Climate Litigation Updates (November 6, 2026)

The Sabin Center for Climate Change Law publishes monthly summaries of developments in climate-related litigation. We also add these developments to The Climate Litigation Database on an ongoing basis. If you know of any cases we have missed, please email us at [email protected]. Thanks to JeeHyun Chung and Kathy Liu for assistance in preparing this update.

HERE ARE THE ADDITIONS TO THE CLIMATE LITIGATION DATABASE FOR UPDATE #216

FEATURED CASES 

Oregon Circuit Court Largely Denied Motions to Dismiss Multnomah County’s Climate Suit Against Fossil Fuel Industry Defendants 

An Oregon Circuit Court denied fossil fuel industry defendants’ motion to dismiss for failure to state a claim the County of Multnomah’s state-law claims seeking more than $51 billion in damages and other relief based on allegations that the defendants’ deceptive conduct regarding the existence and causes of climate change led to harmful climate change impacts in Oregon. The County asserted claims of intentional and negligent creation of public nuisance, negligence, fraud/deceit, and trespass. The court concluded that the defendants did not meet their burden to demonstrate that the Clean Air Act (CAA) implicitly preempted these tort claims, finding that nothing in the CAA “suggests that Congress intended to occupy the field of misrepresentations or claims of deceit/fraud as it relates to fossil fuel consumption and its impact on greenhouse gas emissions and climate change.” The court also found that the case did not present a non-justiciable political question that could not be resolved through judicially discoverable and manageable standards. The court also rejected the argument that the County’s claims violated the separation of powers doctrine. The court granted Valero Energy Corp.’s (Valero’s) motion to dismiss on personal jurisdiction grounds, finding that the County’s allegations did not demonstrate sufficient minimum contacts with Oregon; the court noted that Valero itself did not directly manufacture, produce, market, or sell fossil fuels in Oregon; found insufficient facts to establish an alter ego theory of liability; and found that the complaint’s allegations did not adequately connect Valero to an alleged disinformation campaign. The court denied other defendants’ individual motions to dismiss on personal jurisdiction grounds, finding that the County demonstrated minimum contacts with Oregon based on allegations that included the defendants’ sales and marketing of fossil fuels in Oregon and defendants’ connections to presentations about climate change directed at Oregon; the courts also found that the County met its burden of demonstrating a relationship between those contacts and the County’s claims. The court denied the defendants’ joint motion to dismiss on personal jurisdiction grounds, rejecting their arguments that the County’s claims did not arise out of or related to the County’s alleged minimum contacts. The court further found that the defendants did not meet their burden of demonstrating that the exercise of jurisdiction would not comport with traditional notions of fair play and substantial justice. County of Multnomah v. Exxon Mobil Corp., No. 23CV25164 (Or. Cir. Ct. Nov. 2, 2026) 

New York Appellate Court Affirmed Dismissal of New York City’s Greenwashing Claims Against Fossil Fuel Companies 

The New York Appellate Division affirmed the dismissal of New York City’s greenwashing lawsuit against fossil fuel companies. The City asserted claims under its Consumer Protection Law that the defendants engaged in (1) “product greenwashing” by making misleading statements regarding the environmental benefits of three gasoline product lines advertised and sold to consumers in New York City and (2) “corporate greenwashing” by making statements that exaggerated the defendants’ investments in clean energy and the climate benefits of their natural gas products. With respect to the product greenwashing claim, the appellate court concluded that regardless of whether a reasonable consumer standard or some more subjective standard applied, the City’s claim of deception was implausible. The court found that “[n]ot even the least sophisticated consumer could be led to believe that, by using the advertised gasoline products, he or she would be able to drive a vehicle without producing a significant amount of emissions.” The Appellate Division noted that the City’s deceptive trade practice claim was based on a “foundational assumption of near-universal understanding of the link between gasoline use and climate change,” and described this premise as conflicting with the claim that the defendants’ advertising was deceptive and misleading. The Appellate Division was not persuaded by the City’s effort “to recast its product greenwashing claim as based on defendants’ failure to quantify the reduction emissions that would result from the use of the improved gasolines.” Regarding the corporate greenwashing claim, the Appellate Division agreed with the Supreme Court, New York County that the defendants’ statements fell outside the scope of the Consumer Protection Law because they were not made in connection with the sale of consumer goods or services. The appellate court said out-of-state decisions cited by the City were “inapposite” because the City’s law was “narrower in scope than the consumer protection statutes of other jurisdictions.” In light of its conclusions regarding the applicability of the Consumer Protection Law, the Appellate Division concluded it was unnecessary to address statute of limitations or First Amendment defenses. City of New York v. Exxon Mobil Corp., No. 2025-01687 (N.Y. App. Div. Oct. 8, 2026) 

Brazil: Public prosecutors and government challenge Shell as partly liable for recent floods, pointing to CO₂ emissions caused by the use of fossil fuels 

On October 9, 2026, Brazil’s Federal Public Prosecutor’s Office and Instituto Preservar filed a public civil action against Shell Brasil seeking environmental and climate civil liability for a proportionate share of the material and collective moral harm caused by the April–May 2024 floods in Rio Grande do Sul. The complaint constructs a three-stage causal chain through attribution science: anthropogenic greenhouse-gas emissions caused global warming; emissions associated with the Shell corporate group account for approximately 2.02% of cumulative global fossil-fuel and cement CO₂ emissions from 1854 through 2024; and anthropogenic climate change made the 2024 extreme-rainfall event about twice as likely and approximately 12% more intense. The plaintiffs argue that climate harm is a dimension of environmental harm governed by Brazil’s strict environmental-liability regime, including the polluter-pays principle, liability of indirect polluters, full reparation, and collective moral damages.  

They ask the court to declare the causal link and Shell’s environmental-climate liability; award an initially estimated R$270,518,400 (approximately 49,000,000 USD) in material damages and the same amount in collective moral damages; direct the funds exclusively to recovery, reconstruction, adaptation, disaster prevention, and affected communities in Rio Grande do Sul; require an independently selected technical advisory body for affected communities at Shell’s expense; and reverse the burden of proof. The total amount in controversy is R$541,036,800 (approximately 99,000,000 USD). The complaint relies expressly on the Inter-American Court of Human Rights’ Advisory Opinion OC-32/25, the International Court of Justice’s climate advisory opinion, Carbon Majors data, event-attribution research, and comparative climate litigation. Ministério Público Federal and Instituto Preservar v. Shell Brasil Petróleo Ltda. (Brazil, Rio Grande do Sul)

U.S. DECISIONS AND SETTLEMENTS 

Fourth Circuit Upheld Clean Water Act Permit for Mixed-Use Development in Charleston 

The Fourth Circuit Court of Appeals affirmed a district court judgment rejecting challenges to a Clean Water Act Section 404 permit for a mixed-use development in Charleston, South Carolina, that would affect 181.5 acres of wetlands. The Fourth Circuit found that the U.S. Army Corps of Engineers “thoroughly explained” its conclusions regarding the absence of plausible off-site alternatives, the potentially greater impacts on wetlands of on-site alternatives, the impracticability of a plan proposed by the plaintiffs, and the shortcomings of the no action alternative. The court therefore held that the Corps’ determination that the proposed project was the least environmentally damaging practical alternative was not arbitrary and capricious. The plaintiffs did not appeal the district court’s judgment rejecting their National Environmental Policy Act claims, including their argument that the Corps failed to consider impacts arising from climate change and sea level rise. South Carolina Coastal Conservation League v. U.S. Army Corps of Engineers, No. 25-1797 (4th Cir. Oct. 23, 2026) 

Sixth Circuit Stayed Vacatur of TVA Approval for Gas-Fired Power Plant, Said TVA Was Likely to Succeed in Appeal of NEPA Violations 

The Sixth Circuit Court of Appeals granted the Tennessee Valley Authority’s (TVA’s) motion to stay pending appeal a district court’s vacatur of TVA’s decision authorizing the construction of a gas-fired units to replace coal-fired units at a power plant in Tennessee. The Sixth Circuit’s decision raised questions regarding whether the conservation groups challenging the TVA’s approval had standing but found that it was not necessary to address the standing question at this time because a stay was appropriate on the merits. The Sixth Circuit concluded that TVA was likely to succeed on the merits of its appeal of the two National Environmental Policy Act (NEPA) violations found by the district court. First, the Sixth Circuit concluded that the district court likely misinterpreted NEPA’s requirement for consideration of “a reasonable range of alternatives” to require consideration of at least two alternatives. Second, the Sixth Circuit concluded that even if NEPA prohibited “precommitment” to an option prior to completion of environmental review, TVA would likely show that its agreement with a pipeline developer was not impermissible. In addition, the Sixth Circuit found that vacatur was likely the wrong remedy even if there were NEPA violations. The Sixth Circuit also found that TVA showed it would likely suffer irreparable harm from halting construction, including lost money and risk of power outages, and that the balance of other interests, including the interests of construction workers and TVA customers, weighed in favor of a stay. Appalachian Voices v. Tennessee Valley Authority, No. 26-5836 (6th Cir. Oct. 16, 2026) 

D.C. Circuit Clarified that Stay of Injunction Requiring Disbursement of Greenhouse Gas Reduction Fund Monies Did Not Apply to Grantee’s Previously Withdrawn Funds 

Two months after the en banc D.C. Circuit Court of Appeals’ affirmance of a preliminary injunction that barred the U.S. Environmental Protection Agency from effectuating its March 11, 2025 notice of termination of grants under the Inflation Reduction Act’s Greenhouse Gas Reduction Fund, the en banc court granted Coalition for Green Capital’s (CGC’s) motion for clarification that an administrative stay of the portion of the injunction requiring the disbursement of funds did not apply to funds withdrawn by CGC prior to entry of the stay. Climate United Fund v. Citibank, N.A., No. 25-5122 (D.C. Cir. Oct. 9, 2026) 

Fifth Circuit Affirmed Dismissal of Challenge to Water-Use Standards for Dishwashers and Clothes Washers 

The Fifth Circuit Court of Appeals affirmed the dismissal of two individual plaintiffs’ lawsuit asserting that U.S. Department of Energy (DOE) exceeded its authority under the Energy Policy and Conservation Act (EPCA) by establishing water-use standards dishwashers and clothes washers. Although the Fifth Circuit rejected DOE’s contention that the individuals lacked standing, the Fifth Circuit agreed with the district court that EPCA vested circuit courts with exclusive jurisdiction over the plaintiffs’ claim. Word v. U.S. Department of Energy, No. 25-10668 (5th Cir. Oct. 6, 2026) 

D.C. Circuit Denied Youth Petitioners’ Motion to Stay EPA’s Rescission of Greenhouse Gas Endangerment Finding and Repeal of Vehicle Emissions Regulations; Court Requested Proposed Briefing Format 

On October 5, 2026, the D.C. Circuit Court of Appeals denied youth petitioners’ motion to stay the U.S. Environmental Protection Agency’s (EPA’s) final rule rescinding the 2009 greenhouse gas endangerment finding under the Clean Air Act and repealing all greenhouse gas emission standards for motor vehicles and engines. The court found that the petitioners did not satisfy the “stringent” requirements for a stay pending court review. The court denied the motion by some of the petitioners to hold the proceedings in abeyance to allow EPA to consider petitions for reconsideration. The parties were directed to submit a proposed format for the briefing of the cases within 30 days. The court referred a joint motion by some petitioners to complete the record to the merits panel. The joint motion argued that EPA must include the version of the response-to-comments document that existed at the time of the announcement of the final rule, in addition to the version finalized after the announcement; in addition, the motion argued that EPA improperly excluded two supplemental comments filed by the petitioners. American Public Health Association v. EPA, Nos. 26-1037 et al. (D.C. Cir. Oct. 5, 2026) 

Texas Federal Court Granted Judgment to Defendants on Subset of States’ Claims that Institutional Investors Unlawfully Used Coal Holdings to Reduce Coal Output 

The federal district court for the Eastern District of Texas granted judgment to BlackRock, Inc. and State Street Corporation on several claims in Texas and other states’ action alleging that the defendants violated state and federal antitrust laws and certain state consumer protection laws by using their holdings in coal producers to reduce coal output. First, the court found that only Iowa and Nebraska had standing to assert claims for damages on behalf of electricity purchasers in their states. The court rejected the defendants’ contentions that Iowa and Nebraska lacked standing for their claims under their state antitrust laws, which explicitly permit indirect purchasers to sue when injured by an antitrust violation. Second, the court found that the states waived claims for damages on behalf of coal buyers under Clayton Act Sections 4C (which only permits parens patriae claims on behalf of natural persons) and 16 (which only permits injunctive relief). Third, the court agreed with the defendants that Iowa could not seek civil antitrust penalties against them because they do not sell coal. Fourth, the court granted judgment to the defendants on Louisiana’s and Nebraska’s consumer protection claims, which the court previously dismissed. Texas v. BlackRock, Inc., No. 6:24-cv-00437 (E.D. Tex. Oct. 30, 2026) 

West Virginia Federal Court Blocked Enforcement of West Virginia Attorney General Subpoenas Targeting Environmental Organizations’ Climate Advocacy 

On October 29, 2026, the federal district court for the Southern District of West Virginia granted a nonprofit conservation organization and a nonprofit climate advocacy organization’s request for a temporary restraining order (TRO) barring the West Virginia Attorney General from enforcing investigative subpoenas that demanded approximately 10 years of the organizations’ records. The organizations’ complaint, which they filed on October 22, alleged that the subpoenas demanded each organization’s “records concerning its public statements on climate and energy, its internal deliberations about those statements, its requests for donations, the organizations that have funded its work and the amounts they gave, the organizations it has paid, the officers, directors, staff, and board members it shares with renewable energy entities, its dealings with coalitions and other advocacy organizations on energy permitting and regulation in West Virginia, and its submissions to regulatory agencies.” The subpoenas cited a provision of West Virginia law that permits the Attorney General to investigate if there is probable cause to believe a person “has engaged in an act which is subject to action by the Attorney General” under the Consumer Credit and Protection Act (WVCCPA). The complaint alleged that the investigation’s “stated premise” was that statements asserting, “‘on a purportedly scientific or statistical basis,’ a connection between greenhouse gas emissions from fossil fuels and changes in climate, weather patterns, or extreme weather events” may be unfair or deceptive acts or practices. The organizations asserted that the investigations and subpoenas constituted retaliation for protected speech, association, and petitioning in violation of the First and Fourteenth Amendments; violations of their right to freedom of association under the First and Fourteenth Amendments; violations of their right to petition and to associate for litigation under the First and Fourteenth Amendments; and unreasonable demands under the Fourth and Fourteenth Amendments. In addition, the organizations asserted violations of the First and Fourteenth Amendments on the grounds that the Attorney General’s actions violated their rights to charitable solicitation, which constitutes protected speech. They also asserted a claim of viewpoint discrimination and selective enforcement. The complaint requested preliminary and permanent injunctive relief and declaratory relief, as well as attorney fees and costs.  

In its decision granting the TRO, the court described the subpoenas as “shockingly broad.” As a threshold matter, the court found that the organizations established that they had suffered an actual and imminent injury sufficient for standing. On the merits, the court found that the organizations were likely to succeed on the merits of their claim that the Attorney General’s subpoenas and investigation violated their First Amendment freedom to associate with others. The court described the Attorney General’s theory as asserting that the organizations’ advocacy relied on an “implausible” climate change scenario (RCP8.5) and therefore constituted a deceptive act or practice under the WVCCPA “that affects the energy marketplace of West Virginia.” The court concluded that the WVCCPA only applies to commercial speech and found that plaintiffs did not engage in commercial speech because “[b]y virtue of their missions as nonprofit environmental advocacy groups, their interests are not economic.” The court therefore found that the WVCCPA did not supply a “sufficiently important governmental interest” under the “exacting scrutiny” standard. The court further found no substantial relationship between the compelled disclosure sought by the Attorney General and the government interest. The court stated that while the plaintiffs called the subpoenas “a fishing expedition,” “even on a fishing expedition, hoping to just get one bite in the vast and quiet water, a person brings a fishing pole. And in other cases, perhaps, a net. Here, [the Attorney General] has abandoned both the fishing pole and the net. Instead, he has brought dynamite to the lake. Tossing a couple in, he hopes to catch something.” Regarding the other factors for preliminary injunctive relief, the court found that plaintiffs’ allegations of constitutional violations and denial of rights constituted irreparable harm and that there was no doubt that the public interest and balance of the equities favored the plaintiffs. Although the court found that the organizations alleged substantial evidence to support their retaliation claim, the court said it would “reserve judgment” on that count to allow the Attorney General to present evidence. The court declined to address the remaining counts. West Virginia Rivers Coalition, Inc. v. McCuskey, No. 2:26-cv-00679 (S.D. W. Va., filed Oct. 22, 2026; order granting TRO Oct. 29, 2026) 

D.C. Federal District Court Paused California’s Case Challenging Reclassification of Emissions Standards Preemption Waivers During Appeals of Preliminary Injunction 

On October 20, 2026, the federal district court for the District of Columbia granted federal defendants’ and intervenor-defendants’ motions to stay California’s lawsuit challenging EPA’s reclassifications of Clean Air Act preemption waivers for California emissions standards from orders to rules. The court agreed to stay the case while the federal defendants and intervenors appeal preliminary injunction orders issued by the court. The district court found that a D.C. Circuit ruling on jurisdictional issues “may be dispositive of and preclude further consideration of plaintiffs claims and arguments” in a pending summary judgment motion or might provide guidance that would require additional briefing. California v. EPA, No. 1:26-cv-02185 (D.D.C. Oct. 20, 2026)  

California Federal Court Dismissed Challenge to BLM Drilling Permits on Standing Grounds but Granted Leave to Amend 

The federal district court for the Eastern District of California found that Center for Biological Diversity and four other organizations did not have standing to assert claims challenging the U.S. Bureau of Land Management’s (BLM’s) granting of permits for drilling new oil and gas wells on public land in California’s Central Valley. The court found that the organizations did not establish either (1) organizational standing based on their allegations related to their missions and advocacy activities or (2) associational standing based on the standing of individual members who would suffer injuries in fact. The court dismissed the lawsuit with leave to amend. Center for Biological Diversity v. U.S. Bureau of Land Management, No. 1:25-cv-00140 (E.D. Cal. Oct. 28, 2026) 

Fish and Wildlife Service Agreed to Issue 12-Month Finding on Listing Petition for Rare Wildflower 

The federal district court for the District of Nevada granted a motion to enter a settlement agreement to resolve Center for Biological Diversity’s (CBD’s) lawsuit that sought to compel the U.S. Fish and Wildlife Service (FWS) to issue a 12-month finding under the Endangered Species Act on CBD’s petition to list the Tecopa bird’s beak as threatened or endangered. In the settlement, FWS agreed to submit a 12-month finding for publication in the Federal Register by September 13, 2028. The complaint described Tecopa bird’s beak as “a rare wildflower with limited distribution which grows in alkali wetlands in western Nevada and eastern California” and alleged that it faced threats from multiple factors, including climate change. Center for Biological Diversity v. U.S. Fish & Wildlife Service, No. 2:25-cv-001174 (D. Nev. Oct. 16, 2026)  

Parties Agreed to Hold Challenge to New York’s Greenhouse Gas Reporting Program in Abeyance While State Amends the Regulations 

On October 13, 2026, the federal district court approved a stipulation holding trade groups’ challenge to New York’s Mandatory Greenhouse Gas Reporting Program in abeyance until April 2, 2027. The defendants informed the court that the New York State Department of Environmental Conservation intended to amend the regulations. The stipulation provided that New York would continue to require collection and reporting of data for in-state emissions but would not require collection, reporting, or verification of data for upstream out-of-state emissions and would not require submission of a monitoring plan for large emissions sources until June 30, 2027 at the earliest. In addition, the stipulation provided that New York would not conduct a site inspection or search pursuant to the Program’s regulations without a warrant or written consent until December 31, 2027 at the earliest. New York also agreed that it would not withdraw a July 31, 2026 enforcement discretion letter until after April 1, 2028. American Fuel & Petrochemical Manufacturers v. James, No. 1:26-cv-07203 (S.D.N.Y. Oct. 13, 2026) 

District Court Allowed Some Claims to Proceed in Challenge to Department of Agriculture’s Mass Termination of Grants in March 2025 

The federal district court for the District of Columbia granted in part and denied in part the U.S. Department of Agriculture and related defendants’ (USDA’s) motion to dismiss claims challenging the March 2025 terminations of grants, including grants awarded under the National Resources Conservation Service’s Partnerships for Climate-Smart Commodities program. The court granted in part a motion to dismiss claims by three grantees as moot and also agreed with the defendants that due process claims were legally deficient. The court found, however, that the plaintiffs plausibly alleged that USDA’s mass termination of grants was arbitrary and capricious. The court also declined to dismiss a claim that termination of Land Access Program plaintiffs’ grants was contrary to the statutory mandate for the program. In addition, the court denied a motion to dismiss a separation of powers claim but dismissed the plaintiffs’ ultra vires claim without prejudice. The court denied the plaintiffs’ motion for sanctions against the defendants for failing to comply with the scheduling order; the court also denied the defendants’ motion to vacate the schedule for completion of discovery. Urban Sustainability Directors Network v. U.S. Department of Agriculture, No. 1:25-cv-01775 (D.D.C. Oct. 6, 2026) 

California Federal Court Vacated Approvals for Shasta-Trinity National Forest Project that Would Affect Northern Spotted Owl Habitat 

The federal district court for the Eastern District of California vacated a biological opinion issued by the U.S. Fish and Wildlife Service (FWS) in 2023 that concluded that the South Fork Sacramento Public Safety and Forest Restoration Project in the Shasta-Trinity National Forest was not likely to jeopardize the continued existence of the northern spotted owl. The court also vacated the U.S. Forest Service’s decision notice approving the project. The court found that FWS’s analysis at the recovery unit scale was arbitrary and capricious because the record did not support FWS’s conclusion that two northern spotted owl territories that would be impaired by the project did not represent the “sole source populations” of their recovery units. The court upheld other aspects of the biological opinion’s analysis and did not address the allegations that FWS’s biological opinion failed to adequately account for “how climate change may amplify the effects of the Project—and vice versa.” The court determined that vacatur was the appropriate remedy because the “seriousness of the omitted analysis” outweighed the “speculative” harms identified by the defendants, including potential forfeiture of grant funds. Klamath Forest Alliance v. U.S. Fish & Wildlife Service, No. 2:24-cv-02347 (E.D. Cal. Sep. 16, 2026 and Aug. 19, 2026) 

Hawaii Federal Court Entered Judgment on Insurer’s Duty to Defend Oil Company in Municipalities’ Climate Cases 

The federal district court for the District of Hawaii entered judgment on its ruling that an insurer had a duty under two insurance policies to defend its insured (a subsidiary of Sunoco, LP) in underlying climate lawsuits brought by the City and County of Honolulu and Honolulu Board of Water Supply and the County of Maui. The insurer sought entry of judgment so that it could appeal the ruling on the duty to defend. The court previously denied a motion for entry of judgment because the parties’ disputes over the nature and scope of the insurer’s duty to defend made entry of judgment “inappropriate and inefficient.” After the parties resolved those disputes, the court found that the duty to defend claims had been fully resolved and that there was no just reason for delay. The court noted that a Ninth Circuit reversal of its duty to defend ruling would “effectively resolve” the remaining claims regarding the narrower duty to indemnify and found that the insured would not be prejudiced by an immediate appeal since the insurer was currently covering its defense costs. Aloha Petroleum Ltd. v. National Union Fire Insurance Co. of Pittsburgh, No. 1:22-cv-00372 (D. Haw. Aug. 27, 2026) 

Court Said Greenhouse Gas Accounting Methodology and Emissions Information for Tyson Climate-Friendly Beef Program Were Exempt from FOIA Disclosure 

In a Freedom of Information Act (FOIA) lawsuit brought by Environmental Working Group, Inc. (EWG), the federal district court for the District of Columbia agreed with the U.S. Department of Agriculture’s Food Safety and Inspection Service (FSIS) that it had properly redacted information about Tyson Foods Inc.’s (Tyson’s) greenhouse gas accounting methodology and emissions types and sources for Tyson’s Climate-Friendly Beef Program. EWG filed the FOIA lawsuit seeking information withheld by FSIS in its response to EWG’s request for information provided to FSIS in an application for an “environmentally responsible” labeling certification for its Brazen Beef program. Based on information provided by Tyson, the court concluded the redacted information was part of the production process for the company’s climate-friendly beef. The court therefore found that FSIS properly withheld the greenhouse gas accounting methodology and emissions types and sources information both as “trade secrets” and as “commercial” and “confidential” information under FOIA Exemption 4. The court also found that the defendants met their burden of demonstrating that disclosure of the information would cause “foreseeable harm” to Tyson. The court found that Tyson’s agreement not to market products as climate-friendly for five years in a settlement with EWG in a separate lawsuit did not affect the foreseeable harm analysis. Environmental Working Group v. Food Safety & Inspection Service, No. 1:23-cv-03806 (D.D.C. Aug. 24, 2026)  

Alaska Federal Court Dismissed Challenge to President Trump’s Rescission of Earlier Withdrawals of Outer Continental Shelf Lands from Oil and Gas Leasing 

The federal district court for the District of Alaska found that plaintiffs lacked standing for their challenge to President Trump’s rescission of President Obama’s and President Biden’s withdrawals of federal offshore areas from oil and gas leasing under the Outer Continental Shelf Lands Act. The court found that the plaintiffs failed to establish a substantial risk of imminent harm in the absence of any exploration or leasing on lands implicated by President Trump’s actions. The court dismissed the case without prejudice. Northern Alaska Environmental Center v. Trump, No. 3:25-cv-00038 (D. Alaska Aug. 24, 2026) 

Utah Federal Court Granted BLM’s Request for Voluntary Remand Without Vacatur of Coal Lease Modification 

The federal district court for the District of Utah granted the U.S. Bureau of Land Management’s (BLM’s) motion for voluntary remand without vacatur of a lease modification that BLM approved at the end of the first Trump administration for the Lila Canyon Mine, an underground coal mine in Utah. The court concluded that remand was appropriate (1) because many federal trial and appellate courts had found BLM’s analysis of greenhouse gas emissions for other coal leasing decisions to be deficient and (2) because “sweeping new executive orders” issued by President Trump in his second term shifted the legal landscape. The court rejected the mine operator’s arguments against remand, finding that remand without vacatur preserved the operator’s leasehold rights and finding that the operator did not have prudential standing to raise arguments regarding remand’s harms to other parties. The court also rejected the operator’s contention that a decision on the merits was required for voluntary remand. The court directed BLM to complete the remand process in 18 months. Sierra Club v. Hoffman, No. 4:22-cv-00037 (D. Utah Aug. 19, 2026) 

Court of International Trade Upheld Department of Commerce Determination that Korean Government’s Provision of Additional Emissions Credits to Steel Company Warranted Imposition of Countervailing Duties 

The U.S. Court of International Trade sustained the U.S. Department of Commerce’s (Commerce’s) remand redetermination finding that the Government of Korea’s provision of additional emissions permits to a company exporting carbon and alloy steel cut-to-length plate was “de facto specific” and therefore satisfied requirements for imposing countervailing duties. The permits were used for compliance with the Korea Emissions Trading System (K-ETS). Commerce found that 494 companies received the additional permits under the K-ETS, that more than 900,000 companies operated in the Government of Korea’s jurisdiction, and that the additional permit subsidy therefore could not be considered “widely used.” The court rejected the company’s contention that the number of companies receiving the subsidy should have been compared to the much smaller number of companies subject to the K-ETS. POSCO v. United States, No. 24-00006 (CIT Oct. 27, 2026) 

Greenpeace Defendants Announced Appeal of $345 Million Verdict in Dakota Access Pipeline Case After North Dakota Court Denied Request for New Trial 

The North Dakota District Court denied a motion by Greenpeace International and other Greenpeace entities (together, Greenpeace) for a new trial or for alteration or amendment of the judgment in the case in which the court entered a judgment requiring Greenpeace to pay more than $345 million in damages to the developers and owner of the Dakota Access Pipeline. Greenpeace was found to be liable for defamation, trespass, nuisance, conspiracy, and tortious interference with business, and aiding and abetting in connection with protests of the pipeline. The court rejected Greenpeace’s claims that a new trial was warranted because certain factors prevented a fair trial, including the failure to transfer venue away from the county that was the site of the protests, improper pre-trial publicity, or improper paneling of biased jurors. The court also found that it could not conclude that the jury’s verdict was “manifestly against the weight of the evidence” and declined to order a new trial based on excessive damages. In addition, the court was not persuaded that the presence of law enforcement at the trial prejudiced Greenpeace; the court said it was “surprised” by this allegation, given that Greenpeace did not raise the issue before, during, or after the trial. The court also found that errors of law could be addressed by an appellate court and declined to order a new trial based on a renewed challenge to its personal jurisdiction over Greenpeace International. Greenpeace announced that they would appeal the case to the North Dakota Supreme Court. Energy Transfer LP v. Greenpeace International, No. 30-2019-0V-00180 (N.D. Dist. Ct. Nov. 2, 2026) 

Wisconsin Department of Natural Resources Agreed to Conduct Strategic Statewide Analysis of Data Centers to Resolve Permitting Challenge; Developer to Fund Costs of Study 

Sierra Club, the Wisconsin Department of Natural Resources (WDNR), and the developer of a data center project entered into a stipulation to resolve Sierra Club’s lawsuit asserting that WDNR violated the Wisconsin Environmental Policy Act by failing to prepare an environmental impact statement prior to issuance of permits for the project. The stipulation provided that WDNR would prepare strategic analysis of artificial intelligence (AI) data centers in Wisconsin by January 31, 2028. The analysis must consider the direct, indirect, and cumulative effects and mitigation for a “base case” that includes the anticipated build-out of AI data centers and associated energy infrastructure under current plans and projections, and also for alternative courses of action to be determined through public scoping. The stipulation provided that the developer must fund WDNR’s costs for preparing the analysis. Sierra Club v. Wisconsin Department of Natural Resources, No. 2026CV000294 (Wis. Cir. Ct. Oct. 16, 2026) 

California Trial Court’s Tentative Ruling Said Blanket Ban on Well Stimulation Treatments Was Unlawful 

A California Superior Court issued a tentative ruling setting aside and remanding the California Geologic Energy Management Division’s (CalGEM’s) denials of permits for well stimulation treatments (WSTs), including hydraulic fracturing, between 2021 and 2024. The court’s ruling also vacated CalGEM’s 2024 rule prohibiting approval of WST permit applications. The court declared that CalGEM’s 2021–2024 policy of denying all WST permit applications was “an invalid underground regulation” under the Administrative Procedure Act. The court ruled that CalGEM violated Public Resources Code § 3160 by denying applications based on a “blanket policy” rather than conducting individualized reviews. The court further ruled that “the stated climate rationale was not the operative basis for the ban and that the ban originated in direction from the Governor’s office.” Regarding the 2024 rule, the court found that substantial evidence did not support CalGEM’s determination that a categorical WST ban was reasonably necessary to reduce greenhouse gas emissions because the rulemaking record did not show that CalGEM addressed its prior finding that banning WST would result in a net increase in emissions due to displacement of in-state production by imported oil. The court denied relief against Governor Newsom, finding that he was not a proper respondent in the challenge to the 2024 rule and that relief against the Governor was not necessary with respect to the “underground” ban because complete relief was granted against CalGEM. Chevron U.S.A. Inc. v. Newsom, No. BCV22100636 (Cal. Super. Ct. Oct. 9, 2026) 

U.S. NEW CASES AND FILINGS 

Supreme Court Asked Washington Department of Ecology to Respond to Certiorari Petition in Case Challenging Allocation of Climate Law Compliance Allowances 

On October 27, 2026, the U.S. Supreme Court requested that the director of the Washington State Department of Ecology (Ecology) respond to a petition for writ of certiorari filed by the owner-operator of a power plant in Washington. The certiorari petition sought review of a Ninth Circuit decision rejecting the owner-operator’s dormant Commerce Clause challenge to Ecology’s allocation of compliance allowances for implementation of the Washington Climate Commitment Act’s decarbonization requirements. The director’s response is due November 27. The director previously waived the right to respond; the case was distributed on October 21 for the justices’ November 6 conference. PacifiCorp v. Sixkiller, No. 26-318 (U.S.) 

Department of Energy Sought Rehearing of D.C. Circuit Decision Vacating Order Requiring that Coal-Fired Plant Remain Available to Operate 

On October 26, 2026, the U.S. Department of Energy (DOE) filed a petition for rehearing en banc or panel rehearing of the D.C. Circuit Court of Appeals September 2026 decision holding that DOE exceeded its statutory authority when it unilaterally ordered that the coal-fired J.H. Campbell Generating Plant continue to operate instead of closing under a plan approved by the Michigan Public Service Commission and the Midwest Independent System Operator. In its September opinion, the D.C. Circuit concluded that the text, structure, and history of the Federal Power Act did not support DOE’s “sweeping conception” of its emergency authority. The court held that Section 202(c) of the Federal Power Act was “best read to apply where the Department identifies a risk of substantial harm from inadequate electricity supply that calls for immediate action by DOE in particular, as opposed to by the states.” The D.C. Circuit found that the circumstances DOE identified in the challenged order­—including “the mere possibility of an electricity supply shortfall” without specific details regarding potential severity, timing, location, or likelihood of such a shortfall—did not warrant emergency action under Section 202(c). The D.C. Circuit decision noted that states were “largely responsible for meeting the core policy goal of achieving ‘resource adequacy,’” and noted that in doing so state regulators also have other legal obligations and policy priorities that may include climate change. DOE’s petition for rehearing argued that the D.C. Circuit’s decision erred by interpreting Section 202(c) to require deference to state actions. People of the State of Michigan v. U.S. Department of Energy, No. 25-1159 (D.C. Cir.) 

Environmental Organizations Challenged Latest EPA Extension of Greenhouse Gas Reporting Deadline 

Environmental Defense Fund and Environmental Integrity Project filed a petition for review in the D.C. Circuit Court of Appeals challenging EPA’s interim final rule “Extending the Reporting Deadline Under the Greenhouse Gas Reporting Rule for Reporting Year 2025 to March 10, 2027.” EPA published the interim final rule on October 14, 2026. EPA previously extended the reporting deadline from March 31, 2026 to October 30, 2026 and issued a proposed rule in September 2025 that proposed that no industries would need to submit annual greenhouse gas reports for calendar year 2025. Environmental Defense Fund v. Zeldin, No. 26-1299 (D.C. Cir., filed Oct. 22, 2026) 

First Circuit to Serve as Venue for Challenges to NHTSA Rule “Recalibrating” CAFE Program 

On October 16, 2026, the Judicial Panel on Multidistrict Litigation randomly consolidated six pending challenges to the National Highway Traffic Safety Administration’s final rule “substantially recalibrating the Corporate Average Fuel Economy (CAFE) program” in the First Circuit Court of Appeals. The lawsuits were filed by state and local governments (First Circuit); five environmental organizations (D.C. Circuit); National Resources Defense Council, Inc. (Second Circuit); Texas Food and Fuel Association (Fifth Circuit); corn grower trade organizations (Sixth Circuit); and American Free Enterprise Chamber of Commerce (Eighth Circuit). In re MCP 205, No. 26-8048 (1st Cir.) 

Nonprofit Shareholder Advocacy Organizations Challenged Constitutionality of Kentucky Proxy Advisor Law 

Interfaith Center on Corporate Responsibility, United Church Funds, and Ceres, Inc. filed a facial constitutional challenge to Senate Bill 183 (SB 183). SB 183 is a Kentucky law that imposes requirements for disclosures, notifications, and economic analyses on “proxy advisors” whose advice is inconsistent with the recommendations of the board of directors of a company. In addition, SB 183 imposes disclosure and notification requirements on proxy advice that is based on “nonpecuniary” concerns, which “includes but is not limited to an environmental, social, political, or ideological interest which does not have a direct and material connection to the financial risk or financial return of an investment.” The plaintiffs, who described themselves as “nonprofit organizations that, as part of their missions, partner with institutional investors to engage with companies to seek strong long-term financial performance,” asserted that SB 183 violated the First Amendment because it impermissibly discriminates based on the viewpoint and content of speech and also because it compels speech. The complaint also asserted that SB 183 was void for vagueness due to its lack of guidance regarding its scope, including because questions left to the Attorney General’s discretion included whether a “reasonable investor” would consider environmental, social, and governance interests such as climate change “important” in determining the financial risk or return of an investment. The plaintiffs requested declaratory relief, an injunction barring enforcement of the law, and attorney fees and costs. Interfaith Center on Corporate Responsibility v. Coleman, No. 3:26-cv-00085 (E.D. Ky., filed Oct. 29, 2026) 

New York Defendants Appealed Preemption Rulings in Challenges to Climate Change Superfund Act 

On October 23, 2026, New York State defendants filed notices of appeal of two federal district courts’ judgments holding that federal law preempted New York’s Climate Change Superfund Act. The Act established a $75 billion Climate Change Adaptation Cost Recovery Program to fund adaptation projects in the state, to be funded by companies that engaged in fossil fuel extraction or crude oil refining from 2000 to 2024 and that are responsible for more than one billion tons of greenhouse gas emissions during that covered period. The federal district court for the Northern District of New York ruled on August 31 in a case brought by states, business and trade groups, and a coal producer. The federal district court for the Southern District of New York issued its ruling on September 23 in a case brought by the United States and EPA. West Virginia v. James, No. 1:25-cv-00168, 1:25-cv-01307 (N.D.N.Y. Oct. 23, 2026); United States v. New York, No. 1:25-cv-03656 (S.D.N.Y. Oct. 23, 2026) 

New Complaints Filed Challenging Export-Import Bank Loan for Mozambique LNG Project; Individual Plaintiffs Asserted Claims Against Project Operator 

Friends of the Earth, Justiça Ambiental, and individual plaintiffs who live, farm, and fish near a liquefied natural gas project in Mozambique filed a new lawsuit challenging the March 2025 approval by the board of the Export-Import Bank of the United States (EXIM) of a $4.7 billion loan to subsidize the project’s construction. On the same day, the plaintiffs filed a proposed amended and supplemental complaint in a lawsuit filed in 2025. The two complaints were intended to cure standing issues after the D.C. Circuit concluded the organizational plaintiffs lacked standing. The complaints asserted identical claims that EXIM violated the Export-Import Bank Act of 1945 and the Administrative Procedure Act, including by failing to evaluate the project’s climate-related risks and impacts. The individual plaintiffs also asserted new claims of negligence, conversion, trespass, public nuisance, private nuisance, negligent infliction of emotional distress, and unjust enrichment against the defendant-intervenor TotalEnergies EP Mozambique Area 1, Limitada (Total), the TotalEnergies SE subsidiary operating the project. Total voluntarily intervened in the 2025 lawsuit. The new complaints did not assert a NEPA claim; the D.C. Circuit had found that the organizations were unlikely to succeed on the merits of such a claim. Friends of the Earth v. Export-Import Bank of the United States, No. 1:26-cv-03592 (D.D.C., filed Oct. 15, 2026); Friends of the Earth U.S. v. Export-Import Bank of the United States, No. 1:25-cv-02235 (D.D.C. Oct. 15, 2026) 

Plaintiffs Asked Court to Enforce Order for Department of Defense to Resume Review Process for Wind Energy Projects 

On October 20, 2026, plaintiffs filed a motion to enforce a stay ordered by the federal district court for the District of Oregon in August that required the U.S. Department of Defense (DOD) to resume the review process for assessing the impacts of wind energy projects on military operations and readiness. The plaintiffs argued that the status reports filed by DOD did not demonstrate that DOD had restored the required review process but instead showed that DOD had implemented “a different method of perpetuating the very delays this Court ordered it to end” by creating new administrative requirements that did not address the concerns about radar interference and drones invoked by DOD. Renewable Northwest v. Hegseth, No. 3:26-cv-01092 (D. Or. Aug. 6, 2026 and Oct. 20, 2026) 

City of Boston Challenged Federal Withdrawal of Funding for Transportation Infrastructure Project that Included Electric Vehicle Charging Stations 

The City of Boston filed a lawsuit in the federal district court for the District of Massachusetts challenging the U.S. Department of Transportation’s (DOT’s) withdrawal of the selection of infrastructure improvements in Boston’s Roxbury neighborhood for a $20 million Fiscal Year 2022 Rebuilding American Infrastructure with Sustainability and Equity (RAISE) grant. The grant was authorized by the Infrastructure Investment and Jobs Act (IIJA). The complaint alleged that IIJA’s statutory criteria for the program included environmental sustainability and that the Notice of Funding Opportunity identified installation of electric vehicle charging stations as an example of a project that would support environmental sustainability. The complaint alleged that in September 2025, DOT withdrew the award, citing the Roxbury project’s inclusion of electric vehicle charging stations as the sole reason for the withdrawal. The complaint alleged that the withdrawal “did not occur in a vacuum,” noting, among other things, an internal directive from the Secretary of Transportation requiring review of grant and cooperative agreement awards for allocations of funding “to advance climate, equity, and other priorities counter to the Administration’s Executive Orders.” The City’s complaint asserted that the withdrawal was arbitrary and capricious, in excess of statutory authority, and contrary to law in violation of the Administrative Procedure Act. The complaint also asserted that the withdrawal violated separation of powers and the Take Care Clause and constituted ultra vires action. The City requested declaratory relief, vacatur of the withdrawal, and injunctive relief. The City asked that the court exercise its equitable authority to hold the $20 million in abeyance to preserve the status quo and ensure the funds remained available. City of Boston v. Duffy, No. 1:26-cv-14419 (D. Mass., filed Sep. 28, 2026) 

Florida Attorney General Filed Action Against First Street Alleging that Climate Risk Scores Were Deceptive and Unfair 

The Florida Office of the Attorney General filed an action in Florida Circuit Court asserting that First Street Technology, Inc. (First Street) violated the Florida Deceptive and Unfair Trade Practices Act by seeking “to add alarming climate risk factors to the homebuying decision and to profit from risk scores that use faulty models to exaggerate the risk.” The suit was filed approximately two months after the State of Nebraska filed a similar suit against First Street asserting violations of the Nebraska Consumer Protection Act and Nebraska Uniform Deceptive Trade Practices Act. The Florida Attorney General’s complaint alleged that First Street’s Risk Factor product—which quantifies a property’s climate risk based on numeric scores for flood, fire, wind, air quality, and heat risks—provides misleading and vague information and is not subject to scientific peer review. The complaint alleged that First Street’s data regarding Florida included “inconsistencies or data blown out of proportion by First Street with the intent to fear monger in the name of climate advocacy.” The complaint alleged that First Street’s Risk Factor data negatively impacted Florida consumers who were selling their homes and also affected financing and resulted in increased insurance costs. The complaint sought injunctive relief, equitable relief including redress for consumers and disgorgement of “ill-gotten gains,” civil penalties, and attorney fees and costs. Office of the Attorney General v. First Street Technology, Inc., No. 2026CA005207A000BA (Fla. Cir. Ct., filed Oct. 23, 2026) 

Lawsuit Asked Montana Court to Issue Declaration that Public Service Commission Has Constitutional Obligation to Consider Climate Change 

Seventeen organizations filed a lawsuit in Montana District Court seeking a declaratory judgment requiring the Montana Public Service Commission “to account for and take reasonable steps to avoid climate costs and risks in accordance with Montana’s constitution.” The organizations also requested that the court vacate as arbitrary, capricious, and unlawful the Commission’s order denying a petition for rulemaking submitted in February 2024 asking the Commission to adopt regulations requiring consideration of information about the climate consequences of Commission decisions. In their lawsuit, the organizations contended that the environmental provisions of the Montana Constitution require the Commission to consider climate change to ensure both that its actions do not violate Montanans’ constitutional rights and also that its actions “satisfy the State’s affirmative responsibility to maintain and improve a clean and healthful environment.” Climate Smart Missoula v. Montana Department of Public Service Regulation, No. DV-32-2026-0001129-DK (Mont. Dist. Ct., filed Oct. 15, 2026)

NEW GLOBAL CASES 

European Commission: Dutch NGO challenges Aotearoa New Zealand as breaking the environmental provisions in the EU-NZ FTA based on New Zealand’s recent enactments and legislative amendments 

On September 29, 2026, Both ENDS, a Dutch environmental justice organization, filed a formal complaint with the European Commission regarding the sustainability provisions of the European Union-New Zealand Free Trade Agreement (EU-NZ FTA). The complaint asks the European Commission to examine whether Aotearoa New Zealand has broken two articles under the EU-NZ FTA: not to weaken or set aside environmental laws in order to encourage trade or investment (Article 19.2(4) and (5)), and to effectively implement the Paris Agreement, including refraining from any action or omission that materially defeats its object and purpose (Article 19.6).  

The complaint points to various recent actions of New Zealand that have occurred since the NZ-EU FTA came into force, including the repeal of the ban on offshore oil and gas exploration and the enactment of the Climate Change Response (Tort Liability) Act 2026, which is alleged to reduce environmental protection that was in place when the agreement was signed and entered into force, and were done to attract or protect investment. The complaint alleges that recent actions taken together do not amount to the effective implementation of the Paris Agreement, including regulating private actors behind major sources of emissions. 

The complaint is accompanied by supporting statements from New Zealand civil society and individuals: the Environmental Law Initiative, Greenpeace Aotearoa, Ngāti Pūkenga Iwi ki Tauranga Trust, OraTaiao: New Zealand Climate and Health Council, Mike Smith (Ngāpuhi, Ngāti Kahu) and Professor Emeritus Jane Kelsey, who speak for themselves, and is supported in Europe by La Via Campesina. Complaint to the European Commission regarding Aotearoa New Zealand (Europe, European Commission) 

Finland: Environmental NGOs challenge the government’s first long-term climate plan as inadequate under the Finnish Climate Act 

On December 18, 2025, the Finnish government adopted, in plenary session, Finland’s first long-term climate plan under section 9 of the Climate Act and submitted it to Parliament as a report. On February 18, 2026, the Finnish Association for Nature Conservation (Suomen luonnonsuojeluliitto ry) and Greenpeace, represented by Lakiasiaintoimisto Maailma, appealed against that decision to the Supreme Administrative Court, seeking its annulment and remittal to the Government for fresh preparation. The Appellants contend that the plan fails to satisfy the content requirements of section 9. On their case, it does not present credible pathways to meet the statutory emission reduction and sink targets, particularly the 2035 carbon neutrality target, and is therefore a policy document rather than an instrument answering to the Act. They argue that the Act’s objectives have been abandoned in advance and that responsibility for attaining them has been displaced onto subsequent governments. The Appellants also emphasize the planning cycle: because the long-term plan is prepared at ten-year intervals, they argue that this is the only effective challenge available at this point. Hence, the Appellants demand that the government draw up a long-term climate plan that presents sufficiently clearly how the climate goals set out in the Climate Act will be achieved. The case is pending. Greenpeace Finland and the Finnish Union for the Conservation of Nature v. Orpo’s Government (Finland, Supreme Administrative Court) 

Germany: Environmental NGO challenges provisions of the Building Energy Act as violating young Germans’ rights to life and physical integrity 

On September 28, 2026, Deutsche Umwelthilfe (DUH) filed a constitutional complaint with the Federal Constitutional Court. It challenges provisions of the Building Modernization Act (GModG) and the repeal of sections 71 and 71b–72 of the Building Energy Act. According to DUH, the complaint is supported by young complainants. The complainants allege violations of their freedom as protected intertemporally under the Basic Law, including Article 2(1), and of the state’s duty to protect life and physical integrity under Article 2(2), sentence 1, read together with Article 8 of the European Convention on Human Rights. 

The Act continues to allow the installation and operation of gas, oil, and liquefied natural gas heating systems in existing and new buildings. The complainants state that the required share of biogenic fuels rises only to 60 percent by 2040, so up to 40 percent fossil fuels remain permissible. They also state that the previously planned ban on operating fossil-fuel heating from 2045 was deleted without replacement, and they contend that the announced green gas quota cannot reliably secure the necessary emission reductions. 

Relying on the Federal Constitutional Court’s 2021 climate decision, the complainants argue that this shifts necessary emission reductions to future generations and accelerates the use of the remaining carbon budget. Citing calculations by the German Advisory Council on the Environment, they note that, as of 2025, a 1.75°C scenario leaves a remaining budget of 2.5 gigatons of CO₂ that could be exhausted by 2033. They further argue that, after the amendment to the Climate Protection Act removed binding sectoral emission targets, the Act fails to provide the building sector with a sufficiently clear framework for long-lived heating investments. According to DUH, the complaint also raises formal objections: the Act should not have been treated as a law that did not require Federal Council consent, and the Federal President was asked not to sign it but did so. DUH v. Germany (Building Modernization Act) (Germany, Federal Constitutional Court) 

GLOBAL DECISIONS 

Australia: High Court finds that the Independent Planning Commission should consider Scope 3 emissions in deciding whether to attach GHG-related conditions in granting a project 

Denman Aberdeen Muswellbrook Scone Healthy Environment Group Incorporated (DAMSHEG), a community environmental organization, brought judicial review proceedings in the Land and Environment Court of New South Wales challenging the September 6, 2022 development consent granted by the Independent Planning Commission of New South Wales (IPC). The consent approved MACH Energy Australia Pty Ltd’s proposal to extend the operation of the Mount Pleasant open cut coal mine in the Upper Hunter region of New South Wales for an additional 22 years. The proceedings were brought as a Class 4 judicial review under the Land and Environment Court Act 1979 (NSW), which allows challenges to the legal validity of administrative decisions made under planning and environmental legislation. 

DAMSHEG alleged that the IPC’s decision was legally invalid on multiple grounds. Among other arguments, the applicants contended that the Commission failed to properly consider the likely impacts of the project’s greenhouse gas emissions, including Scope 3 emissions arising from the downstream combustion of coal, and failed to consider expert evidence and submissions addressing those impacts. DAMSHEG also argued that the Commission’s reasoning was illogical and that the decision failed to meet the standard of legal reasonableness. Finally, DAMSHEG argued that the Commission failed to consider the likely environmental impacts of climate change on the locality in which the mine would operate. 

On August 19, 2024, Justice Robson dismissed the application. The Court emphasized that judicial review proceedings do not involve reconsidering the merits of the decision, but rather assessing whether the Commission complied with the statutory framework governing development approvals. Justice Robson concluded that the IPC had considered relevant environmental factors, including greenhouse gas emissions and air quality impacts, and had imposed conditions requiring compliance with specified air quality criteria. The Court therefore found no jurisdictional error in the Commission’s approval of the project. 

DAMSHEG appealed the decision to the New South Wales Court of Appeal. On July 24, 2025, the Court of Appeal declared the development consent invalid. The Court focused on s 4.15(1)(b) of the Environmental Planning and Assessment Act 1979 (NSW), which requires consent authorities to consider the likely environmental impacts of a proposed development. The Court held that the IPC had failed to consider a mandatory statutory consideration by not addressing how climate change itself could affect the locality in which the project would operate. In particular, the Court explained that an assessment of the “likely impacts” of a development may require consideration not only of how the project contributes to global climate change through greenhouse gas emissions, but also how climate change may affect the local environment and community during the life of the project. The Commission had considered greenhouse gas emissions associated with the project, but it did not consider the effects of climate change on the Upper Hunter region over the period in which the mine would operate. The Court rejected the argument that the widely accepted nature of climate change impacts excused the Commission from explicitly addressing those impacts in the local planning context. The Court remitted the matter to the Land and Environment Court to determine whether further orders could be made. 

On August 21, 2025, MACH Energy applied for special leave to appeal in the High Court of Australia. On December 4, 2025, that application was granted. DAMSHEG went on to file a Notice of Contention contending that the Court of Appeal erred in failing to find that the Commission did not take into consideration, in the manner required by § 4.15(1)(b) of the Environmental Planning and Assessment Act 1979 and cl 2.20 of the State Environmental Planning Policy (Resources and Energy) 2021, whether the development consent should be issued subject to conditions aimed at ensuring that greenhouse gas emissions (including downstream emissions) of the development are minimized to the greatest extent practicable. The High Court also granted leave for Melbourne Climate Futures, the Union of Concerned Scientists, the Center for Climate Engagement and the Sabin Center for Climate Change Law to be heard as amici curiae. 

On October 7, 2026, the High Court of Australia delivered its judgment. It unanimously held that the IPC had complied with § 4.15(1)(b) of the Environmental Planning and Assessment Act 1979, and that therefore it was not necessary to decide whether climate change itself could constitute an environmental impact ‘in the locality’ for the purposes of § 4.15(1)(b). 

However, by majority, the High Court upheld the ground concerning the IPC’s obligations under cl 2.20(1)(c) of the State Environmental Planning Policy (Resources and Energy) 2021, therefore granting leave for DAMSHEG to file its Notice of Contention. That provision required the Commission to consider whether the development consent should be subject to conditions aimed at ensuring that greenhouse gas emissions were minimized to the greatest extent practicable. The majority found that the IPC had failed to properly consider whether conditions should be imposed to minimize the project’s greenhouse gas emissions, including its Scope 3 emissions. Scope 3 emissions represented approximately 98% of the project’s total predicted greenhouse gas emissions, but the Commission’s consideration of those emissions was insufficiently ‘limited to an analysis of whether they were ‘appropriately regulated and accounted for through broader national policies and international agreements (such as the Paris Agreement)’ (Gordon J at [182]). 

The High Court has remitted the matter to the Land and Environment Court to determine whether it can remedy MACH Energy’s development consent through terms of consent, or whether it must declare it invalid, in whole or in part. MACH Energy Australia Pty Ltd v. Denman Aberdeen Muswellbrook Scone Healthy Environment Group Inc (Australia, High Court of Australia) 

Argentina: The Supreme Court orders national and subnational governments to implement the Comprehensive Strategic Plan for the Conservation and Sustainable Use of the Paraná Delta 

In late Fall 2020, uncontrolled pasture burning in Ramsar’s wetland ecosystem (Delta del Paraná) created a serious environmental conflict among Argentina’s provinces. This conflict gave place to several lawsuits seeking protection for the ecosystem, including this constitutional collective claim (amparo colectivo ambiental) against three Argentine provinces and a municipality filed on July 03, 2020. The case was filed by two NGOs and a group of children represented by their parents, alleging that the government entities were failing in their duties regarding the protection and sound environmental management of the inter-jurisdictional ecosystem, which is key for mitigation and adaptation of climate change while also being at risk due to its negative impacts.  

The complaint relied primarily on the Argentinian Constitution, the Convention on the Rights of the Child, the UNFCCC, the Paris Agreement, General Environmental Law No. 25.675, and Environmental Law to Control Burning Activities No. 23.919, while also referencing laws in other countries recognizing the rights of nature, rivers, and other non-human entities. The complaint asked the Supreme Court to (i) declare the ecosystem as an entity subject to rights, (ii) order the defendants to prepare and implement a coordinated environmental management and land use plan that recognizes the vulnerability of the ecosystem and its relevance for future generations, (iii) designate a ‘guardian’ for the entity, responsible for monitoring its conservation and sustainable use, as well as informing the Supreme Court about the enforcement of the judgment, and (iv) order that broad, early and effective public participation is guaranteed in any decision-making regarding the future management of the ecosystem.  

After combining all related cases on December 28, 2021, the Supreme Court of Justice rendered a final judgment in the main proceedings, “Equística,” on December 4, 2025. The Court ordered the National State, the Provinces of Buenos Aires, Entre Ríos, and Santa Fe, and the municipalities of Rosario and Victoria to implement and execute the Comprehensive Strategic Plan for the Conservation and Sustainable Use of the Paraná Delta (PIECAS-DP), which had been established in September 2008. The Court ordered implementation of the measures agreed under the Plan, including equipment and infrastructure for early-warning mechanisms, the Network of Conservation Lighthouses (Red de Faros de Conservación), a systematic control plan, and a fire management plan for the Delta. The Court considered that its intervention had broken the status quo and facilitated the development of the basic regulatory and institutional tools necessary for the competent authorities to address the environmental problem. It nevertheless held that indefinite judicial monitoring of PIECAS-DP was outside the Court’s role, as the relevant national, provincial, and municipal political authorities are responsible for its implementation. The final judgment, however, made no reference to climate change and did not address the plaintiffs’ claims concerning climate change mitigation and adaptation. Asociación Civil por la Justicia Ambiental v. Province of Entre Ríos, et al. (Delta del Paraná case) (Argentina, Supreme Court of Argentina) 

Italy: The Italian Competition Authority fines a fashion company for greenwashing 

On September 23, 2024, the Italian Competition Authority (AGCM) opened proceedings PS12709 against Infinite Styles Services Co. Ltd, the Irish company that operates SHEIN’s online stores in Europe, over environmental claims published on the Italian SHEIN website and related web pages since at least 2023. The claims concerned the circularity of production, product quality, and responsible consumption (the #SHEINTHEKNOW, evoluSHEIN and “Social Responsibility” sections), the share of recycled materials in the “evoluSHEIN by Design” collection, and the company’s decarbonization targets: a 25% reduction of greenhouse gas emissions (Scope 1, 2 and 3) by 2030 and net-zero emissions by 2050. In its July 29, 2025 decision, the Authority found the claims vague, generic, false or misleading, and lacking relevant information.  

With regard to the climate targets, the Authority noted that, by the company’s own account, more than 99% of its emissions fall under Scope 3 and are generated by suppliers, transportation and other sources outside its direct control, and that its total greenhouse gas emissions rose from 6.04 million tonnes of CO2 in 2021 to 9.17 million in 2022 and 16.68 million in 2023, an 82% increase over 2022. It concluded that presenting a real and effective decarbonization commitment was confusing and misleading. The Authority held that the conduct constituted an unfair commercial practice under Articles 20, 21(1)(b), and 22(1)-(2) of the Consumer Code, prohibited its continuation, imposed an administrative fine of EUR 1,000,000, and ordered the company to report on the measures taken within 90 days. Italian Competition Authority v. Infinite Styles Services Co. Ltd (SHEIN) (Italy, Italian Competition Authority Administrative Courts) 

Italy: Council of State affirms that the right of access to environmental information must be interpreted as broadly as possible, extending to activities that affect the environment indirectly 

On April 19, 2021, as part of a campaign on the influence of fossil fuel companies on Italian universities, Greenpeace Italy requested access to the framework agreements, contracts, conventions and collaboration agreements concluded in 2019-2021 between the Polytechnic University of Turin and ENI S.p.A. and its group companies (Versalis, Eni Rewind, Eni Corporate University and Fondazione Eni Enrico Mattei), together with information on the degree and postgraduate courses and other funding provided by those companies. On May 21, 2021, the University denied access, arguing that documents concerning academic agreements and financial relationships did not contain environmental information. Greenpeace challenged the denial before the Regional Administrative Court of Piedmont.  

On April 19, 2022 (judgment No. 379/2022), the Court annulled the denial and ordered disclosure within 20 days, holding that environmental information covers not only data directly related to the environment but also choices, actions and activities that directly or indirectly involve the environment and its protection. ENI and the University appealed, and the Council of State suspended the judgment pending appeal (orders No. 2695/2022 and No. 2701/2022).  

On July 6, 2023 (judgment No. 6611/2023, Seventh Section), the Council of State dismissed both appeals. It held that the right of access to environmental information must be interpreted as broadly as possible and extends to activities that affect the environment only indirectly. In finding that agreements between a university and “a company that is notoriously a leader in the energy sector” concern environmental information, the Court relied on ENI’s own public statements that it is committed to the energy transition and to achieving carbon neutrality by 2050, described the energy transition as “one of the essential areas of current environmental problems”, and noted that energy is expressly listed among the environmental factors in Legislative Decree No. 195/2005. It further held that generic claims of commercial confidentiality relating to corporate strategies cannot override the right of access, and that disclosing corporate funding of research grants, scholarships, and degree courses could only improve the quality of university education. Greenpeace Italy v. Polytechnic University of Turin and ENI S.p.A. (Italy, Council of State) 

Norway: Court of Appeal agrees that environmental assessments for oil and gas fields development should include consideration of Scope 3 emissions 

On June 29, 2023, two environmental NGOs, Greenpeace Nordic and Natural og Ungdom (Nature & Youth), challenged three administrative decisions in which the Norwegian Energy Ministry approved plans to develop and operate the oil and gas fields of Breidablikk, Yggdrasil, and Tyrving in the North Sea. The three fields underwent impact assessments that did not include combustion (Scope 3) emissions from the produced oil and gas. Plaintiffs argued that the failure to include Scope 3 emissions in the assessment was unlawful relying on various grounds. The Ministry of Petroleum and Energy, now the Ministry of Energy, asserted that a general-level assessment of Scope 3 emissions sufficed and that the Ministry had no explicit requirement to integrate this assessment into the specific impact assessments for the fields. 

On January 18, 2024, the Oslo District Court concluded that all three decisions were unlawful. The court found that Scope 3 emissions must be subject to an impact assessment under Section 4-2 of the Petroleum Act and Section 22a of the Petroleum Regulations, interpreted in light of Article 112 of the Norwegian Constitution (the right to a healthy environment). On remedies, the Court granted the application for a temporary injunction, prohibiting the state from adopting other decisions that require valid PDO approval for Breidablikk, Yggdrasil and Tyrving until the validity of the decisions is finally decided.  

The decision was appealed. On October 14, 2024, the Oslo Court of Appeals reversed the interim injunction. In April 2025, the Supreme Court of Norway reversed the appellate decision and remanded the case to the Oslo Court of Appeal. On November 14, 2025, the Borgarting Court of Appeal delivered its judgment and order following the Supreme Court’s remand and the EFTA Court’s May 21, 2025 advisory opinion.  

Giving substantial weight to the EFTA Court’s advisory opinion, the Court of Appeal held that greenhouse gas emissions arising from the eventual combustion of oil and gas extracted and sold to third parties constitute likely environmental effects of the petroleum projects under Directive 2011/92/EU, as amended by Directive 2014/52/EU. Such combustion emissions must therefore be investigated and assessed as part of the environmental impact assessment process. The court found that the Ministry’s supplementary process remained deficient. In particular, the Ministry had not clearly based its assessment on the projects’ gross combustion emissions; had not adequately considered the cumulative combustion emissions of Norwegian petroleum production; had not assessed the emissions against the remaining carbon budget for limiting warming to 1.5°C; and had not sufficiently evaluated the direct and indirect effects specified in Article 3 of the Directive, including global effects. The Ministry also failed to provide the required reasoned conclusion explaining why it should approve the projects despite their significant climate effects. The Court of Appeal declared the Ministry’s August 28 and December 20, 2024 decisions invalid and did not reverse the approvals. It held that the procedural defects required invalidation under both Norwegian administrative law and EEA law, emphasizing that the approval stage was the final opportunity to conduct the legally required assessment before the Ministry authorized petroleum extraction.  

The court nevertheless declined to order the immediate suspension of development and production. It reasoned that the violations concerned procedural deficiencies rather than a finding that the Ministry lacked substantive authority, and that an immediate halt would be disproportionate given the consequences for operators, contractual relationships, employment, local communities, and Norway’s role as an energy supplier. The court instead ordered the Ministry to reconsider the applications and adopt new decisions within six months of the Court of Appeal’s ruling, or, if the validity ruling had not become final by then, within two months after a final judgment. Any retrospective environmental assessment must examine both past and future environmental effects, avoid circumvention of EEA law, and be conducted while all outcomes remain genuinely open. The State appealed. The Supreme Court of Norway agreed to hear the case in an enlarged formation, and it heard the appeal in August 2026. A final Supreme Court judgment is pending. Greenpeace Nordic and Nature & Youth v. Ministry of Energy (The North Sea Fields Case) (Norway, Borgarting Court of Appeal) 

United Kingdom: Court of Appeal agrees that the Secretary of State for Transport’s assessment in granting the development of Gatwick Airport was sufficient 

An individual and a group consisting of community members sought permission in front of the High Court to bring a claim for judicial review of the September 21, 2025 decision of the Secretary of State for Transport (SST), to make the Gatwick Airport (Northern Runway Project) Development Consent Order 2025 (the “DCO”). The DCO authorizes development that will enable dual-runway operations at Gatwick Airport. 

The parties, collectively, argued that: 

(1) The SST failed to properly understand the Airports National Policy Statement (June 2018) [“the ANPS”] and/or failed to have regard to the relevant policy of the ANPS concerning the expansion of Gatwick Airport.  

(2) In granting development consent pursuant to section 114 of the 2008 Act, the SST was obliged but failed to exercise her power so as to promote the policies and objects of the statutory scheme.  

(3) In making the DCO, the SST acted in breach of certain provisions of the Infrastructure Planning (Environmental Impact Assessment) Regulations 2017 [“the EIA Regulations”] and/or failed to reach conclusions on the DCO and/or the adequacy of the environmental impact assessment [“EIA”] for the proposed development in a procedurally rational manner; or alternatively, the SST’s conclusions were Wednesbury unreasonable.  

(4) The SST’s consideration of need and economic benefits was procedurally irrational and/or Wednesbury unreasonable.  

(5) The SST erred in her interpretation of the Aviation Policy Framework (March 2013) [“the APF”] and ANPS policies governing aviation noise and/or in any event, reached irrational conclusions on noise. 

(6) The SST took an irrational approach to the significance of GHG emissions and/or failed to give adequate reasons for her approach to that issue.  

(7) The SST erred in law in her consideration of GHG emissions from international inbound flights under the EIA Regulations.  

(8) The SST erred in law in her consideration of non-carbon dioxide (CO2) emissions under the EIA Regulations.  

(9) The SST failed to take into account material risks to the Jet Zero Strategy (July 2022) [“JZS”] and/or to comply with her Tameside duty of reasonable inquiry and/or took an irrational approach to the JZS.  

(10) The SST imposed an unlawful requirement in Schedule 2 to the DCO in respect of Work No 44 (wastewater treatment works). 

The Court refused permission on grounds (2), (3), (5), (7), (8), and (9). And while the Court granted permission on other grounds, the Court rejected all of them, therefore dismissing the claim.  

Claimants applied for permission to appeal the High Court judgment. But on August 4, 2026, the Court of Appeal refused their application. The Court of Appeal held that: (1) the SST had correctly interpreted the ANPS; (2) on the evidence, the High Court judge had reached accurate factual conclusion in the assessment of economic benefits; (3) the question under the ANPS of whether the development’s failure to contribute to net zero was “so significant that it would have a material impact on the government’s ability to meet its carbon reduction targets ... involved a question of degree which was a matter of judgement for the SST”; (4) the SST’s decision to rely on a qualitative (rather than quantitative) assessment of the impact of non-CO2 emissions from the development had not been “irrational”; (5) the SST’s approach to information relating to the government’s Jet Zero strategy for reducing aviation emissions had not been irrational; and (6) the risks regarding the capacity to manage waste water did not require more than what the SST had already required when making the DCO. Barclay and Communities Against Gatwick Noise Emissions (CAGNE) v Secretary of State for Transport (United Kingdom, High Court (King’s Bench Division - Planning)) 

Costa Rica: Constitutional Chamber holds that climate variables should be included in environmental impact assessments prospectively 

In December 2024, the plaintiff filed an Amparo Lawsuit before the Constitutional Chamber of the Supreme Court of Costa Rica, alleging that the Executive Branch and the National Environmental Technical Secretariat (SETENA) have omitted to include the evaluation of climate impacts in the Environmental Impact Assessment (EIA) procedures. The plaintiff argued that Executive Decree 43898-MINAE-S-MOPT-MAG-MEIC of December 21, 2022, which regulates environmental assessment in the country, is unconstitutional because it does not include the obligation to assess the climate risks and climate impacts of proposed projects, nor does it establish climate change mitigation or adaptation measures. 

The main argument is that this omission violates the right of present and future generations to a safe climate within the right to a healthy and ecologically balanced environment, which is incompatible with international standards and commitments, such as the Paris Agreement and the UNFCCC. The plaintiff requested the Court to order the State to include climate change in the EIA and review projects in process under this new criterion. 

On June 16, 2026, the Constitutional Chamber granted the amparo. It held that the Executive Branch and SETENA violated Article 50 of the Constitution by failing to issue rules that bring climate variables into environmental impact assessment (EIA) instruments. The Chamber agreed that land-use plans should address climate change but rejected the respondents’ position that project-level assessment must wait for those plans. Nor, in the Chamber’s view, did technical, methodological, or budgetary gaps justify the omission. 

The majority relied on the Inter-American Court of Human Rights’ Advisory Opinion OC-32/25. Section III invokes paragraph 546 on the pro actione principle to support hearing a claim that named no specific project. Section IV refers to the opinion’s treatment of the pro natura principle at paragraphs 281 and 552 (cited as 582). Section V.1 also cites paragraphs 216 and 279–286 on pro natura. It quotes paragraphs 359 and 361, which require EIAs to assess effects on the climate system and set the minimum content of EIA regulation. Section VIII draws on the opinion’s standards of enhanced due diligence, intergenerational equity, and differentiated protection of vulnerable groups (paragraphs 98, 236, 308, 311–313, 346, 348, 349, 353–356, and 614). 

The Chamber relied separately on the Inter-American Court’s earlier Advisory Opinion OC-23/17 for the autonomous right to a healthy environment, the precautionary and prevention principles, and prior EIA (Sections IV, V.1, and VII). It also quoted paragraph 298 of the International Court of Justice’s 2025 advisory opinion on climate change, which addresses EIAs. 

It ordered the Minister of Environment and Energy and the Secretary General of SETENA to incorporate into the EIA regulatory framework, within 18 months, the obligation to examine the climate risks and impacts of activities, works, and projects, together with the mitigation and adaptation measures that developers must implement. The State was ordered to pay costs and damages. Individual v. Government of Costa Rica (Costa Rica, Constitutional Chamber of the Supreme Court of Costa Rica) 

United Kingdom: Northern Ireland’s Court of Appeal holds that courts should not interfere with otherwise appropriate environmental assessments on a project-by-project basis 

At the beginning of 2025, a group of landowners, farmers, and campaigners under the name the Alternative A5 Alliance (AA5A) filed for judicial review to challenge the Northern Ireland Department for Infrastructure’s (DfI) decision to continue the A5 dual carriageway project, which was aimed at improving the A5 route between Derry and Aughnacloy — a lasting safety concern, resulting in numerous civilian deaths.  

The plaintiff alleged that the DfI’s decision failed to comply with Section 52 of the Climate Change (Northern Ireland) Act 2022. This section mandates public authorities to have regard and act in accordance with the legally binding Climate Action Plan, which was not in place at the time the DfI decided to proceed with the project. The plaintiff also contended that the defendant failed to take into account a critical relevant consideration, or a recently updated Climate Action Plan, when it approved the plan. The plaintiff alleged that the DfI acted unlawfully by disregarding the Planning Appeals Commission’s recommendation of imposing a time limit for the project’s development, representing a breach in procedural fairness. The plaintiff contended that the lack of a time limit caused uncertainty for the landowners and residents near the project, failing to comply with Article 8 of the European Convention on Human Rights, which protects the right to respect for private and family life.  

The High Court issued a judgment stating that the DfI acted unlawfully by making a decision inconsistent with Section 52 of the Climate Change (Northern Ireland) Act 2022. The court also stated that the DfI ignored a critical relevant consideration as it proceeded without an updated Climate Action Plan and that DfI violated the principles of procedural fairness when prolonging uncertainty for landowners and residents. The court also ruled that the time limit violations constituted a human rights violation, and ultimately quashed the DfI’s decision to proceed with the project.  

The Court of Appeal overturned the High Court decision. It reasoned that the High Court erred in effectively requiring a greater analysis of this distinct issue of GHG emissions arising from induced cross-border journeys than would be needed to allow the project to proceed. It said an approach which required inclusion of this consideration was too exacting and was over and beyond the requirement to have an adequate environmental impact assessment. The methodology and additional expert evidence filed on behalf of the DfI should have satisfied the High Court that the question of transboundary emissions was adequately addressed. The Court concluded that provided the authority had considered the greenhouse gas emissions and could explain how the project fits within the broader effort to meet net zero targets, the Court would not interfere to shut down projects on a project-by-project basis where there was otherwise an appropriate EIA. Alternative A5 Alliance v Northern Ireland Department for Infrastructure (United Kingdom, Court of Appeal in Northern Ireland) 

Brazil: Appellate court upholds that judicial intervention can happen when unconstitutional state omission in environmental policy is observed 

In October 2021, the Public Prosecutor’s Office of the State of Goiás (MPGO) brought a Public Civil Action against the state of Goiás, seeking to compel the state to take the necessary measures to improve air quality and, consequently, safeguard the health of the population. MPGO claimed that the regional government has failed to comply with public environmental control policies aimed at protecting air quality and the climate. It further claimed that although the State Policy on Climate Change - PEMC (State Law 16.497/2009) was instituted in line with the National Policy on Climate Change - PNMC (Federal Law 12.187/2009), few public policies have been implemented. It also pointed out the lack of implementation of instruments to prevent atmospheric pollution and climate change, especially the Atmospheric Emissions Control Plan (PCEA) and the Vehicle Pollution Control Plan (PCPV). It highlights the inadequacy of the PCPV in the state of Goiás. 

On January 19, 2026, a judgment was issued, which partially granted the requests made by the plaintiff, confirming the preliminary injunction granted and ordering the State of Goiás to: (i) prepare and implement the Atmospheric Emissions Control Plan (PCEA); (ii) update the Vehicle Pollution Control Plan (PCPV); (iii) complete the installation and operation of the remaining automatic air quality monitoring stations; (iv) prepare and implement the Vehicle Inspection and Maintenance Program; (v) improve the regulations on environmental impact assessments related to climate change in environmental licensing procedures, specifying technical criteria for the analysis of GHG emissions in large-scale and high-polluting potential projects; (vi) require the submission of GHG emission inventories from licensed industrial projects; and (vii) keep the State GHG Emissions Inventory updated.  

In response to the decision, the state of Goiás filed an appeal. 

In a single-judge decision, the reporting judge of the appeal denied the appeal, upholding the appealed sentence. The decision was based on shared environmental jurisdiction, the joint and several nature of environmental responsibility, and precedents from the Supreme Federal Court (STF) regarding the legitimacy of judicial intervention in the face of unconstitutional state omission in public policies, provided that the proportional modulation of compliance deadlines is respected. The judge established that the requirement for emissions inventories and the structuring of an environmental monitoring network does not constitute double jeopardy (bis in idem), as they are distinct and complementary instruments for environmental management, oversight, and control. 

Although the State of Goiás filed an internal appeal, the 2nd Civil Chamber of the Court of Justice of the State of Goiás, unanimously, denied the appeal, upholding the single-judge decision in accordance with the same grounds. Prosecutor’s Office of the State of Goiás v. State of Goiás (State public policy on air quality control) (Brazil, Goiás State Court) 

Brazil: Federal Court holds that environmental legislation does not stipulate the need for specific obligations, especially the carrying out of Strategic Environmental Assessments  

On October 28, 2022, Instituto Internacional Arayara filed a Public Civil Action against the National Environmental Agency (IBAMA), the Federal Union, the Rio de Janeiro’s State Environmental Agency (INEA), the State of Rio de Janeiro, and the companies EDF Norte Fluminense S.A. - Usina Termelétrica Norte Fluminense S.A., Global Participações em Energia S.A., Usina Termelétrica Nossa Senhora de Fátima, and Litos Energia Ltda. The plaintiff sought the annulment of the previous environmental licenses issued by IBAMA for thermoelectric projects located in the municipality of Macaé, in the state of Rio de Janeiro. It also sought the annulment of the (i) water resources use right grants and (ii) Water Availability Reserve Certificates referring to the Macaé and Ostras River Hydrographic Basin, granted by INEA for the same projects. The plaintiff institution argued that the installation of a thermoelectric complex in the region, consisting of eighteen enterprises, is contrary to the need for investment in a clean energy matrix and the fight against climate change. It argued that there should be a determination that licensing agencies require, prior to issuing licenses: (i) a Strategic Environmental Assessment (AAE) for the analysis of synergistic and cumulative impacts of enterprises to be installed in the same hydrographic basin; (ii) the updating of the plan of the Hydrographic Basin of the Macaé and Ostras River and the study of water availability of the Basin; and (iii) the presentation of a Climate Diagnosis, with an inventory of Greenhouse Gas (GHG) emissions by the enterprises. 

In June 2026, a judgment was issued declaring the claims unfounded. The court understood that there are no regulations to support the plaintiff’s claims. It argued that the National Environmental Policy only generically provides for the possibility of conducting environmental studies and environmental impact assessments. It understood that environmental legislation does not stipulate the need for specific obligations, especially the carrying out of Strategic Environmental Assessments (SEA) and Climate Diagnosis. It pointed out that the request for air quality assessment is broad, as pollution is a problem caused by sources from various sectors and cannot be addressed in a specific action. 

The Arayara Institute filed an appeal. Instituto Internacional Arayara v. IBAMA and others (Brazil, Rio de Janeiro Federal Court) 

Brazil: Case dismissed without prejudice due to a related case 

On December 13, 2022, the Instituto Internacional Arayara de Educação e Cultura filed a Climate Public Civil Action (ACP) with a request for an injunction against the National Agency for Petroleum, Natural Gas, and Biofuels (ANP) and the Federal Union. It argued for the nullification of the inclusion of blocks located in the Santos and Campos Basins in the auction, as these areas overlap and are near Priority Areas for Biodiversity Conservation and Conservation Units. It was contended that the climate crisis demands a transition to clean energy and a reduction in carbon dioxide emissions, which is incompatible with the expansion of oil exploration in protected areas.  

As an injunction, it requested:  

(i) the suspension of the offering of the mentioned blocks;  

(ii) the presentation of an inventory of greenhouse gas emissions that will be generated by the commercial exploitation of the blocks offered in the auction; and  

(iii) the presentation by the defendants of detailed studies on the socio-environmental and economic impacts resulting from the expansion of exploration and production (E&P) activities in the Santos and Campos Basins. On the merits, it is requested that the provisional injunction be confirmed and that the defendants refrain from holding new rounds of auctions for the mentioned blocks/areas unless the technical-environmental regularity is unequivocally demonstrated, especially with reasoned opinions from bodies such as ICMBio, IBAMA, and state/municipal environmental agencies. 

In June 2023, the ruling extinguished the case without resolving the merits due to Arayara’s illegitimacy and lack of interest in acting. According to the decision, Arayara was unable to demonstrate thematic relevance to be an active party in this ACP and the bidding procedure it seeks to prevent was already concluded on December 16, 2022. 

Arayara filed an appeal in which it argued that it has active legitimacy to file the ACP defending the diffuse right to an ecologically balanced environment and that the fact that the auction has already taken place does not prevent it from being aware of the requests related to the greenhouse gas emissions inventory and studies on the socio-environmental and economic impacts resulting from the expansion of E&P activity. 

On July 29, 2026, the appeal was judged by the Panel of the Federal Regional Court of the 4th Region, which, unanimously, denied the appeal filed by the Arayara Institute and upheld the judgment that had recognized the existence of a connection between the present Public Civil Action and Public Civil Action 5050920-75.2023.4.04.7100 and dismissed the action without prejudice. The TRF 4 considered that the connecting action had already been decided and that the continuation of the present lawsuit could lead to conflicting decisions. Instituto Arayara vs. ANP and Federal Union (1st Permanent Offer Cycle of Oil Concession in the Santos and Campos Basins) (Brazil, Federal Regional Court of the 4th Region)