hydrographic Basin Committee

On July 8, 2026, the Federal Public Prosecutor’s Office (MPF) filed a Public Civil Action against the Union, ANA, IBAMA, and the states of Pará and Mato Grosso over their failure to establish the Tapajós River Hydrographic Basin Committee, an instrument required under the National Water Resources Policy to ensure decentralized, participatory water management. 

The MPF argues that despite the National Water Resources Policy (Law 9.433/1997) and the Strategic Plan for Water Resources of the Right Bank of the Amazon, the Committee has never been created, violating principles of popular participation, prevention, and precaution, and leaving affected communities without a voice in water-management decisions in a basin with high environmental, social, and economic stakes, including indigenous lands, hydroelectric projects, and mining activity. It argues the omission compromises coordinated adaptation to droughts and other climate-driven hydrological extremes and leaves large projects to proceed without adequate indigenous and traditional-community participation, in violation of ILO Convention 169, despite years of MPF recommendations and public hearings. 

The MPF requests a court-ordered schedule for creating the Committee, with suspension of new or renewed water-use permits and environmental licenses for medium- and large-impact basin projects if that schedule is not met; on the merits, it seeks confirmation of that order, a final mandate to establish the Committee, and R$1 million in collective moral damages. Ministério Público Federal vs. União and others (Tapajós River Basin Committee) (Brazil, Pará Federal Court)

Brazil: The Federal Public Prosecutor challenges a national department and the State of Pará to suspend the dredging in the Tapajós River

On March 29, 2025, the Federal Public Prosecutor’s Office (MPF) filed a preliminary injunction proceeding against DNIT and the State of Pará seeking to suspend emergency dredging of the Tapajós River between Santarém and Itaituba, authorized under Pará’s Environmental Authorization 5776/2025 without an EIA/RIMA, assessment of cumulative impacts, or free, prior, and informed consultation with affected indigenous, quilombola, riverside, and extractive communities, in alleged violation of the Constitution, environmental law, and ILO Convention 169. 

The MPF argued the licensing should have included climate-impact analysis and that the North’s drought impacts fall unequally on traditional communities, framing this as environmental racism tied to the broader Tapajós Waterway project, noting that similar protection had been granted in ACP 1014317-12.2024.4.01.3902 (Federal Public Prosecutor’s Office and INCRA vs. State of Pará and Municipality of Santarém (Tapajós-Xingu Logistics Corridor)). A May 2025 conciliation hearing denied the injunction and directed the MPF to amend its petition; after an interlocutory appeal,

The MPF amended its claim into a Public Civil Action, noting the specific emergency dredging had already been completed (mooting that narrow request) but maintaining claims regarding the licensing, consultation, and environmental-study requirements for future dredging under the Tapajós Waterway plan, now citing evidence of mercury-contaminated sediment resuspension and risks to biodiversity, water quality, artisanal fishing, and food security. It seeks public disclosure and hearings for affected communities and R$500 million in collective moral damages, partly earmarked for impacted traditional communities.

DNIT defends the emergency dredging as legally authorized under its Annual Waterway Maintenance Dredging Plan (PADMA), necessitated by critical navigability conditions and the lack of time for a bidding process, and argues waterway transport is the most sustainable mode available, with dredging having negligible climate impact; it disputes the existence of collective moral damages and seeks dismissal of the injunction and the claims.

The State of Pará defends the emergency authorization as proportionate given the water crisis, says a full environmental assessment will apply to the ongoing regular licensing process, disputes the collective moral damages claim for lack of evidence of damage or causation, and notes its formal commitment to give prior notice of future emergency dredging; it likewise seeks dismissal. Ministério Público Federal vs. Estado do Pará and others (Dredging in the Tapajós River) (Brazil, Pará State Court)

Brazil: State prosecutor sues its own state to ensure establishment of tools to protect the rights of children and adolescents against risks including that of environmental licensing

On January 23, 2026, the Public Prosecutor’s Office of the State of Pará (MPPA) filed a Public Civil Action (ACP) against the State of Pará, with a request for urgent relief, aiming to ensure compliance with Resolution 215/2018 of the National Council for the Rights of Children and Adolescents (CONANDA) to incorporate its guidelines into the licensing processes in the state. The Resolution establishes parameters and actions for the protection of the rights of children and adolescents at risk of being affected by the context of works and projects, including the environmental licensing phase. 

The MPPA argues, based on a Civil Inquiry, that SEMAS (Pará’s environmental agency) has not complied with the Resolution — citing the Marituba Sanitary Landfill licensing as an example, where SEMAS argued the project predated the Resolution even though corrective licensing occurred in 2020 — and frames the issue as one of climate justice, since environmental impacts fall disproportionately on vulnerable groups, citing UN Committee on the Rights of the Child General Comment 26/2023, the 2030 Agenda, and the UNFCCC. 

The MPPA sought a diagnosis of the Resolution’s implementation and measures to implement it, including indicators in licensing Terms of Reference, public hearings with children and adolescents, and consultation with affected communities; on the merits, it seeks confirmation of the injunction.

On February 6, 2026, Judge Aldinéia Maria Martins Barros partially granted the injunction, ordering the State to document inclusion of child-protection indicators in new licensing Terms of Reference, present a schedule for adapting ongoing licensing processes, and establish a methodology for listening to affected children and adolescents, with a fine payable to Marituba’s Municipal Fund for the Rights of Children and Adolescents for non-compliance.

The State of Pará denies any omission, arguing the Resolution is a non-binding programmatic norm, invoking separation of powers and judicial restraint, and citing Urgenda, Neubauer, and Juliana as precedent against courts substituting for the Executive on technical policy instruments. It seeks revocation of the injunction and dismissal of the action. MPPA vs Estado do Pará (Environmental licensing and CONANDA Resolution 215/2018) (Brazil, Pará State Court)

Brazil: NGO files a Public Civil Action against investment fund for disclosure of climate risks associated with real estates

In August 2026, the Institute of Collective Law (IDC) filed a Public Civil Action against the Edifício Galeria Limited Liability Real Estate Investment Fund and its administrator, BTG Pactual Serviços Financeiros S/A DTVM, due to the alleged lack of adequate assessment, management, and disclosure of climate risks associated with the fund’s real estate asset. The fund is a “brick-and-mortar” type fund and its assets are entirely tied to a physical asset, the Edifício Galeria, a commercial building located at Rua da Quitanda, nº 86, in the Center of Rio de Janeiro/RJ, situated in an area identified as having high exposure to climate risks. 

The IDC argues that the property is exposed to significant climate risks, especially floods, extreme temperatures, landslides, and forest fires, capable of affecting its physical integrity, functionality, and economic value, as well as rental income and shareholder returns. It alleges that, although the fund discloses other types of risks to investors, it does not present specific information on climate or environmental risks, nor has it published the asset valuation report, a circumstance considered especially serious given the existence of 3,750 unit holders, of which 3,727 are individuals. It further argues that climate risks constitute material financial risks and that Real Estate Investment Funds must incorporate them into their management and provide clear and sufficient information to investors to allow for adequately informed decisions. 

Therefore, the IDC requests: (i) the presentation and publication of an asset valuation report containing a detailed analysis of the aspects capable of affecting its value, including physical and transitional climate risks; (ii) the organization and periodic disclosure of the identified climate risks and the methodologies used for their assessment and management; and (iii) the development and implementation, by the administrator, of a Formal Policy for the Management and Disclosure of Climate Risks for the fund. IDC vs. Edifício Galeria Responsabilidade Limitada and BTG Pactual (Real Estate Investment Fund and Climate Risks) (Brazil, Rio de Janeiro State Court)

New Zealand: Individual litigant challenges the Minister’s announcement denying his judicial rights and the climate concerns behind them

In June 2026, Mr. Smith filed a proceeding in the High Court, challenging Justice Minister Paul Goldsmith’s announcement that he will introduce legislation to amend the Climate Change Response Act 2002 to prevent tort-based climate litigation, including with retrospective effect. 

In the announcement, the Minister expressed that “[o]ngoing litigation in the High Court, where an applicant has brought civil claims against six major businesses for their greenhouse gas emissions, is creating uncertainty in business confidence and investment that the Government must address.” He further stated that “the Government will amend the Climate Change Response Act 2002 to prevent findings of liability for tort for climate change damage or harm caused by greenhouse gas emissions in both current and future proceedings before the courts.” This is in reference to Mr Smith’s existing case, Smith v Fonterra, against six of New Zealand’s largest corporate emitters. 

The claim challenges both the Minister’s announcement and the Cabinet process and decision behind it. Mr Smith alleges that the decision was unlawful on several grounds, including that: 

(i) The decision was reached with input from the defendants in Mr Smith’s existing case, Smith v Fonterra, in a way that was hidden from the public record and amounts to procedural impropriety;

(ii) The decision directly concerns Mr Smith’s rights in an existing High Court claim, but was made after consulting with the defendants and without consulting him; 

(iii) Cabinet decided to remove Mr Smith’s rights without considering how the defendants would compensate for the damage they have caused, contrary to principles in the Regulatory Standards Act 2025; and 

(iv) The announcement was made, at least in part, knowing and intending it would disrupt the High Court process, and was therefore made for an improper purpose. 

Plaintiff seeks a declaration that the Minister’s announcement and the Cabinet decision were unlawful. Smith v Minister of Justice (New Zealand, High Court of New Zealand)

Singapore: Australian NGO sues Oversea-Chinese Banking Corporation Limited for an alleged act of greenwashing

On February 23, 2026, the Australian NGO Market Forces filed a complaint with the Singapore Exchange (SGX) alleging that Oversea-Chinese Banking Corporation Limited (OCBC) has made materially misleading disclosures about its climate-related financing exposure. OCBC’s Responsible Financing Policy for Energy bars financing clients deriving more than 25% (new) or 50% (existing) of power capacity or revenue from coal-fired power plants, yet the complaint alleges OCBC provided term loans in 2021, 2022, and January 2023 to three Harita Nickel Group entities, alongside other co-lenders. 

Harita operates new coal infrastructure on Obi Island, Indonesia, where its nickel smelting complex already runs 910 MW of a planned 1,670 MW in coal capacity (against only 40 MW of solar), supplying nickel for EV batteries sold in Europe, China, and the US even as buyers move toward supply-chain decarbonization and the EU’s Carbon Border Adjustment Mechanism heightens transition risk. 

The complaint argues this exposes OCBC to material credit, regulatory, and reputational risk, pointing to Harita’s emissions nearly tripling from 3.74 to 10.87 MtCO2e between 2022 and 2024 and to a reduction target that excludes roughly 73% of current smelting capacity built after 2022. It alleges OCBC’s 25%/50% coal-power thresholds may be insufficient or misleading because they fail to capture clients’ captive coal-power activities, leaving investors without complete information to assess the bank’s transition-risk exposure. Market Forces claims this non-disclosure could mislead investors and contribute to a false market, in potential violation of SGX Listing Rule 703(1) (requiring disclosure necessary to avoid a false market) and Rules 711A/711B (requiring sustainability reports with climate disclosures aligned with IFRS Sustainability Disclosure Standards, which build on TCFD recommendations).

Practice Note 7.6 to Rule 711B confirms that sustainability reporting does not reduce an issuer’s separate Rule 703(1) disclosure obligation. SGX Complaint Regarding Oversea-Chinese Banking Corporation Limited (SGX: 039) Misleading Disclosures (Singapore, Singapore Exchange)

Sweden: Environmental group brings a lawsuit identical to a class action that was rejected standing after failing Verein KlimaSeniorinnen’s victim status test 

In Anton Foley and others v Sweden (Aurora Case), a group of over 600 young people born between 1996 and 2015 filed a class action lawsuit against the Swedish state, arguing that Sweden’s action on mitigating climate change is inadequate and thus in violation of their rights under the European Convention of Human Rights (ECHR). On February 19, 2025, however, the Swedish Supreme Court rejected standing, finding that the applicants had not satisfied the victim status test required in Verein KlimaSeniorinnen and others v Switzerland.

Following the decision, on February 6, 2026, a new claim was submitted to the Stockholm District Court, this time by the association Aurora. The claim is framed around the standing criteria delineated in Verein KlimaSeniorinnen and others v Switzerland, advancing more or less the same claims as in the class action regarding violations of the rights to life and to private and family life (articles 2 and 8 ECHR) and the prohibition of discrimination (article 14). The state responded to this claim, accepting that the case could be heard on its merits, but disputing the claims made, arguing that the state has satisfied its climate change-related obligations under Article 8 of the ECHR. Aurora v Sweden (Aurora Case) (Sweden, Stockholm District Court)

United Nations: Individuals and NGOs file a complaint against the New Zealand Government’s intended Tort Prohibition

In June 2026, Mike Smith (Ngāpuhi and Ngāti Kahu), the National Iwi Chairs Forum Pou Tikanga, Climate Clinic Aotearoa (a youth coalition), and Lawyers for Climate Action NZ submitted a complaint to the United Nations Special Rapporteur on the promotion and protection of human rights in the context of climate change, regarding the New Zealand Government’s announcement of May 12, 2026. In the announcement, the Government announced its intention to amend the Climate Change Response Act 2002 to bar existing and future civil claims in tort for loss or harm arising from greenhouse gas emissions (the “Tort Prohibition”).

The complainants assert that the Tort Prohibition would extinguish potential tort liability for greenhouse gas emissions, including in Mr Smith’s ongoing proceeding against seven of New Zealand’s largest corporate emitters, Smith v Fonterra, which the Supreme Court of New Zealand had reinstated and allowed to proceed to substantive trial following strike-out decisions in the lower courts. 

The complaint raises concerns about procedural defects in the Government’s decision-making and substantive inconsistencies with the rule of law, the separation of powers, and New Zealand’s obligations under international human rights law, including the right of access to a court. This includes an assertion that the Tort Prohibition is inconsistent with the rights of persons belonging to minorities to enjoy their own culture under Article 27 of the International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights, given the centrality of tikanga to Smith v Fonterra. It is further asserted that the Tort Prohibition is inconsistent with New Zealand’s stringent due diligence obligations to protect the climate system, being a necessary precondition of the exercise and enjoyment of human rights as articulated by the International Court of Justice in its Advisory Opinion of July 23, 2025, including through the regulation of private actors within the State’s jurisdiction. Smith, Climate Clinic Aotearoa, National Iwi Chairs Forum Pou Tikanga and Lawyers for Climate Action NZ v New Zealand (United Nation, UN Special Rapporteurs)

Zambia: NGO petitions High Court over the government’s failure to operationalize two statutory environmental and climate funds 

On July 8, 2026, Climate Action Professionals Zambia, a company limited by guarantee that works on environmental and climate advocacy and awareness, filed a constitutional petition before the High Court of Zambia (Constitutional Jurisdiction, Principal Registry, Lusaka) against the Zambia Environmental Management Agency (ZEMA) and the Attorney General. The petitioner alleges that the failure to operationalize two statutory funds infringes, or is likely to infringe, the right to life under Article 12(1) of the Constitution of Zambia.

The petition first concerns the Environment Fund, established under Section 95(1) of the Environmental Management Act No. 12 of 2011 and intended, among other purposes, for mitigating or restoring environmental degradation and adverse effects on the environment (Section 97(a)). The petitioner contends that ZEMA has still not implemented the fund more than fifteen years after the Act was passed. It also concerns the Green Economy and Climate Change Fund, established under Section 34(1) of the Green Economy and Climate Change Act No. 18 of 2024 to manage green economy and climate change interventions. The petitioner contends that the fund has not been implemented more than a year and a half after the Act was enacted, and it attributes that failure to the Attorney General as second respondent.

The petitioner seeks declarations that the right to life under Article 12(1) is interlinked with the right to a clean, safe and healthy environment, and that each respondent’s failure to implement its respective fund infringes or is likely to infringe the right to life. It also seeks orders compelling ZEMA to implement the Environment Fund and the Attorney General to implement the Green Economy and Climate Change Fund, plus any other relief the court deems fit. The petition was drawn and filed by KAN Legal Practitioners, and the case is pending. Climate Action Professionals Zambia v. Zambia Environmental Management Agency and the Attorney General (Zambia, High Court)

GLOBAL DECIDED CASES

Argentina: Cotton company held responsible for clearing protected forests

In early 2025, it was reported that the company Algoservicios S.A. had cleared part of a native forest located in the town of Logroño, in the 9 de Julio department of the province of Santa Fe, to install a cotton ginning plant. Extraction activities in this forest are expressly prohibited by Law No. 26,331, the minimum standards law for the protection of native forests.

On July 1, 2025, the Public Prosecutor’s Office No. 15 of the Judiciary of Santa Fe filed an environmental protection lawsuit requesting the cessation of the deforestation and the restoration of the destroyed portion of the forest. In the lawsuit, the Prosecutor presented significant climate-related arguments. In particular, it contended that the company’s conduct was inconsistent with the legal commitments undertaken by Argentina to address climate change. To that end, the Prosecutor emphasized the role of forest conservation as a climate change mitigation measure and argued that such obligations are binding not only by state actors but also by non-state actors.

On September 30, 2025, Acting Judge Dr. Jorge da Silva granted the injunction and ordered the definitive cessation of the land-clearing activities, declared Algoservicios S.A. responsible for the environmental damage caused, and ordered the company to fully remediate the damage. In reaching this decision, the court considered that the requirement of “manifest illegality” for the admissibility of the environmental injunction was met by the violation of national and provincial regulations mandating adaptation to and mitigation of climate change. The court expressly referred to the Paris Agreement (ratified by Law No. 27,270), which is binding upon Argentina, as well as to Law No. 27,520 (National Minimum Standards Law on Climate Change Adaptation and Mitigation). It also invoked Article 33 of the Constitution of the Province of Santa Fe, which establishes the duty of every person to cooperate in climate action. According to the court, the clearing of a specially protected native forest constituted a serious infringement of climate mitigation obligations, and it endorsed the Prosecutor’s position that such obligations extend beyond public authorities to the private sector.

The judgment has become final, no appeal having been lodged by the defendants, and is currently under implementation. Prosecutor’s Office Of District 15 Tostado v. Algoservicios S.A. — Collective Amparo Action (Argentina, Provincial Lower Court)

Brazil: Court holds that NGOs lack standing when the institutional objectives of the associations do not align with the protection sought on behalf of others 

On May 28, 2024, the Brazilian Association for Economic Freedom (ABLE) and the Institute of Law and Economics of Rio Grande do Sul (IDERS) filed a Public Civil Action (ACP) against the Federal Government, following the floods that hit Rio Grande do Sul in April and May 2024. 

Plaintiffs argued that the climate disaster caused a humanitarian, social, and economic crisis that severely affected the productive sector of Rio Grande do Sul, and that the Federal Government has a constitutional and legal duty to act in prevention, response, and recovery in the face of public calamities. They alleged that the measures adopted by the federal government were insufficient, as they focused primarily on offering subsidized credit, financial guarantees, and postponement of obligations, rather than non-refundable resources capable of promoting the economic reconstruction of the state. Plaintiffs pointed out that the federal government took no concrete measures despite its knowledge from its study, “Brazil 2040: Scenarios and Alternatives for Adaptation to Climate Change,” of a likely extreme rainfall increase in Southern Brazil. Plaintiffs sought the implementation of a comprehensive financial support plan for the affected productive sector, with direct transfer of non-refundable resources, as well as the condemnation of the federal government to pay collective moral damages arising from its alleged responsibility for insufficient preparation and management of the calamity. Amending its initial petition, Plaintiffs also pointed out the Union's responsibility in the prevention, response, and recovery from disasters, based on Law No. 12.340/2010.

In June, 2024, the 1st Federal Court of Porto Alegre dismissed the lawsuit without prejudice, recognizing the lack of standing of ABLE and IDERS. The court understood that there was not sufficient thematic relevance between the institutional objectives of the associations and the protection sought on behalf of the companies affected by the floods.

In their appeal, the plaintiffs argued that the lawsuit did not seek private compensation, but rather the implementation of a public economic policy aimed at rebuilding the productive sector of Rio Grande do Sul. They argued that the statutory purposes of ABLE and IDERS, related to the economic analysis of law, public policies, and economic freedoms, were sufficient to legitimize their actions.

The Federal Regional Court of the 4th Region dismissed the appeal filed by AMICROPOA – which requested to join the case as a co-litigant assistant to the plaintiffs – due to a procedural representation defect, and denied the appeal filed by ABLE and IDERS. The court concluded that the institutional objectives of the associations were predominantly focused on teaching, research, academic production, and the promotion of debates on law and economics, and that there was insufficient thematic relevance to require the Union to implement a financial support plan for the productive sector, nor to claim collective moral damages, thus upholding the dismissal of the action. ABLE e IDERS vs. União Federal (Economic reconstruction after the floods in Rio Grande do Sul) (Brazil, Regional Federal Court for the Fourth Region)

Brazil: Supreme Court finds constitutional Resolution 501/2021 of the National Council for the Environment, based on the need for regulations to adapt to technological advances

In September 2023, the Attorney General of the Republic filed a Direct Action of Unconstitutionality (ADI) with a request for a precautionary measure against Resolution 501/2021 of the National Council for the Environment (CONAMA), which amended Resolution 382/2006 to remove the application of maximum limits for atmospheric pollutant emissions from fully electrified oil and gas platforms located beyond Brazilian territorial waters. 

According to the Plaintiff, the resolution suspended emission limits for pollutants and greenhouse gases established for electricity-generating turbines on offshore platforms, provided that each individual turbogenerator had a capacity of less than 100 MW, even if the total generation capacity of the platform exceeded this limit. Plaintiff argued that the rule promoted a true deregulation of environmental protection by excluding such projects from the previously existing objective parameters for controlling atmospheric emissions, making it impossible for Brazilian Institute of Environment and Renewable Natural Resources (IBAMA) to enforce such limits within the scope of environmental licensing. The petition pointed to the violation of the principles of prohibition of deficient protection, prohibition of environmental regression, prevention and precaution, as well as the fundamental right to an ecologically balanced environment and the state's duty of environmental protection provided for in Article 225 of the Federal Constitution. It was further argued that the absence of normative parameters for potentially polluting activities would compromise the performance of prior environmental impact studies and could lead to environmental damage that is difficult to repair. As a precautionary measure, the immediate suspension of the effectiveness of Resolution 501/2021 was requested and, on the merits, a declaration of its unconstitutionality for violating Articles 5, LIV, and 225, caput and § 1, IV and V, of the Federal Constitution.

In the judgment of ADI 7467, published June 16, 2026, the Supreme Federal Court dismissed the claims made in the initial petition, concluding that CONAMA Resolution 501/2021 was constitutional. The Court understood that no violation of the principles of prohibition of deficient protection and prohibition of environmental regression had been demonstrated, nor the suppression of the essential core of the right to an ecologically balanced environment. It was considered that the normative change resulted from the need for regulatory adaptation to technological advances related to fully electrified offshore platforms and that the mere modification of environmental control parameters does not, in itself, imply an unconstitutional reduction in the level of environmental protection. Although the Court recognized weaknesses in the deliberative process that culminated in the issuance of the resolution, especially given the limitation of technical studies and the reduced participation of specialized bodies, the Court understood that such circumstances were not sufficient to justify declaring the norm unconstitutional. Nevertheless, the Plenary recommended that CONAMA, in improving the regulations, promote new technical studies, broaden the participation of bodies such as IBAMA and the Public Prosecutor's Office, and deepen the analysis of the environmental impacts resulting from the new technological reality of fully electrified offshore platforms.The judgment became final and unappealable.The file removal order was issued. ADI 7467 (Atmospheric Emissions from Offshore Platforms) (Brazil, Federal Supreme Court)

Brazil: The Federal Public Prosecutor appeals a federal court’s decision as disregarding the legal duty of the FUNCAP and related Supreme Court precedent

On February 28, 2025, the Federal Public Prosecutor's Office (MPF) filed a public civil action (ACP) against the Federal Union, arguing that the federal entity is failing to allocate a portion of the revenue from fines for environmental infractions and crimes to the National Fund for Public Calamities, Protection and Civil Defense (FUNCAP), in violation of Law No. 12,340/2010. It was argued that this omission compromises the socio-environmental recovery of the areas affected by the collapses of the Fundão and Córrego do Feijão dams, as well as the implementation of public policies for disaster prevention and mitigation. Plaintiffs requested: (i) the granting of urgent relief to order the Union to remedy the omission in allocating resources to FUNCAP; (ii) the condemnation of the Union to the obligation to promote the regular allocation of a portion of the environmental fines to the aforementioned fund; (iii) the allocation of these resources to the recovery of affected soils, to support family farming and to the adoption of measures aimed at reducing the physical and social vulnerabilities of the affected communities.

The Union filed a response, alleging preliminarily that the initial petition was defective due to the lack of indication of the value of the case. On the merits, it argued that the allocation of environmental fines to FUNCAP is not an automatic legal obligation, stating that the definition of these resources depends on budgetary legislation and administrative and legislative discretion, for which reason it requested that the claims be dismissed.

On May 12, 2026, Judge Marcelo Aguiar Machado of the Minas Gerais Federal Court dismissed the MPF’s claims. It determined that the allocation of resources to FUNCAP falls within the budgetary discretion of the Executive and Legislative branches, and there is no basis for the Judiciary to impose the desired allocation.

On June 30, 2026, the MPF filed an appeal, arguing that the ruling confused discretion regarding the amount of resources with the legal duty to ensure the functioning of FUNCAP. It argued that the Federal Government has an obligation to allocate a reasonable portion of environmental fines to the fund in future budget laws and to regulate its operation. Furthermore, it expressly framed the controversy within the context of climate change, arguing that strengthening FUNCAP is essential to finance policies for prevention, adaptation, risk management, and response to extreme events, the frequency and intensity of which are being exacerbated by climate change. Plaintiff highlighted that, according to the terms defined by the Supreme Federal Court in PSB et al. v. Brazil (ADPF 708/DF), the international commitments to which Brazil is a signatory and which provide for the protection of an ecologically balanced environment are of paramount importance to the realization of human rights, which is why they are characterized as supralegal norms. Plaintiff further emphasized the understanding of the Supreme Court, recognizing the unconstitutional omission of the Federal Government in failing to allocate resources in the Budget Laws (LOAs) for the composition of the Climate Fund and the Amazon Fund. Plaintiff stressed that with regard to FUNCAP, the unconstitutional omission is even more serious than that relating to ADPF 708/DF because, while in relation to FUNCAP there was omission by both the Executive and Legislative branches, in the cases of the Climate Fund and the Amazon Fund, the Legislative branch exercised its powers to ensure the effectiveness of the environmental funds, with omission only on the part of the Executive branch. Finally, the MPF requested the complete reversal of the judgment and the granting of urgent appellate relief, ordering the Federal Government to adopt the necessary measures to ensure that future budget laws guarantee a reasonable portion of the financial resources derived from environmental fines for the composition of FUNCAP (Fund for the Control of Environmental Risks), in order to make the operation of FUNCAP fully viable for the implementation of public policies for risk management and disaster response, including in the context of the collapses of the Fundão and Córrego do Feijão dams. The MPF also requested that the Federal Government be compelled to implement the regulations stipulated in Law 12.340/2010, reducing its discretion in the management and transfer of financial resources that should comprise FUNCAP. Ministério Público Federal vs. União Federal (FUNCAP and environmental fines) (Brazil, Minas Gerais Federal Court)

Brazil: Supreme Court emphasizes the importance of the Amazon and the Pantanal for maintaining climate balance

On September 17, 2020, the Rede Sustentabilidade party filed a Claim of Non-Compliance with a Fundamental Precept (ADPF), with a request for preliminary injunction, based on the multiple omissions and unconstitutional commissions by the Public Authorities, related to state action against fires that affected the Pantanal and the Amazon Rainforest. Plaintiff argued that these biomes are structurally important for the balance of the ecosystem and are affected by the conjunction of three factors: the omission of state authorities; criminal activity and the interest of groups and individuals in the destruction of the biomes; and the occurrence of climatic conditions, resulting from and promoted by anthropogenic interventions such as global warming, which are favorable to the rapid spread of destruction. Plaintiff also argued that the actions of the Public Authorities—including the dismantling of environmental agencies, non-execution of budgetary funds (Climate Fund and National Environment Fund), and dismantling of inspection policies—led to record levels of fires and deforestation in the biomes in 2019 and 2020. Climate is mentioned contextually, for example, when stating that the State did not promote the generation of renewable energy and the neutralization of its carbon footprint. Considering this scenario, it is argued that insufficient state action violated the duties of environmental protection, prevention, precaution, inspection, and conservation, the principle of non-regression, the dignity of the human person, legal certainty, and the rights to life, health, and an ecologically balanced environment. 

In a preliminary injunction, Plaintiff requested: (i) the adoption of operational efforts to combat the fires in the Pantanal and the Amazon, presenting a prevention and combat plan; (ii) the restructuring of the National System for the Prevention and Combat of Forest Fires (PREVFOGO), the resumption of the Action Plan for the Prevention and Control of Deforestation in the Legal Amazon (PPCDAm), and the presentation of equivalent plans for the other biomes; (iii) the intensification and resumption of environmental enforcement, ensuring punishment for identified offenders; (iv) the provision of humanitarian assistance to impacted populations, especially indigenous, quilombola, and traditional communities; (v) the establishment of transparency and monitoring mechanisms; (vii) an explanation from the Federal Government and the Ministry of the Environment regarding the budgetary execution of environmental protection programs in 2019 and 2020; (vii) the suspension of deforestation authorizations. On the merits, it is requested that the unconstitutionality of the current state of affairs of Brazilian environmental management be recognized, due to violation of the fundamental precepts raised, fully confirming the preliminary injunctions.

In March 2024, the current requests were joined for joint judgment with ADPF 746 and 857 due to the similarity of their subject matter. The three requests were also partially upheld. While the Court did not declare the state of affairs unconstitutional, it recognized the existence of structural flaws in the policy for protecting the Legal Amazon, imposing a series of measures to combat deforestation so that the Federal Government presents a plan for preventing and combating fires in the Pantanal and the Amazon, with the recovery of the operational capacity of PREVFOGO; discloses data related to the budget and budgetary execution of actions related to environmental protection by the States and the Union during the years 2019 and 2020; and informs, as do the state governments, the authorizations for vegetation suppression.

Afterwards, the judgment was published. It was highlighted that the Federal Government is resuming environmental protection measures and emphasizes the importance of the Amazon and the Pantanal for maintaining climate balance. In his dissenting opinion, Justice Edson Fachin acknowledged the still unconstitutional state of affairs, a view shared by Justices Luiz Fux and Cármen Lúcia. Fachin stressed that climate jurisprudence exists internationally due to foreign cases. He argued that allowing the repeated violation of the right to an ecologically balanced environment without permitting the Supreme Court to act promptly to "prevent climate chaos and the compromise of Amazonian biodiversity is not consistent with international agreements and the democratic commitment expressed in the Constitutional Charter."

Considering the structural nature of the case and the measures determined in the judgment that ruled on the merits of the actions, there was a sequence of decisions and actions determined in this specific action for the execution of the content of the decision. ADPF 743 (Fires in the Pantanal and Amazon) (Brazil, Federal Supreme Court)

Brazil: Individuals unsuccessfully sue local and state government for the failure to adopt sufficient measures to address the effects of the climate emergency on public schools

In February 2025, Silvia Andrea Ferraro, Letícia Lé Oliveira, Dafne Sena Coutinho Ribeiro, Nayara Schrank do Rosário, Nathalia Santana Pereira, councilwomen of the Municipality of São Paulo, Paula Nunes dos Santos, Carolina Iara Ramos de Oliveira, Simone Ferreira Nascimento, Mariana Alves de Souza and Sirlene Sales Maciel, state co-deputies of São Paulo, and members of the PSOL Feminist Caucuses filed a preliminary injunction against the municipality of São Paulo and the State of São Paulo, on the alleged omission of public entities in adopting sufficient measures to address the effects of the climate emergency on public schools. Plaintiffs argued that high temperatures and successive heat waves harm the learning of children and adolescents, compromising concentration, memorization and cognitive capacity, in addition to affecting the regular provision of public education services. 

Notably, in 2024, the Municipality of São Paulo recorded above-average temperatures in all months, while several schools in the municipal and state networks remain without air conditioning, adequate ventilation, or a water supply in appropriate conditions, and only 595 of the 5,077 state schools had air conditioning. It was alleged, therefore, that Defendants remain inactive or adopt insufficient measures in the face of a situation that tends to worsen, violating the right to education and compromising the protection ensured to children and adolescents. 

In a preliminary injunction, it was requested that the Municipality of São Paulo and the State of São Paulo be compelled to present their respective plans for air conditioning the school units of the municipal and state public networks, within the scope of their competencies.

On May 31, 2025, however, an interlocutory decision was issued stating that the filing of a preliminary injunction was not justified in this case, as the request was of an anticipatory nature. Plaintiffs were ordered to supplement the initial petition to adapt the action within ten days.

On February 24, 2026, the action was dismissed without prejudice due to the absence of an amendment to the initial petition. Silva Andrea Ferraro and others vs. Estado de São Paulo (Air conditioning in schools) (Brazil, São Paulo State Court)

European Union: General Court clarifies that Article 10 of the Aarhus Regulation cannot be used to obtain a reassessment of  legislation

On February 26, 2024, Global Legal Action Network (GLAN) and Climate Action Network Europe (CAN-Europe) brought a case in the General Court against the European Commission for its refusal to internally review Implementing Decision 2023/1319 on Member States’ annual greenhouse gas emission allocations. The General Court dismissed the case on September 2, 2026.

The case concerned the Effort Sharing framework of the European Union (EU): sectors outside the EU Emissions Trading System for which Member States receive annual emissions allocations. Decision 2023/1319 replaced the relevant annex to the earlier 2020 implementing decision and set updated annual allocations, expressed in metric tons of CO2 equivalent, for 2023–2025. Under Article 4(3) of Regulation 2018/842, the Commission’s task was to translate legislatively fixed targets into annual Member State allocations using prescribed linear trajectories and national inventory data.

On August 23, 2023, GLAN and CAN-Europe requested internal review of Decision 2023/1319 under Article 10(1) of the Aarhus Regulation. They argued that the allocation decision was unlawful because the underlying EU climate targets and the 2020 impact assessment supporting them were inadequate. The NGOs contended that the EU target of a 55% net reduction in greenhouse gas emissions by 2030 compared with 1990 levels, and the linked Effort Sharing target of a 40% reduction compared with 2005 levels, were insufficient and inadequately assessed. They relied, among other grounds, on the Paris Agreement, Article 191 TFEU, the precautionary and prevention principles, and Charter rights. The applicants also argued that the Commission should have carried out fresh assessments before setting the annual allocations, and that allocations based on an allegedly inadequate 2030 target were themselves inadequate.

In December 2023, however, the Commission refused the NGOs’ internal-review request. As a result, the current case was filed in the General Court, seeking annulment of that refusal. 

Five Judges of the General Court held that the NGOs’ challenge was directed at the EU’s legislative 2030 climate targets, rather than at a defect specific to the Commission’s implementing decision. Under Article 10 of the Aarhus Regulation, internal review is confined to non-legislative administrative acts. It therefore cannot be used to require the Commission, when exercising an implementing power, to revisit or depart from choices made by the EU legislature. Reviewing the sequence of events, the Court reaffirmed that an NGO cannot use Article 10 Aarhus internal review of a Commission implementing act to obtain a reassessment of the ambition, validity, or compatibility with environmental law of the underlying legislative targets that the Commission is legally obliged to implement under Article 291 TFEU. Global Legal Action Network and CAN-Europe v Commission (European Union, General Court)

Kenya: Court establishes principles for handling carbon-credit-related disputes

On August 24, 2021, Sasenyi Multipurpose Co-operative Society Limited filed a case against Rukinga Ranching Company in the Environment and Land Court at Mombasa. At issue was the parcel of land known as L.R. No. 12263/2 (the “Property”), measuring approximately 5,000 acres situated within Taita Taveta County. The Property was part of a bigger parcel owned by Defendant. According to Plaintiff, however, pursuant to a sale agreement dated April 8, 1998, the Property’s leasehold interest was sold to Plaintiff with the Property’s freehold tenure certified upon full payment. Through the lawsuit, Plaintiff sought to obtain proper title of the Property and compensation in respect of the carbon credit income the Defendant acquired over the years.

The case was transferred to the Environment and Land Court at Voi on April 3, 2025.

Upon review, Judge E. K. Wabwoto, on July 23, 2026, found that Defendant had an “obligation to convey to the Plaintiff a good leasehold title to the [Property].” More importantly, however, the court dismissed the claim for compensation arising from Defendant’s carbon credit project. In doing so, the court developed an elaborate body of principles concerning carbon credits, carbon rights, REDD+, climate governance and remedies—first of a kind in Kenya, according to the court. 

The court held that for disputes following carbon credit:

(i) Entitlement follows the land: the right to establish a carbon project and to the credits and income it generates is an incident of lawful ownership of, or lawful rights over, the land or resource generating the reduction, avoidance or sequestration. A claimant to carbon income must therefore trace his claim to a recognized proprietary interest in the project land, or to a contractual or statutory entitlement.

(ii) Contract is the vehicle of the carbon trade: carbon transactions are contractual in nature and are governed by the ordinary principles of the law of contract, subject only to the statutory safeguards enacted below.

(iii) The community entitlements created by the Community Development Agreement must be pursued through the statutory channels, beginning with the dispute resolution mechanisms in the Community Development Agreement itself. The statutory regime does not create a roving equitable entitlement in favour of any neighbour or stranger to a project to share in its proceeds.

(iv) The regime is prospective.

(v) Monetary claims to carbon income are commercial claims subject to the ordinary rules of pleading and proof: a claimant must specifically plead and strictly prove the income said to have been earned and the basis of his share therein. Tools including the National Carbon Registry, verification reports, and issuance records furnish the means of such proof.

(vi) In interpreting and applying this framework, courts should be guided by the constitutional values of sustainable development, intergenerational equity, public participation, and the equitable sharing of accruing benefits under Articles 10, 42, 60, 69, and 70 of the Constitution. Sasenyi Multipurpose Co-operative Society Ltd v Rukinga Ranching Company Ltd (Kenya, Environment and Land Court at Voi)

New Zealand: High Court clarifies that while climate change can create new risks, regional councils do not have an ongoing duty to review its previous zoning decisions

In 2024, Tangoio Developments Ltd (TDL) brought a suit against both the Hastings District Council and the Hawke’s Bay Regional Council in the High Court of New Zealand, for negligence and for breach of statutory duty for the way the zoning and subdivision consent were dealt with. After Cyclone Gabrielle hit Tangoio Beach, Hawke’s Bay, in February 2023, Plaintiff was no longer able to build on the 12 lots it retained from a 36-lot residential subdivision. According to the Plaintiff, the Regional Councils were negligent and breaching their statutory duty, as they did not put in sufficient care despite their knowledge of the subject’s risk of flooding. 

More specifically, one of the causes of action was that Hastings District Council owed a duty of care to TDL and any subsequent landowner within the coastal residential development to ensure that the relevant District Plan provisions were appropriate. TDL relied on the level of knowledge that Hastings District Council had regarding the flood risk of the coastal area, and Hastings District Council’s “ongoing awareness of the effects of climate change”, meaning that the District Council had an “obligation to revisit” the planning rules relating to the area, and breached that duty by not doing so. This argument was developed with reference to the District Council’s “institutional knowledge” of the flooding risks of this land, alongside the Council’s “increased awareness of climate change”.

Defendants applied for and obtained a strike-out of all causes of action against them. Associate Judge Lester of the High Court decided on December 8, 2025, that in the statutory context (being the Resource Management Act 1991 (RMA)) there was no obligation to carry out a review of the relevant planning rules. Section 79(1) of the RMA exempted the relevant rules from compulsory review because they were made within the previous 10 years. Further, while section 79(4) creates a discretionary power to review planning provisions at any time, this discretionary power cannot create a duty of care to review, in part because the decision of whether or not to review is a policy judgment, but also because of the ‘floodgates’ that this would create, holding at [50] that: “It is then said the significance of the adverse reports in respect of [the planning provisions] was reinforced by climate change. However, this would mean that ongoing risks created or exacerbated by climate change would impose on every council a duty to review zoning where flooding or inundation was a recognised hazard, even when met with mitigation conditions”. The Court found that if there were such a duty, it would be “owed to a potentially open-ended class”, to both current and subsequent landowners and councils would “be in a never-ending cycle of reviews, contrary to the 10-year scheme under s 79 of the RMA.” The Court applied the same reasoning to claims against the Hawke’s Bay Regional Council.

In relation to the subdivision consent, the Court also noted that the relevant planning rules had flood-risk mitigation aimed at a “one in 100-year event”, and Cyclone Gabrielle was a “one in 1000-year event”, and that TDL’s subdivision consent was “granted on the basis of risk mitigation, not on the basis of risk elimination.” Tangoio Developments Ltd v Hastings District Council(New Zealand, High Court of New Zealand)

New Zealand: Broadcasting Standards Authority hold that the New Zealand Government’s channel was fair in broadcasting about the nation’s new methane target

On October 13, 2025, Richard Craig, an individual, filed a complaint with the Broadcasting Standards Authority (BSA) against Television New Zealand Ltd, the owner of channel TVNZ. At issue was TVNZ’s Breakfast programme that followed New Zealand Government’s announcement of its intention to reduce New Zealand’s legislated 2050 methane target in the Climate Change Response Act 2002. In the programme, two interviews on the 2050 methane target were included: the first with the Executive Director of a climate NGO, and the second, 45 minutes later, with New Zealand’s Prime Minister. 

According to Craig, the Breakfast show breached the balance and fairness standards set out in the Code of Broadcasting Standards in New Zealand. Specifically, Craig alleged that the NGO representative received “patsy questioning” while the Prime Minister was “scrutinised with vigour”, when both sides should have been treated equally. On April 1, 2026, the BSA did not uphold the complaint. 

In relation to balance, the BSA accepted that the balance standard applied, as the broadcast was regarding a “controversial issue of public importance,” of which the “Government’s decision to reduce the methane emissions target” fell into. However, the BSA was satisfied that TVNZ met the requirements for balance by including interviews that presented opposing perspectives, with both sides having ample opportunity to present and discuss their views. 

Responding to the complainant’s concerns about the interview style and approach, the BSA noted that “the balance standard does not dictate how perspectives are to be presented or what questions should be asked to elicit those perspectives — those are within the broadcaster’s editorial discretion.” Further, the balance standard does not require that each perspective be given equal airtime. Instead, the balance standard requires only that broadcasters give a “fair voice to significant alternative perspectives,” which “clearly happened here, with Lawyers for Climate Action’s position being the lead “angle” near the beginning of the programme, and [the Prime Minister] presenting the Government’s position in response later in the programme.” The BSA did not agree that there was any “skew” in the way these interviews were presented. 

In relation to the fairness standard, the BSA noted that “fairness” does not address the audience or whether facts or issues are “fairly” or misleadingly conveyed, and was not relevant to the complainant’s concern that the presenter’s interview approach and TVNZ’s “skewed presentation” created unfairness for viewers. Instead, BSA held that these concerns were more appropriately addressed under the balance standard above, in considering whether the interview approaches resulted in an unbalanced discussion or left viewers uninformed (which the BSA found not to be the case). Craig v Television New Zealand Ltd (New Zealand, Broadcasting Standards Authority)

Pakistan: Supreme Court reiterates that the constitutional right to life encompasses sustainable environment

On October 24, 2024, the Supreme Court of Pakistan disposed of a monitoring matter arising from a petition concerning the illegal cutting of 218 shisham trees. The Court addressed the broader decline in Khyber Pakhtunkhwa’s forest cover and stated that deforestation contributes to landslides and flooding, reduces the sequestration of greenhouse gas emissions from fossil fuels, and exacerbates climate change in a country highly vulnerable to its effects. The Court had required the provincial government to report on the Forest Department’s budget, staffing, authorized and illegal timber cutting, reforestation measures, and forest-cover measurement for the preceding five years.

The order applied Article 9A of the Constitution, inserted three days earlier, which recognizes a right to a clean, healthy, and sustainable environment. It also reiterated that Article 9’s right to life had already been interpreted to encompass a sustainable environment. After government counsel committed to promote and implement sustainable environmental practices, the Court disposed of the matter on those terms. Mehar Badshah v. Government of Khyber Pakhtunkhwa (Pakistan, Supreme Court of Pakistan)

Pakistan: High Court holds that courts have the authority to supervise petitions concerning water management

In an order dated September 9, 2021, the Lahore High Court continued its supervision of consolidated petitions concerning water management, pollution, and environmental degradation in Punjab. The Court stated that Article 9’s right to life extends to life free from environmental pollution and that the climate crisis places that right in serious jeopardy. It linked Article 9 with Articles 3 and 38 to develop constitutional principles of climate justice and water justice, and held that Article 155’s intergovernmental water-dispute mechanism does not displace the High Court’s Article 199 jurisdiction.

The Court described the proceeding as an exercise of continuing supervisory jurisdiction and reviewed measures implemented through the Water and Environment Commission, including water metering, restoration of irrigation channels, restrictions on polythene bags, cleaner brick-kiln technology and environmental fines. It relied on D.G. Khan Cement Co. v. Government of Punjab and cited State of the Netherlands v. Urgenda Foundation. The docket has not yet been finally disposed of. Haroon Farooq v. Government of Punjab (Pakistan, Lahore High Court)

Pakistan: Supreme Court highlights the importance of forest protection in the face of the current climate crisis

On February 7, 2023, the Supreme Court of Pakistan decided consolidated appeals concerning private title claims to land designated as protected forest in the former State of Swat. The Court held that the Khyber Pakhtunkhwa Forest Ordinance, 2002, barred the civil suits where the claimants could not establish title predating the forest notification. It allowed the government’s appeals and dismissed the private parties’ appeals.

In explaining the importance of forest protection, the Court treated climate change as a present crisis, reviewed Pakistan’s forest loss and the carbon-sequestration function of trees, and stated that deforestation compounds the warming caused by fossil-fuel emissions. It relied on D.G. Khan Cement Co. v. Government of Punjab for climate democracy and intergenerational justice and connected forest stewardship with Islamic environmental principles. Although the immediate holding concerned title and jurisdiction, the climate-mitigation analysis formed a substantial part of the Court’s rationale for protecting the forest. Shah Zaman Khan and others v. Government of Khyber Pakhtunkhwa (Pakistan, Supreme Court of Pakistan)

Pakistan: High Court uses a petition by the brick industry to order the regional government to regulate use of topsoil

On October 10, 2019, the Lahore High Court considered a brick-kiln operator’s challenge to police interference with the excavation and transport of soil. The Court declined to resolve the petitioner’s fact-dependent individual claim but used the proceeding to address unregulated topsoil removal by the brick industry. It held that soil falls within the public trust doctrine because it supports plant growth, filters water, maintains atmospheric-gas balance, stores carbon, and sustains ecosystems. 

Relying in part on the IPCC Special Report on Climate Change and Land and Asghar Leghari v. Federation of Pakistan, the Court found that removal of topsoil contributes to desertification, lower agricultural yields, food insecurity, environmental degradation, and climate change. 

The Court directed the Government of Punjab to begin, within six months, administrative and legislative measures to regulate brick manufacturing and the use and conservation of soil, in consultation with affected agencies and industry stakeholders. Mian Muhammad Asif v. Superintendent of Police and others (Pakistan, Lahore High Court)

Pakistan: Supreme Court Justices emphasize the danger of climate change in causing natural disasters

On October 21, 2022, the Supreme Court of Pakistan modified Sindh High Court orders that placed judicial officers in charge of citizens’ committees overseeing relief after the 2022 floods. The Court held that judicial management of the committees crossed into executive functions under the National Disaster Management Act, 2010. It preserved a monitoring role for reconstituted committees, required representation of vulnerable groups and continued reporting by disaster-management authorities.

In an additional note expressly joined by the other members of the bench, Justice Syed Mansoor Ali Shah connected the floods to climate change, cited attribution research finding that five-day maximum rainfall over Sindh and Balochistan was 75% more intense in a world warmed by 1.2 degrees Celsius, and reviewed the scale of flood damage and reconstruction needs. The Court stated that protection of the rights to life and dignity requires a climate-resilient adaptation plan, including a mechanism for the use of loss-and-damage finance, and called for the implementation of Pakistan’s climate-governance framework. Province of Sindh v. Sartaj Hyder et al. (Pakistan, Supreme Court of Pakistan)

Pakistan: Supreme Court holds that a regional agency should obtain federal environmental assessment before inviting bids on small-scale mining

On February 2, 2023, the Supreme Court of Pakistan held that Punjab’s Mines and Minerals Department must obtain any required Initial Environmental Examination or Environmental Impact Assessment before inviting bids for small-scale mining licenses for sand, gravel, and sandstone. The Court found that requiring the successful bidder to obtain environmental approval only after bidding defeated the purpose of environmental review.

The Court required a climate-proof mining policy under which climate risks to mining areas are integrated into environmental assessment. It directed the Department to develop guidelines and standard operating procedures and recommended enforceable penalties in licenses for violations of environmental management plans. The climate analysis was part of the Court’s operative reasoning on the timing and content of environmental review. Public Interest Law Association of Pakistan v. Province of Punjab (Pakistan, Supreme Court of Pakistan)

Peru: Superior Court reaffirms the Marañón River and its tributaries as rights-holders concerning their protection, conservation, maintenance, and sustainable use

On September 15, 2021, Mariluz Canaquiri Murayari and other Kukama Indigenous women, associated with the Huaynakana Kamatahuara Kana Federation, filed a constitutional amparo action against Petróleos del Perú – Petroperú S.A. and several Peruvian national and regional government authorities. Plaintiffs alleged that recurrent oil spills from the Norperuvian Oil Pipeline and deficiencies in its maintenance and environmental management threatened the Marañón River, surrounding ecosystems, and the fundamental and collective rights of Kukama communities that depend on and maintain cultural and spiritual relationships with the river.

Plaintiffs sought recognition of the Marañón River and its tributaries as rights-holders; recognition of Indigenous organizations and state authorities as guardians, defenders, and representatives of the river; Indigenous participation with decision-making capacity in river-basin governance; effective maintenance of the Norperuvian Oil Pipeline; and an updated environmental management instrument. 

In supporting an ecocentric interpretation of the right to a healthy environment and the recognition of Rights of Nature, Plaintiffs relied on the Inter-American Court of Human Rights’s OC-23/17 concerning the relationship between environmental degradation, the adverse effects of climate change, and the effective enjoyment of human rights. They also referred to comparative Rights of Nature developments, including recognition of a right to a healthy climate in the U.S.

On March 8, 2024, Judge Armas Chapiama Corley of the Mixed Court of Nauta partially granted the action. The court recognized the Marañón River and its tributaries as rights-holders and ordered measures concerning their guardianship and representation, Indigenous participation in river-basin governance, and the updating of Petroperú’s environmental management instrument. In interpreting the right to a healthy environment and the intrinsic value of nature as a component of that right, the court relied on Inter-American human rights jurisprudence, including Advisory Opinion OC-23/17 and Lhaka Honhat v. Argentina. In particular, it drew on the relationship between environmental degradation, the adverse effects of climate change, and the enjoyment of human rights, as well as the autonomous protection of the environment. However, the court rejected Plaintiffs’ request for an order requiring maintenance of the Norperuvian Oil Pipeline.

The first-instance judgment was appealed by the plaintiffs, Petroperú, and government defendants, who challenged different aspects of the ruling. Among other issues, Plaintiffs challenged the court’s rejection of their request for an order requiring maintenance of the Norperuvian Oil Pipeline, while Defendants challenged aspects of the orders concerning the river’s guardianship and representation, river-basin governance, and Petroperú’s environmental management obligations. 

On August 29, 2024, the Civil Chamber of the Superior Court of Justice of Loreto issued its appellate decision, confirming the principal elements of the first-instance judgment. The appellate court further developed the environmental and climate-related reasoning, describing the right to a healthy environment as encompassing clean air, a stable climate, thriving biodiversity, and healthy ecosystems. It also referred to the Paris Agreement, Pope Francis’s encyclical Laudato Si’, and Peru’s National Environmental Policy to 2030, including its objectives of reducing vulnerability to climate change and greenhouse gas emissions. The court confirmed the recognition of the Marañón River and its tributaries as rights-holders, specifying that their recognized rights concern their protection, conservation, maintenance, and sustainable use. Canaquiri Murayari et al. v. Petroperú S.A. et al. (Marañón River Case) (Peru, Superior Court of Justice of Loreto (Civil Chamber))

South Korea: Board of Audit and Inspection dismisses an environment-impact-related audit request, partly based on the respect of policy decision

On July 24, 2025, a group of 300 South Korean citizens filed a public interest audit request with Korea’s Board of Audit and Inspection (BAI) pursuant to Article 4(1) of the BAI’s Public Interest Audit Processing Regulations. Article 4(1) allows citizens to request an audit of the affairs of public institutions — including the duties of their affiliated public officials — where such affairs are deemed unlawful or improper. The request targeted the National Pension Service Fund Management Committee (FMC) and the National Pension Service (NPS), alleging that the FMC’s December 19, 2024, resolution on coal investment restrictions was unlawful and contrary to the public interest. 

Specifically, the petitioners contended that the FMC: (i) selected the weakest of three options proposed in a 2022 research report — restricting investment only in companies where coal revenues exceed 50% of total sales, far below the international standard of 30%; (ii) added an unresearched five-year private engagement period before any investment restriction takes effect; (iii) deferred application to domestic assets until 2030; and (iv) failed to act on the research findings for over two years.The petitioners further alleged that, despite the FMC’s own May 2021 coal-exit declaration, the NPS had significantly increased investments in coal-dependent companies — raising holdings in KEPCO bonds from approximately KRW 9 trillion to KRW 15 trillion, and increasing investments in major overseas fossil fuel companies (ExxonMobil, Shell, BP, Chevron, TotalEnergies) from approximately KRW 770 billion to KRW 4.2 trillion between 2020 and February 2024. 

On November 5, 2025, the BAI closed all five claims without proceeding to a full audit. Claims on the 50% threshold and the 2030 domestic implementation timeline were dismissed as important policy decisions made through a rational deliberative process, exempt from audit review. Claim on the absence of implementation guidelines was closed after the FMC adopted internal guidelines on September 30, 2025. Claim on the alleged failure to report or discuss the 2022 research findings for over two years was rejected on the grounds that the FMC had in fact conducted internal consultations through sub-committees and relevant agencies during that period. Finally, the claim on increased investments in coal-dependent companies after the 2021 coal-exit declaration was closed because a civil damages lawsuit raising the same issues (Kim Min et al. v. Kim Tae-Hyun et al.) had become final on July 12, 2025, rendering the matter a confirmed case excluded from audit review. Public Interest Audit Request on NPS’s Coal Exclusion Policy (South Korea, Board of Audit and Inspection)

South Korea: Consumer group challenges non-life insurers on the validity of “force majeure” clause in an era of severe natural disasters

On April 29, 2025, Consumers Korea, a consumer group, filed an unfair terms review request with the Korea Fair Trade Commission (KFTC) against five major non-life insurers — Samsung Fire & Marine Insurance, DB Insurance, Hyundai Marine & Fire Insurance, Meritz Fire & Marine Insurance, and KB Insurance — seeking a declaration that the natural disaster exclusion clauses in their Personal Automobile Insurance Policies (Articles 8(1)(4), 14(5), 19(5), and 23(3)) are unlawful and void under Articles 6 and 7(2) of the Terms and Conditions Act, and an administrative guidance that the clauses be deleted or amended.

The petitioner’s core argument was that the traditional “force majeure” justification for such exclusions is no longer tenable: the respondent insurers have themselves materially contributed to the climate crisis — and thereby to the increased frequency and severity of natural disasters such as typhoons, floods, and wildfires — through their insured emission and financed emissions attributable to underwriting and investing in fossil fuel industries, making it unjust for them to invoke force majeure to deny coverage for losses caused by the very disasters their own activities have helped intensify, while profiting from selling separate natural disaster riders to policyholders who seek coverage that should already be included in the base policy.

On June 11, 2025, the KFTC closed the petition without a full review on the ground that it is impossible to conduct a review based solely on the submitted petition. KFTC Review Request on Unfair Terms in Personal Auto Insurance Policies (South Korea, Fair Trade Commission)

South Korea: The Financial Supervisory Service finds no technical violation in rating a coal-based company as very stable despite nation’s coal phase-out policy

On January 20, 2026, Solutions for Our Climate (SFOC), a climate advocacy group, filed a complaint with the Financial Supervisory Service (FSS) against NICE Investors Service and Korea Ratings, alleging that their credit rating reports for Samcheok Blue Power’s unsecured corporate bonds violated Article 335-11(1) of the Capital Markets Act and Article 8-19-9(1) of the Financial Investment Business Regulations by assigning an A+(Stable) rating in a manner inconsistent with their own publicly disclosed rating methodologies.

The complainant argued that the A+ rating was driven by an inflated business risk grade of ‘AA’ that was not reasonably possible under the agencies’ own published methodologies once three critical negative factors were properly weighted: (i) the government’s 2040 coal phase-out policy, formally declared at COP30 in November 2025, which would force Samcheok Blue Power into early closure within approximately 15 years — far short of its 30-year design life; (ii) the prolonged delay in the East Coast transmission line construction, which had already been extended to at least June 2027 and had resulted in an actual operating rate of their power plants less than 15% as of mid-2025; and (iii) the risk to retail investors, who had become the primary buyers of the bonds as institutional investors withdrew on ESG grounds. 

On March 26, 2026, the FSS closed the complaint without finding a violation, concluding that while the two parties disagreed on the assumptions and methodology underlying the rating, no explicit violation of the Capital Markets Act was identified, noting that the agencies acknowledged the coal phase-out policy as a key factor but stated they would reassess business risk only if the forthcoming 12th Basic Plan for Electricity Supply and Demand contained concrete adverse changes for Samcheok Blue Power. In re Samcheok Blue Power Corporate Bond Credit Rating (South Korea, Financial Supervisory Service)