Climate Litigation Updates (May 30, 2025)
The Sabin Center for Climate Change Law publishes summaries of developments in climate-related litigation twice each month. We also add these developments to our U.S. and Global climate litigation charts. If you know of any cases we have missed, please email us at [email protected].
HERE ARE THE ADDITIONS TO THE U.S. CLIMATE CASE CHART FOR UPDATE #197:
FEATURED CASE
Supreme Court Said NEPA Does Not Require Consideration of Effects of “Separate” Upstream and Downstream Projects
The U.S. Supreme Court reversed a D.C. Circuit judgment that found that the Surface Transportation Board violated the National Environmental Policy Act (NEPA) when it approved an 88-mile railroad line in northeastern Utah that would facilitate transport of crude oil from the rural Uinta Basin to the national rail network. The D.C. Circuit had found, among other violations, that the STB failed to disclose reasonably foreseeable upstream and downstream effects of increased oil drilling and refining, including greenhouse gas emissions. In a five-justice majority opinion authored by Justice Kavanaugh, the Court first found that the D.C. Circuit had not afforded “the substantial judicial deference required in NEPA cases” to the agency’s choices regarding the scope and contents of the environmental impact statement (EIS). The Court stated that some courts, by engaging in “overly intrusive (and unpredictable) review in NEPA cases,” had transformed NEPA “from a modest procedural requirement into a blunt and haphazard tool employed by project opponents” and that a “course correction of sorts is appropriate to bring judicial review under NEPA back in line with the statutory text and common sense.” Second, the Court ruled that the D.C. Circuit incorrectly interpreted NEPA to require the STB “to consider the environmental effects of upstream and downstream projects that are separate in time or place” from the proposed action. The Court distinguished the “indirect effects” of a project at issue such as “run-off into a river that flows many miles from the project and affects fish populations elsewhere, or emissions that travel downwind and predictably pollute other areas” from the environmental effects of a separate project that “breaks the chain of proximate causation between the project at hand and the environmental effects of the separate project.” In addition, the Court stated that—“importantly”—NEPA does not require agencies “to analyze the effects of projects over which they do not exercise regulatory authority.” The Court noted that NEPA does mandate consultation with other agencies but further opined that “there is a vast difference between, for example, an agency’s consulting with the Forest Service to determine the effects of a railroad line that would pass through a national forest and an agency’s asking another agency to assess how 88 miles of additional track in rural Utah would contribute to emissions or climate change along the Gulf Coast.” The Court also emphasized that but-for causation and “mere foreseeability” were not a sufficient basis for courts to order agency analysis of the effects of separate projects. The Court found that the NEPA question in this case was “not close” and that the STB did not need to consider the impacts of future oil drilling in the Uinta Basins or the environmental effects of refineries on the Gulf Coast.
Justice Sotomayor, joined by Justices Kagan and Jackson, concurred in the judgment. The concurrence applied a two-step analysis for judicial review of an EIS: first, courts must “consider the grounds on which an agency may rely under its organic statute modify (by mitigation) or reject a proposed federal action”; second, courts must determine whether the agency acted arbitrarily in determining that an impact was “too causally attenuated from the question at hand” to be considered. In this case, the concurrence found that first step resolved the question because the STB’s organic statute would not permit the STP to reject the rail line application in order to prevent or mitigate the effects of oil drilling and refining. Justice Gorsuch did not participate in the consideration or decision of the case. Seven County Infrastructure Coalition v. Eagle County, No. 23-975 (U.S. May 29, 2025)
DECISIONS AND SETTLEMENTS
New York High Court Said State Climate Law Did Not Preempt New York City’s Building Emissions Law
Reversing an intermediate appellate court, the New York Court of Appeals held that New York State’s Climate Leadership and Community Protection Act (CLCPA) did not preempt the field of regulating greenhouse gas emissions and did not preempt New York City’s Local Law No. 97, which requires large existing buildings to reduce emissions. The court found that the CLCPA did not demonstrate an intent to preempt the field of greenhouse gas emissions regulation, noting that the state law “recognizes that local government plays an important role in this area,” that the state law does not expressly preempt local regulation of emissions, and that its legislative findings “evince a sense of urgency” regarding implementation of climate measures and encourage climate change mitigation action by other jurisdictions. In addition, the Court of Appeals pointed to the CLCPA’s directive requiring the Climate Action Council to consider measures taken by other jurisdictions such as localities when developing the Scoping Plan that sets forth actions to achieve the CLCPA’s emissions reduction mandates. The Court of Appeals noted that Local Law No. 97 had been enacted before the CLCPA and also cited “the recognized and longstanding involvement of localities in regulating matters of environmental concern” such as air pollution. The Court of Appeals said the inclusion in the CLCPA of a savings clause stating that the CLCPA did not relieve entities from compliance with applicable local laws and regulations further reflected the CLCPA’s “embrace of complementary local action.” The Court of Appeals held that the intermediate appellate court erroneously interpreted this “broad savings clause”—which provides that “[n]othing in this act shall relieve any person, entity, or public agency of compliance with other applicable federal, state, or local laws or regulations, including state air and water quality requirements, and other requirements for protecting public health or the environment”—to apply only to local laws that did not regulate greenhouse gas emissions. The Court of Appeals also rejected the plaintiffs’ contention that the “nature and statewide significance” of the CLCPA’s subject matter demonstrated an intent to preempt the field; the Court of Appeals acknowledged the “ambitious” reach of the CLCPA but said it could not conclude that “aspirational” legislative findings regarding the CLCPA’s intent to create a “comprehensive regulatory program” were meant to prevent local governments from taking actions that would help the State achieve its emissions goals. Glen Oaks Village Owners, Inc. v. City of New York, No. APL-2024-00106 (N.Y. May 22, 2025)
Pennsylvania Court Dismissed Bucks County Climate Case Against Fossil Fuel Companies
The Pennsylvania Court of Common Pleas ruled that the Clean Air Act preempted Bucks County’s climate change tort claims against fossil fuel companies and dismissed the County’s lawsuit with prejudice. As a threshold matter, the court rejected the companies’ argument that the County did not have capacity to sue because the County Commissioners violated Pennsylvania’s Sunshine Act by not approving the filing of the lawsuit in an open meeting. The court found that the Commissioner’s use of a “consent agenda” item to authorize the lawsuit complied with the letter of the law, though the court said it believed the Commissioners violated the “spirit” of the Sunshine Act by “burying the resolution to retain current counsel and pursue this lawsuit” within the consent agenda, particularly because the Commissioners’ subsequent characterization of the lawsuit as “historic” and “momentous” was at odds with the use of the consent agenda for “routine or non-controversial” items not expected to require more discussion. Also as a threshold matter, the court found that it had personal jurisdiction over all defendants, even those not registered to do business in Pennsylvania. The court concluded, however, that it did not have subject matter over the case because the County “is truly seeking redress for harm caused by climate change, a global phenomenon caused by the emission of greenhouse gases in every nation in the world,” even though the County argued that its claims sought damages from the defendants’ alleged “deceptive marking campaign.” The court concluded that the U.S. Supreme Court’s decision in American Electric Power Co. v. Connecticut that the Clean Air Act displaced any federal common law right to seek abatement of greenhouse gas emissions from power plants also applied in this case to displace “any Pennsylvania common law right to seek abatement of greenhouse gas emissions from fossil fuel production companies.” Bucks County v. BP p.l.c., No. 2024-01836-0000 (Pa. C.P. May 16, 2025)
Fifth Circuit Dismissed Challenge to Louisiana’s Regulatory Authority over Carbon Dioxide Sequestration Wells
The Fifth Circuit Court of Appeals ruled that three environmental groups lacked standing to challenge the U.S. Environmental Protection Agency’s (EPA’s) decision granting the State of Louisiana primary enforcement authority over underground injection control wells used for geological sequestration of carbon dioxide. First, the court found that alleged past and future reallocation of resources by one of the organizations in response to EPA’s action did not establish “organizational” standing. Second, the court found that the other two organizations’ allegations of injuries to their members did not satisfy standing requirements for imminence and causation because the injuries were speculative, attenuated, or contingent. The alleged injuries included economic injuries from increased energy costs; health, property, aesthetic, recreational, economic, profession, and procedural injuries related to concerns regarding carbon dioxide leaks, explosions, and other dangers; and absence of recourse for damages due to the Louisiana’s provision for a liability transfer upon well completion. Deep South Center for Environmental Justice v. EPA, No. 24-60084 (5th Cir. May 21, 2025)
South Carolina Federal Court Ordered Restoration of 32 Grants Under Inflation Reduction Act and Other “Mandatory Legislation”
On May 20, 2025, the federal district court for the District of South Carolina ordered Trump administration defendants to immediately restore access to 32 terminated or frozen grants under the Inflation Reduction Act, Infrastructure Investment and Jobs Act, or other “mandatory legislation.” The defendants did not contest judgment on the merits of the plaintiff’s Administrative Procedure Act (APA) claims but opposed the injunctive relief. The court granted judgment to the plaintiffs on the APA claims, based on the “full record” and the defendants’ concession, finding that the plaintiffs produced “substantial, highly persuasive evidence to support their claims that their grant funds were frozen and/or terminated because Defendants disfavored previously authorized congressional appropriations and that such actions were outside of the legal authority of the agency Defendants and in violation of the Constitution’s separation of powers.” The court further concluded that a stay of the injunctive relief was not appropriate, finding that the defendants were unlikely to succeed on their challenges to the court’s jurisdiction. The court also found that the federal defendants did not demonstrate irreparable injury; in addition, the court cited harms to the plaintiffs as well as the public interest in upholding the rule of law. The court also found that it had jurisdiction over the plaintiffs’ nonstatutory review claims of separation of powers violation and ultra vires action, which the court described as a “mirror image[]” of the plaintiffs’ APA claims that the defendants no longer contested. The court found that the plaintiffs had standing for the nonstatutory review claims and granted preliminary injunctive relief on the basis of the nonstatutory review claims. The court concluded, however, that the plaintiffs did not meet the standard for preliminary injunctive relief for six grants that were awarded under the U.S. Department of Agriculture’s (USDA’s) Partnerships for Climate Smart Commodities. The defendants said the grant funds were from general appropriations and that USDA therefore had “broad discretion in the use of these funds” that was different from the appropriations under mandatory legislation. The defendants appealed the order, as well as the court’s April order finding that it had subject matter jurisdiction over the case. They filed an emergency motion for a stay pending appeal on May 22. Sustainability Institute v. Trump, No. 2:25-cv-02152 (D.S.C. May 20, 2025)
Utah Federal Court Restored Case Challenging 2018 and 2019 Oil and Gas Lease Sales
On May 19, 2025, the federal district court for the District of Utah reopened Southern Utah Wilderness Alliance’s case challenging four oil and gas leasing decisions made by the U.S. Bureau of Land Management (BLM) in 2018 and 2019 for federally owned land in eastern Utah. The leasing decisions resulted in issuance of 145 oil and gas leases. Since 2019, BLM suspended certain of the leases to conduct still-pending additional analyses under the National Environmental Policy Act (NEPA) of the climate change impacts of oil and gas leases, but many of the leases at issue in this lawsuit, which was filed in 2023, were not currently suspended. On January 30, 2025, BLM approved eight applications for permits to drill (APDs) by an intervenor defendant pursuant to the leases. The court dismissed the lawsuit as unripe on February 4. In its May 19 decision, the court acknowledged that the February 4 decision “relied heavily on two factual determinations which it now concedes are inaccurate”: (1) that all of the leases were suspended, and (2) that there were no approved APDs on any of the leases at issue. The court concluded that upon re-examination of these facts, BLM’s leasing decisions were final given that lessees “can take concrete steps to develop and disturb their leased land,” even if the decisions might change when the supplemental NEPA analysis is concluded. The court therefore granted SUWA’s motion to reconsider and denied intervenor defendants’ motions to dismiss. Southern Utah Wilderness Alliance v. U.S. Department of the Interior, No. 2:23-cv-00804 (D. Utah May 19, 2025)
Illinois Federal Court Remanded Chicago’s Climate Case Against Fossil Fuel Defendants to State Court
The federal district court for the Northern District of Illinois agreed with the City of Chicago that the court did not have subject matter jurisdiction over the City’s lawsuit alleging that fossil fuel industry defendants’ alleged misrepresentations and concealment of the climate change harms associated with their products caused an acceleration of global warming and “devastating consequences” to Chicago and its people. The court found that the defendants had abandoned their contention that the court had jurisdiction based on federal common law. The court then concluded that it did not have jurisdiction under the federal officer removal statute, rejecting the defendants’ contention that under Seventh Circuit precedent the plaintiffs’ case fell within the scope of federal officer removal even though eight circuit courts of appeal had rejected removal in similar cases. The court found that the City had validly disclaimed claims based on the defendants’ provision of fossil fuels to the federal government for military and national defense purposes since the City’s claims were based not on that activity but on the alleged misrepresentation and deception. The court further found that other elements of federal officer removal were not satisfied: (1) the “timing of certain activities” and the “relationship of the activities to the crux of the City’s claims” did not support that the defendants were “acting under” a federal official; (2) the plaintiffs’ claims regarding the defendants’ conduct were “insufficiently connected” to any acts by the defendants under federal authority; and (3) the defendants did not have a “colorable” government contractor or other federal defense. The court denied the City’s request for fees, finding that the defendants’ arguments for removal based on the Seventh Circuit precedent were reasonable. City of Chicago v. BP p.l.c., No. 1:24-cv-02496 (N.D. Ill. May 16, 2025)
California Federal Court Said Fish and Wildlife Service Failed to Use Best Available Climate Data in Listing Determination for Joshua Trees
The federal district court for the Central District of California set aside the U.S. Fish and Wildlife Service’s (FWS’s) 2023 finding that Joshua trees did not warrant listing as threatened or endangered under the Endangered Species Act. The court found, among other things, that the FWS was arbitrary and capricious because it did not explain why it did not use current trends and standards regarding greenhouse gas emissions as the basis for its definition of “foreseeable future,” which for this review was defined as midcentury (2040–2069) because the FWS found that after that time, it could not make reliable projections regarding the Joshua trees’ responses to threats and stressors. The court also found that the FWS failed to explain its change in policy from using the end of the century as the foreseeable future timeframe in a 2019 finding (which the court previously set aside) and using a midcentury timeframe in the 2023 finding. In addition, the court found that the FWS did not use the best available data to make decisions regarding climate change and that its evaluation of cumulative threats was arbitrary and capricious. In addition, the court found problems with the FWS’s determination regarding the “significant portion” of the Joshua trees’ range. The court also declined to adopt a D.C. Circuit rule that courts “may not give species the benefit of the doubt when faced with uncertainty”; the court said it would instead abide by Ninth Circuit and Supreme Court precedent “requiring that courts ensure agencies use the best science available but allowing courts to honor Congress’s intent by giving species the benefit of the doubt.” The court remanded to the FWS for reconsideration. WildEarth Guardians v. U.S. Fish & Wildlife Service, No. 2:24-cv-02281 (C.D. Cal. May 12, 2025)
Department of Agriculture Agreed to Restore Climate Change Content to Website
In a lawsuit challenging the U.S. Department of Agriculture’s removal of climate change-related content from its website after President Trump’s inauguration, the parties notified the federal district court for the Southern District of New York on May 12, 2025 that USDA would restore the content, with substantial completion expected in approximately two weeks. USDA also committed to complying with applicable statutory requirements in connection with any future publication or posting decisions. The court directed the parties to submit a joint status report by June 11, 2025. Northeast Organic Farming Association of New York v. U.S. Department of Agriculture, No. 1:25-cv-01529 (S.D.N.Y. May 13, 2025)
California Court Rejected Challenges to State Agency’s Oil Drilling Approvals
A California Superior Court rejected Center for Biological Diversity’s claims that the California Geologic Energy Management Division (CalGEM) violated the California Environmental Quality Act (CEQA) by relying on outdated environmental reviews for drilling of certain oil wells. The court found that substantial evidence supported the conclusion that CEQA’s exemption for ongoing projects applied to well deepening at 15 wells off the coast of Long Beach. Regarding wells in San Luis Obispo County, the court found that CalGEM did not abuse its direction in looking to the County’s history of findings on contested wells in 2004, 2005, 2015, and 2021 to determine that additional environmental review was not necessary. Regarding Center for Biological Diversity’s contention that there was new data regarding the environmental impacts of oil drilling, including increased greenhouse gas emissions, and that California’s policy on climate mitigation had evolved, the court noted that the County Board of Supervisors had approved an extension for drilling, finding that a new environmental impact report (EIR) was not necessary after County staff advised that changes in the regulatory landscape did not trigger a requirement for a new EIR. Center for Biological Diversity v. California Geologic Energy Management Division, No. 23CV033371 (Cal. Super. Ct. Apr. 23, 2025)
Massachusetts Court Said Exxon Must Produce Contested McKinsey Documents in Commonwealth’s Climate Consumer Protection Case
In the lawsuit brought by the Commonwealth of Massachusetts against Exxon Mobil Corporation (Exxon) under the Massachusetts Consumer Protection Act, the Massachusetts Superior Court granted the Commonwealth’s motion to compel production by the consulting company McKinsey & Company, Inc. of two documents related to McKinsey’s 2017 engagement to assess Exxon’s corporate risks and its 2019 engagement to assist with development of a corporate framework for sustainability. The documents were (1) a draft presentation that contained comments from an Exxon in-house attorney and (2) McKinsey’s notes from interviews with Exxon attorneys “about the regulatory environment in which Exxon operates and the risks Exxon faces.” The court concluded that the attorney-client privilege did not apply because Exxon did not demonstrate that McKinsey’s business consulting work or the documents at issue “were necessary to the exchange of attorney-client communications.” Commonwealth v. Exxon Mobil Corp., No. 1984CV03333 (Mass. Super. Ct. Apr. 9, 2025)
NEW CASES AND FILINGS
Lawsuit Filed Seeking to Hold Fossil Fuel Companies Liable for Woman’s Death During 2021 Pacific Northwest Heat Dome
The daughter of a woman who died from hyperthermia in Seattle during the 2021 Pacific Northwest heat dome filed a lawsuit in Washington Superior Court on behalf of her mother’s estate seeking to hold manufacturers, distributors, and sellers of fossil fuels liable for causing the acceleration of climate change and the extreme heat event that caused her mother’s death. The complaint alleged that the defendants had known for decades that fossil fuel combustion was the primary cause of the accumulation of carbon dioxide in the atmosphere and that elevated concentrations of carbon dioxide would increase global temperatures and have “destructive consequences for human and ecological systems.” The complaint alleged that the defendants nonetheless acted to “undermine public certainty about climate science,” to downplay the seriousness of climate change, and to misrepresent their own actions to mitigate greenhouse gas emissions. The complaint alleged that the defendants’ deceptive conduct delayed measures to mitigate and adapt to climate change and was the proximate cause of the plaintiff’s mother’s death. The plaintiff asserted claims of wrongful death and survival under Washington’s wrongful death statute, failure to warn under the Washington Product Liability Act, and public nuisance under Washington’s public nuisance statute. The relief sought included economic and non-economic damages, general and special damages, equitable relief (including a “public education campaign to rectify Defendants’ decades of misinformation” but expressly not including any regulation of fossil fuel activities or greenhouse gas emissions or interference with the defendants’ ability to lobby or petition any government or engage in non-deceptive speech about climate), exemplary or punitive damages, and costs and attorneys’ fees. Leon v. Exxon Mobil Corp., No. 25-2-15986-8 SEA (Wash. Super. Ct., filed May 29, 2025)
Youth Plaintiffs Filed Lawsuit Challenging Constitutionality of Trump Energy Executive Orders
Twenty-two youth plaintiffs filed a lawsuit in the federal district court for the District of Montana against President Trump and federal agencies and officials alleging that three energy-related executive orders violate their substantive due process rights and are ultra vires. The three executive orders are: Executive Order 14154, “Unleashing American Energy”; Executive Order 14156, “Declaring a National Energy Emergency”; and Executive Order 14261, “Reinvigorating America’s Beautiful Clean Coal Industry and Amending Executive Order 14241.” The plaintiffs alleged that the executive orders’ directive will slow the development of clean energy infrastructure and increase use of fossil fuels, as well as “dismantle[e] the climate science and climate change warning infrastructure of the Nation.” The complaint asserted claims of substantive due process violations of right to life and right to liberty, as well as claims that the executive orders and agency implementation of them were ultra vires exercises of power that “illegally amended, repealed, rescinded, and circumvented” federal statutes, including the 1970 law creating EPA, the Clean Air Act, and the Inflation Reduction Act. The complaint also asserted that the termination of the National Climate Assessment and “wholesale suppression of climate science research and data across the federal government” were ultra vires. In addition, the complaint included a claim that the executive orders and implementing actions were unconstitutional under the state-created danger doctrine. The plaintiffs seek declaratory and injunctive relief. Lighthiser v. Trump, No. 2:25-cv-00054 (D. Mont., filed May 29, 2025)
Federal Government Informed Fifth Circuit of Intent to Conduct New Rulemaking on Subject of Regulation Allowing ERISA Fiduciaries to Consider ESG Factors
In an appeal of a district court decision upholding a 2022 final rule that allows Employee Retirement Income Security Act of 1974 (ERISA) fiduciaries to consider “collateral benefits” such as environment, social, and governance (ESG) factors “when deciding between competing investment options that each equally served the beneficiaries’ financial interests,” the federal government informed the Fifth Circuit Court of Appeals on May 28, 2025 that the U.S. Department of Labor had decided to “engage in a new rulemaking on the subject of the challenged rule.” The government said the rulemaking would be included in the Labor Department’s Spring Regulatory Agenda and that “the Department intends to move through the rulemaking process as expeditiously as possible.” Utah v. Chavez-DeRemer, No. 23-11097 (5th Cir. May 28, 2025)
Lawsuit Challenged Federal Authorization for Deepwater Port for LNG Exports
Three organizations filed a petition for review in the Fifth Circuit Court of Appeals challenging the U.S. Department of Transportation Maritime Administration’s issuance of a license for the Delfin LNG LLC deepwater port terminal off the coast of Louisiana. In a press release announcing the lawsuit, the organizations said they were challenging the failure to fully assess the environmental and climate harms of the project, which would be the U.S.’s first offshore liquefied natural gas (LNG) export project. Center for Biological Diversity v. U.S. Department of Transportation, No. 25-60282 (5th Cir., filed May 19, 2025)
Environmental Groups’ Challenge to Biological Opinion for Gulf Oil and Gas Activities Alleged Failure to Consider Climate Change Impacts on Protected Species and Habitat
Sierra Club and three other environmental organizations filed a lawsuit in the federal district court for the District of Maryland challenging the National Marine Fisheries Service’s (NMFS’s) issuance of a new “Biological Opinion on the Federally Regulated Oil and Gas Program Activities in the Gulf of America.” NMFS prepared the biological opinion after the court found in 2024 that a 2020 biological opinion violated the Endangered Species Act and the Administrative Procedure Act. The 2025 biological opinion found that the proposed activities would jeopardize the continued existence of the Rice’s whale but that proposed mitigation measures would prevent jeopardy. The biological opinion also concluded that the proposed activities would not jeopardize the continued existence of other protected species or adversely modify critical habitat. The plaintiffs’ claims included that the biological opinion failed to account for how climate change-related population shifts would interact with effects of the proposed action in the analysis of whether the proposed action would jeopardize protected species or cause adverse modification to critical habitat. The plaintiffs also alleged that NMFS failed to use best available science on the effects of climate change on endangered species and their Gulf habitats. Louisiana, American Petroleum Institute, and Chevron U.S.A. Inc. filed a lawsuit in the Western District of Louisiana challenging the biological opinion. They did not make arguments that were directly climate change-related but asserted that the 2025 biological opinion overestimated impacts of oil and gas program vessels on listed species, imposed a “reasonable and prudent alternative” based on “hypothesized vessel strikes that are not reasonably certain to occur,” used the wrong take standard, and imposed unnecessary “reasonable and prudent measures” to minimize the impacts of incidental take. Sierra Club v. National Marine Fisheries Service, No. 8:25-cv-01627 (D. Md., filed May 20, 2025)
FOIA Lawsuit Sought Agency Records on Actions to Expand American Timber Production
Center for Biological Diversity (CBD) filed a Freedom of Information Act (FOIA) lawsuit in federal district court in the District of Columbia seeking to compel four federal agencies to produce records related to President Trump’s Executive Order (EO) 14225, “Immediate Expansion of American Timber Production,” in which he directed “all relevant agencies” to eliminate “all undue delays within their respective permitting processes related to timber production” and to “suspend, revise, or rescind all existing regulations, orders, guidance documents, policies, settlements, consent orders, and other agency actions that impose an undue burden on timber production.” CBD filed FOIA requests for records about how agencies were implementing these directives. CBD alleged that the agencies’ failures to disclose responsive information and records precluded CBD “from gaining a full understanding of important information about plans to implement the EO, and rules and orders that currently protect air and water, wildlife and nature, public lands, the climate, and vulnerable communities, and if and how such plans will be carried out and impl[e]mented.” Center for Biological Diversity v. U.S. Department of Commerce, No. 1:25-cv-01571 (D.D.C., filed May 16, 2025)
Shareholder Derivative Action Against Edison International Directors and Officers Sought Damages for Alleged Breaches of Fiduciary Duties in Connection with Southern California Wildfires
A shareholder derivative action was filed in the federal district court for the Central District of California against directors and officers of Edison International (Edison), the parent company of Southern California Edison Company (SCE), a public utility that supplies electricity to a 50,000-square-mile area in southern California. The plaintiff shareholder asserted that Edison suffered damages in connection with the Eaton and Hurst wildfires in January 2025 as a result of the defendants’ breaches of their fiduciary duties. In addition, the complaint asserted that the defendants “abandoned or abdicated” their fiduciary duties “with regard to prudently managing the assets and business of [Edison] in a manner consistent with the operations of a publicly held corporation”; that the defendants wasted corporate assets; and that they were unjustly enriched at the expense and to the detriment of Edison. Other claims included aiding and abetting, insider trading, and violations of Sections 10(b) and 14(a) of the Securities Exchange Act of 1934. The complaint cited reports and documents potentially linking the wildfires to SCE equipment. The complaint also included allegations that Edison made materially false and misleading statements in proxy statements in 2021, 2022, 2023, and 2024 regarding its preparations to mitigate wildfire risks. The complaint cited statements in those documents such as: “We continue to directly address the impacts of climate change with SCE’s significant advancement of grid hardening, situational awareness and operational enhancements, primarily focused on reducing wildfire risk.” The 2024 proxy statement stated: “We are now seeing the effects of climate-change-driven wildfires throughout the nation, particularly with the heart-wrenching fire in Maui and fires in places like Louisiana, Texas and the East Coast. These unfortunate events demonstrate the need to build on SCE’s progress by continuing to collaborate with industry peers, governments and communities to further enhance resiliency and adapt to climate change as we transition to a clean energy future.” The complaint alleged that, contrary to these statements, the defendants—including members of Edison’s Safety and Operations Committee, whose duties included reviewing and monitoring operations, significant developments, resources, risks, and risk mitigation plans related to wildfires and climate adaptation, among other issues—failed to fulfill their obligations related to wildfire prevention and mitigation. The plaintiffs seek damages, disgorgement of illegally gained proceeds from insider training, and a directive requiring the company to improve its corporate governance and internal procedures, as well as costs and disbursements, including attorneys’ fees. Bark v. Pizarro, No. 2:25-cv-04403 (C.D. Cal., filed May 15, 2025)
Greenpeace Argued for Reduced Damages or to Reverse $667 Million Jury Verdict in Dakota Access Pipeline Case
Two post-trial hearings were held in May 2025 in Energy Transfer LP and Energy Transfer Operating, L.P.’s (Energy Transfer’s) lawsuit seeking damages from Greenpeace defendants (Greenpeace) for actions related to Dakota Access Pipeline protests. In March 2025, a state court jury found that the Greenpeace defendants were liable for $667 million in compensatory and exemplary damages. At a May 15 hearing, Greenpeace said it had argued that the damages awarded were in excess of what the law would allow and that they bore no reasonable relationship to Energy Transfer’s alleged damages. At a May 27 hearing, Greenpeace said the court heard Greenpeace’s arguments that the evidence presented at trial was legally insufficient to support the jury’s verdict. The court withheld any rulings on Greenpeace’s motions. Energy Transfer LP v. Greenpeace International, No. 30-2019-0V-00180 (N.D. Dist. Ct.)
Virgin Islands Claimed PepsiCo and Coca-Cola Misrepresented Recyclability of Single-Use Plastic; Case Removed to Federal Court
On April 11, 2025, the Commissioner of the Department of Licensing and Consumer Affairs and the Government of the U.S. Virgin Islands (USVI) filed a lawsuit in Virgin Islands Superior Court against PepsiCo and Coca-Cola defendants alleging that the companies engaged in disinformation campaigns regarding the recyclability of single-use plastic bottles while knowing that “plastic recycling is mostly theater—a show designed to make consumers feel good about, and be willing to, consume unprecedented volumes of Defendants’ single-use plastic.” The complaint alleged that plastic pollution posed threats to terrestrial ecosystems, marine life, and human health and that the Virgin Islands face a waste management crisis resulting from the defendants’ action. The complaint cited federal consent decrees between USVI and the United States requiring USVI to stop accepting waste at two landfills and to undertake other measures. Alleged harms from plastic pollution also included climate change-related harms, including reductions in ecosystems’ capacity to adapt to climate change and the release of greenhouse gas emissions as plastic resins break down. The complaint alleged that recycling alone would be “incapable” of eliminating impacts of plastic production such as greenhouse gas emissions and that “advanced” or “chemical” recycling, which converts certain plastic wastes into fuels, chemicals, waxes, and petrochemical feedstocks, is more expensive, requires more energy, and creates more greenhouse gas emissions. The complaint asserted that the defendants violated USVI’s Consumer Protection Law of 1973 and Consumer Fraud and Deceptive Business Practices Act and contributed to the creation of a public nuisance. The relief sought included injunctive relief, civil penalties, abatement of the nuisance, and payment of proceeds from violations of the Consumer Protection Law into an account to be administered pursuant to the Consumer Protection Law.
On May 19, the PepsiCo defendants removed the case to federal court, arguing that federal jurisdiction existed because USVI’s claims “necessarily involve substantial questions of federal law” because they incorporate and rely on the federal consent decrees concerning the two landfills and collaterally attack court orders approving the consent decrees. Alternatively, the defendants contended that if the federal court determined that only the public nuisance claim arose under federal law, the other two claims were within the court’s supplemental jurisdiction. Commissioner of the Department of Licensing & Consumer Affairs v. PepsiCo, Inc., No. SX-2025-CV-00102 (V.I. Super. Ct., filed Apr. 11, 2025), removed, No. 1:25-cv-00024 (D.V.I. May 19, 2025)
HERE ARE RECENT ADDITIONS TO THE GLOBAL CLIMATE LITIGATION CHART
HIGHLIGHTED CASE
Germany: Court dismisses Peruvian farmer’s case against RWE due to lack of substantial risk but establishes important principles
In November 2015, Saúl Luciano Lliuya, a Peruvian farmer who lives in Huaraz, Peru, filed claims for declaratory judgment and damages in the District Court Essen, Germany against RWE, Germany’s largest electricity producer. Luciano Lliuya’s suit, supported by NGO Germanwatch, alleged that RWE, having knowingly contributed to climate change by emitting substantial volumes of greenhouse gases (GHGs), bore some measure of responsibility for the melting of mountain glaciers near his town of Huaraz. Especially, as the melting gave rise to an acute threat: Palcacocha, a glacial lake located above Huaraz, has experienced substantial volumetric increase since 1975, which has dramatically accelerated from 2003 onwards. Luciano Lliuya presented several legal theories in support of his claim, including one that characterized RWE's emissions as a nuisance due to which plaintiff had incurred compensable costs to mitigate. Acknowledging that RWE was a contributor to the emissions responsible for climate change and thus for the lake's growth, Luciano Lliuya asked the court to order RWE to reimburse him for a portion of the costs that he and the Huaraz authorities are expected to incur from setting up flood protections. The share calculated amounted to 0.47% of the total cost - the same percentage as RWE’s estimated contribution to global industrial greenhouse gas emissions since the beginning of industrialization (from 1751 onwards).
On May 28, 2025, the Higher Regional Court (Oberlandesgericht, OLG) of Hamm dismissed the plaintiff's appeal. The judgment is final; no further appeal was permitted. The court found that there was no concrete danger to the plaintiff’s property, which ultimately led to the dismissal of the claim. However, the ruling established important legal principles for climate litigation. The court held that major greenhouse gas emitters can, in principle, be held accountable for the impacts of their emissions under German civil law.
Specifically, the court found that the plaintiff might potentially have a claim under Section 1004 of the German Civil Code (BGB). If an impairment of property appears imminent, a CO₂ emitter may be obligated to take preventive action. Should the emitter refuse to do so definitively, liability for future costs could be established in advance—based on the emitter’s proportional contribution to global emissions.
The court further emphasized that the geographical distance between the defendant’s power plants and the plaintiff’s home in Peru does not, by itself, render the claim unfounded. The presiding judge rejected one of the defendant’s key arguments, clarifying that the court’s reasoning does not open the door to lawsuits against every individual emitter. The emissions of a single person are typically so minor that they do not give rise to liability. Similarly, the defendant cannot invoke its public utility obligations under German law to justify interference with the plaintiff’s property rights abroad.
The appeal was dismissed because the evidence demonstrated no concrete or substantial risk to the plaintiff’s property. The likelihood of water from a nearby glacier lake reaching his home within the next 30 years was assessed at only about one percent—a probability the court deemed too low to justify legal intervention. Even if such an event were to occur, the projected flood would reach the house with a height of just a few centimeters and a flow speed insufficient to compromise the building’s structural integrity. Luciano Lliuya v. RWE AG (Germany, Higher Regional Court of Hamm)
EFTA Court: EFTA Court decides that EIAs must include analysis of Scope 3 emissions
On June 29, 2023, Greenpeace Nordic and Nature and Youth filed a lawsuit before the Oslo District Court challenging the legality of three administrative decisions by Norway’s Ministry of Energy approving development and operation plans (PUDs) for the Breidablikk, Yggdrasil, and Tyrving oil and gas fields in the North Sea (Greenpeace Nordic and Nature & Youth v. Energy Ministry (The North Sea Fields Case). The plaintiffs argued that the approvals were unlawful due to the absence of environmental impact assessments (EIAs) covering downstream (Scope 3) greenhouse gas emissions from the eventual combustion of the extracted oil and gas. The Oslo District Court referred several questions to the EFTA Court regarding the proper interpretation of the EIA Directive (Directive 2011/92/EU), as incorporated into the EEA Agreement.
Core Legal Issues:
1. Whether greenhouse gas (GHG) emissions from the combustion of petroleum and natural gas extracted under a project (and later sold to third parties) constitute “effects” under Article 3(1) of the EIA Directive (2011/92/EU).
2. Whether national courts must nullify the consequences of unlawfully granted development consents that lack an adequate environmental impact assessment (EIA), specifically regarding climate impacts.
3. Whether a national court may retroactively waive the EIA obligation if it finds that the procedural failure had no influence on the decision outcome.
On May 21, 2025, the EFTA Court issued an advisory opinion confirming that:
- Greenhouse gas emissions resulting from the combustion of extracted oil and gas must be considered “likely significant effects” under Article 3 of the EIA Directive.
- Such emissions must be assessed before development consent is granted, and this obligation applies even if combustion occurs outside the project site or jurisdiction.
- National courts are required to take all necessary measures to address the consequences of an unlawful approval granted without a proper EIA, including revocation, invalidation, or suspension of the approval.
- The fact that an approval might have been issued even after a full assessment does not cure the procedural failure to conduct the EIA beforehand.
- The assessment must be publicly available and may not be substituted by speculative arguments about market effects or alternative emissions scenarios.
Föreningen Greenpeace Norden and Natur og Ungdom v. State of Norway (EFTA Court Advisory Opinion) (EFTA Court)
Scotland: Court decides that Rosebank and Jackdaw projects were unlawful due to the failure to consider downstream emissions
Following the UK government’s approval of the Jackdaw (2022) and Rosebank (2023) offshore fossil fuel developments, environmental NGOs Uplift and Greenpeace brought judicial review proceedings in the Court of Session in Edinburgh in December 2023. The claimants challenged the legality of the decisions, arguing that the approvals failed to consider the full climate impacts of the projects, in particular the downstream (Scope 3) emissions resulting from the eventual combustion of extracted oil and gas.
In August 2024, the UK government conceded that the original decision was unlawful in light of the UK Supreme Court’s Finch v Surrey County Council ruling, which clarified that environmental impact assessments (EIAs) must account for downstream emissions. The cases proceeded on whether the consents should be quashed or left in place pending further review.
Main Legal Issues:
1. Omission of Downstream Emissions: The environmental assessments for both projects had excluded Scope 3 emissions. The applicants argued this violated legal obligations under domestic and EU-derived environmental law.
2. Lack of Transparency: The NSTA failed to provide adequate reasons for concluding that the Rosebank development passed the “net zero” test.
3. Marine Environmental Impacts: In the Rosebank case, the applicants further alleged that the approval failed to properly assess the project’s impact on the Faroe-Shetland Sponge Belt Marine Protected Area.
On January 30, 2025, Lord Ericht ruled that the development consents for both Rosebank and Jackdaw were unlawful due to the failure to consider downstream emissions. Citing Finch, the court held that the environmental assessments must account for the climate impact of burning fossil fuels extracted by the projects. The consents were overturned. The ruling emphasized that the “public interest in authorities acting lawfully and the private interest of members of the public in climate change outweigh the private interest of the developers.” While preparatory work on the fields may continue, no extraction can occur unless and until new, lawful approvals are issued under updated guidance.
Outcome:
• Approval for both the Rosebank and Jackdaw fields quashed.
• Government must reassess the projects under new environmental guidance accounting for downstream emissions.
• Development cannot proceed without new consents based on a full environmental impact assessment.
• The decision sets a precedent for integrating climate impacts into all future UK fossil fuel project assessments.
Rosebank and Jackdaw developers must submit new Environmental Statements, including downstream emissions, once the UK government finalizes revised guidance (expected Spring 2025). Any new consents will be subject to public consultation and scrutiny. Greenpeace UK and Uplift v. Secretary of State for Energy Security and Net Zero and the North Sea Transition Authority (Court of Sessions, Scotland, United Kingdom)
Kenya: Court determined that an EIA license approval requires adequate public participation and a climate impact assessment
The plaintiffs challenged a decision by the National Environment Tribunal (NET) that upheld the decision of the National Environment Management Authority (NEMA) in granting the 2nd Respondent, Sosian Energy Limited (SEL), an Environmental Impact Assessment (EIA) license to operate a geothermal energy project. The EIA license was contested on, among other grounds, that there was inadequate public participation. Regarding climate change, the decision of the NET was challenged for requiring the 2nd respondent to conduct a climate change impact assessment without making it a precondition for commencing any project activity.
The court determined that climate impact assessment serves as a mechanism to inform policy development and decision-making, ensuring that actions are in accordance with obligations pertaining to climate change by identifying potential impacts and risks linked to climate change, as well as proposed projects or policies. It emphasized that climate impact assessments are essential for comprehending the potential ramifications of climate change and for formulating effective adaptation and mitigation strategies. Consequently, they ought to be conducted prior to the initiation of a proposed project, during which scoping, stakeholder engagement, risk assessment, and impact analysis are taken into account.
The appeals court found that the tribunal erred in law and in fact in finding that there was proper public participation and erred in not requiring a climate impact assessment. Menengai West Stakeholders Forum, and Solomon Manyarkir and 1 Other v National Environment Management Authority and Sosian Energy Ltd (Kenya, Environment and Land Court at Nakuru)
New Zealand: Court determined that the defence of necessity does not apply for climate protests absent immediate risk of actual physical harm to a readily identifiable person or class of persons
The defendant participated in an Extinction Rebellion protest on December 4, 2021. The intention of the protest was to disrupt the journey of a freight train which, in part, comprised a shipment of coal destined for a Fonterra plant. The protest succeeded in causing the train to stop, and due to the protesters’ actions, the train was prevented from resuming its journey that day. The defendants were arrested when they refused to leave their positions on the track and in, or on, rolling stock.
The defendants faced various charges, including entering railway infrastructure without the express authority of the appropriate licensed access provider, and to knowingly obstructing employees of the New Zealand Railways Corporation in the performance of their duty, which was amended to trespass.
The defence argued that the defence of necessity applied - that the defendants were acting to save lives that would be lost if climate change continued unabated, with particular reliance placed on the article “The mortality cost of carbon” by R Daniel Bressler. The central thesis of that article is that every 4,434 metric tonnes of carbon dioxide added to the atmosphere from 2020 will lead to one excess death globally between 2020 and 2100 ([72]). The Court accepted that it is indisputable that climate change threatens human wellbeing and planetary health, and did not doubt there the defendants believe that there is an impending catastrophic disaster in which lives will be lost as a consequence of climate change and unabated carbon dioxide emissions from the use of coal ([84]).
However, the Court ultimately rejected the argument that the defence of necessity applied, in large part because the actions were to draw attention to climate change, and cannot be construed as “necessary to save lives” ([97]). Further, the Court found that necessity is not available in “direct action” cases, where “defendants essentially take the law into their own hands to interfere with lawful activities despite the availability of appropriate fora for addressing their concerns” ([101]). The Court also considered whether the threat must be imminent or immediate for the defence to apply, finding that all indicators pointed to the defence requiring an immediate risk of actual physical harm to a readily identifiable person or class of persons, which was not satisfied in the present case. The Court noted that while there is academic support for recasting the defence or broadening the concept of imminence to reflect the impending catastrophe of climate change, it was not open to the Court to interpret this element as sought, and instead “academic acknowledgement that the approach to imminence needs to be changed confirms that necessity is not available as the law currently stands” ([106]). Police v Brorens (New Zealand, New Zealand District Court)
New Zealand: High Court said District Court did not err in denying climate protester ordinary bail
Ms Olsen is involved with the climate change protest group Restore Passenger Rail (RPR). She believes the New Zealand Government has failed to reduce greenhouse gas emissions adequately, and that other means of political activity to address the issue have failed to prompt the necessary action. The group seeks better passenger rail services within Aotearoa New Zealand and has taken to protesting on significant roadways.
On April 17, 2023, during morning rush hour, Ms Olsen allegedly took part in a protest blocking access to State Highway One in Wellington by endeavouring to glue her hand to the motorway with super glue. This alleged conduct resulted in Ms Olsen being charged with being a pedestrian on a motorway and, separately, endangering transport. Ms Olsen was released on ordinary bail, subject to conditions including not returning to Wellington, and not to encourage any illegal protest activity related to RPR.
Ms Olsen breached the terms of her bail by going to Wellington and allegedly participating in another protest blocking a main road in Wellington by gluing her hand to the road on April 20, 2023. The alleged conduct gave rise to a further charge of endangering transport. Ms Olsen was again released on ordinary bail. Subsequently, Ms Olsen breached the terms of her bail and went to Wellington, and it is alleged that on September 4, 2023, she attempted to cement her hand on the road to block traffic. Ms Olsen was charged, but this time the District Court “reluctantly” declined her bail, in large part due to a significant risk of reoffending while on bail, including because the Judge found that Ms Olsen had “demonstrated that she believes her cause justifies breaching the law”.
Ms Olsen appealed the District Court judgment. It was submitted that the Judge erred in failing to consider the importance of the climate emergency (in which RPR are trying to address), and failing to consider the historical importance of protest and of the right to protest. The District Court Judge did not refer to climate change or the right to protest in rights terms explicitly.
The High Court accepted the risks and dangers of climate change and the international obligations New Zealand owes to try and address it. The Court further accepted that a citizen’s right to protest is fundamental, and, as with all rights under the New Zealand Bill of Rights Act 1990, must be interpreted purposively (referencing Penwarden v R, a bail appeal relating to one of Ms Olsen’s alleged fellow protesters). However, while accepting on the face of it that the District Court Judge did not refer to climate change or to the right to protest in rights terms, Radich J found it was sufficiently clear that he took into account the fact that Ms Olsen was exercising a right to protest at the time of which she breached the conditions of her bail and of her subsequent arrest ([37]).
Due to changed circumstances since the District Court hearing, the appeal was allowed (the circumstances being potential loss of job ([43]), and that a number of safety precautions had been taken before the alleged offending ([45]). Olsen v Police (New Zealand, High Court of New Zealand)
New Zealand: Court found that campaigning for the protection of the environment (including climate change) is a charitable purpose of public benefit
Greenpeace of New Zealand Incorporated (Greenpeace NZ) is part of the international Greenpeace movement that seeks a greener and more peaceful future. Greenpeace NZ’s focus in New Zealand now is advocacy for the protection of the environment, particularly protecting the environment and its population from climate change and protecting the ocean environment.
Greenpeace NZ appealed from a decision of the Charities Registration Board |Te Rātā Atawhai (the Board) declining its application for registration as a charitable entity. This decision was made in the background of a legal case between the Charities Commission (now the Board), and Greenpeace NZ resulting in a Supreme Court decision (Re Greenpeace of New Zealand [2014] NZSC 105), where the Supreme Court remitted the decision back to the Board in light of its decision that a political purpose does not necessarily disqualify an organisation from charitable status if the advocacy is of public benefit. The Board declined Greenpeace NZ’s application, including because it advocated its own views on environmental issues and it could not be established that it was of public benefit and charitable ([6]). In addition to the appeal of the Board’s decision, Greenpeace NZ also applied for judicial review on the ground of apparent bias. Ultimately, Mallon J held that Greenpeace NZ was entitled to be registered as a charity and should be registered ([12]).
The Charities Act 2006 (CA) provides for the registration of entities as charitable entities, with a society qualifying for registration if it “is established and maintained exclusively for charitable purposes” and is “not carried on for the private pecuniary gain of any individual” (s 13(1)(b)). S 5 of the CA defines “charitable purpose”, which includes whether it relates to the relief of poverty, the advancement of education or religion, or any other matter beneficial to the community. Any purpose of the entity, that is not ancillary to its main purpose(s), must fit within one of the four heads of charity (relief of poverty, the advancement of education, the advancement of religion, or any other matter beneficial to the community) and be of public benefit ([15]).
One of the reasons the Board declined Greenpeace NZ’s application was because Greenpeace’s main activity is advocacy on causes that it considers will protect the environment (of which climate change falls within). In relation to climate change specifically, the Board found that “most of Greenpeace’s activities involve advocating its points of view on climate change and promoting those views to the public. The Board considers it is not possible to say whether the views promoted by Greenpeace on climate change are of a benefit in the way that the law recognises as charitable” ([76]).
On appeal, the Attorney-General submitted that, in relation to climate change, while it accepted that addressing climate change is a public benefit, and advocacy aimed at that goal may be a public benefit, it depends on what is being advocated. The Attorney-General compared where advocacy was “simply that there is an urgent need to reduce our reliance on fossil fuels” which might be of public benefit, versus if the advocacy was “that we must stop all deep-sea oil drilling now” which the Attorney-General submitted was not a public benefit because there are complex choices to be made ([81]).
Mallon J, in relation to climate change, found that “avoiding catastrophic climate change is also of benefit to the public. Advocacy to this end is a charitable purpose of public benefit, depending on its nature. Greenpeace NZ’s advocacy promotes reducing global emissions by limiting fossil fuel use and switching to clean energy. It is uncontroversial science that is an available mitigation measure” ([90]). Ultimately, the Court held that the Board erred in finding that campaigning for the protection of the environment (including climate change) was not a charitable purpose of public benefit ([101]). Greenpeace of New Zealand v Charities Registration Board (New Zealand, High Court of New Zealand)
New Zealand: Court found that the Wairoa District Council need not consider climate change in every decision it makes
The New Zealand Forest Owners Association Inc (NZFOA) represents forestry owners who, between them, own a substantial portion of the total forestry land in the Wairoa District. In 2021, the Wairoa District Council (Council) overhauled its rating system and introduced five categories of land use to which various differential rates would apply. This resulted in substantial rates increase for the NZFOA members. NZFOA says that the rating decision was unfair and unreasonable, failed to take into account mandatory relevant considerations, namely environmental wellbeing and climate change, as well as making mistakes of fact.
On April 28, 2022, the High Court dismissed the application. In relation to climate change, it was argued that there had been a failure to take into account mandatory relevant considerations, namely environmental wellbeing and climate change, both of which were said to be relevant to the rating decision. NZFOA submitted that climate change and the need to mitigate the effects of climate change and environmental wellbeing for future communities needed to be considered in setting the rates differentials ([194]). NZFOA argued that the Council failed in that it (a) failed to take into account the different emissions profiles of the proposed categories of land for differential rating; (b) failed to take into account the way in which each of the proposed categories of land for differential rating would mitigate or exacerbate the manifestations of climate change; and (c) expressly considered only the best interests of the Wairoa District, despite acknowledging the benefits of forestry at a regional or national level. NZFOA argued that the issue of climate change was a significant issue and was recognised as such in the Wairoa District through its various planning documents. The Council’s long-term plan noted that climate change would affect the district within this lifetime and action needed to be prioritised to achieve a vision for a prosperous community. NZFOA submitted that despite having a climate change commitment, the local authority failed to consider that issue in setting the rates differential.
The Court differentiated from Hauraki Coromandel Climate Action Inc v Thames-Coromandel District Council, where Palmer J concluded that decisions about climate change deserved heightened scrutiny on judicial review, holding the challenged decision in that was a fundamentally different decision to the present rating decision ([206]). Instead, the Court held that “while climate change is an important issue, it is not a mandatory consideration in every decision made by the Council, nor is the Council required to specifically address climate change, in every decision it makes” ([206]). Instead, while climate change is an important issue for any local authority, including the Wairoa District Council, how the council addresses it is a decision for it. Grice J held that in the present context the issue was not of such significance that it was a mandatory consideration - in a rating decision, climate change was only indirectly if at all related, and as such the Council was not required to take it into consideration as a mandatory consideration ([210]).
NZFOA unsuccessfully appealed the High Court decision to the Court of Appeal. The climate change ground was not pursued in the Court of Appeal. New Zealand Forest Owners Association Inc v Wairoa District Council (New Zealand, High Court of New Zealand)
New Zealand: Court held that regulating the effects of regulatory responses to climate change is too remote and could not determine as a preliminary matter whether ocean acidification fell within the definition of climate change in the RMA
In this case, the Environment Court considered a preliminary question about the relevance of climate change to the assessment of the proposed rules and proposed coastal plan for the Taranaki Region. The relevant proposed rules, Rules 26 to 30, sought to regulate the effects of oil exploration and drilling activities (Proposed Rules).
The Court held that section 70A of the RMA prevents the Court from considering (a) the effects of discharges into air of greenhouse gases on climate change (which in the context of the appeal, included the proposed rules); and (b) the effects of any activities incidental to those listed in Rules 26 to 30, insofar as they may have effects on climate change ([37]).
Climate Justice Taranaki (CJT) argued that the Taranaki Regional Council (Council) had a responsibility to anticipate the effects of climate change and prepare a resilient plan for the Region. CJT was concerned about the costs of sunset industry and increasing liabilities ([39]). The Environment Court noted Council’s argument that the effects CJT seeks to address are not the effects of climate change, but effects that may result from regulatory responses to climate change which are too remote to be regulated.
A further preliminary consideration was to what extent, if any, ocean acidification could be considered, with CJT arguing it is not excluded from consideration by s 70A. However, the Council argued that ocean acidification and climate change are so linked that to seek to reduce ocean acidification by making a rule to reduce CO2 emissions is, in essence, requesting consideration of the effects on climate change ([36]). The Court found that it could not determine as a preliminary matter whether ocean acidification fell within the definition of climate change in the RMA - however it did note that “insofar as ocean acidification is entwined with climate change, it is unhelpful to rely on it as a means of seeking to amend the [Proposed Rules] to address the effects of those activities on climate change. Parliament’s policy is clear. It is for Parliament to regulate the effects of activities on climate change, not this Court” ([43]). Climate Justice Taranaki Inc v Taranaki Regional Council (New Zealand, Environment Court)
Ireland: Friends of the Irish Environment lodges a Judicial Review of a proposed LNG power plant and battery storage system for EIS deficiencies, mandated by EU law, climate science, and Ireland’s Sectoral Emissions obligations
Friends of the Irish Environment [FIE] has lodged a Judicial Review of a proposed LNG’s 600 MW gas power plant and battery storage system in Co Kerry. The challenge is based on EU law, climate science, and Ireland’s breaching of its Sectoral Emissions obligations.
In the proceedings, FIE cites what they allege are critical failures in the Environmental Impact Statement submitted by the developer, which include a description of the methods used to assess the climate impact. They argue that (a) these methods underestimate the amount of greenhouse gas emissions that will be released by the plant and (b) even if the developer’s emissions calculations are accepted, this single PowerStation would account for on its own 1/3rd of all budgeted emissions from the entire electricity sector in 2030 - which in turn raises questions about the extent to which the national planning authority [An Bord Pleanala] can explain how this could possibly be compliant with the relevant national carbon budgets and sectorial emissions ceilings, in a manner consistent with the authorities functions in relation to the proposed development in a manner consistent with the requirements of Section 15 of the Climate Action and Low Carbon Development Act 2015 (as amended).
Leave to pursue judicial review has been granted by the Irish High Court. Friends of the Irish Environment CLG v An Bord Pleanala Ireland Attorney General Minister for Housing Local Government and Heritage (Ireland, High Court of Ireland)
Bulgaria: Za Zemiata (For the Earth) files a complaint for gaps in Bulgaria’s National Plan on Energy and Climate Plan arising from lack of public consultation
On April 19, 2025, Association “Za Zemiata” (For the Earth) filed a complaint with the European Commission alleging serious gaps in the final version of Bulgaria's National Plan on Energy and Climate Plan, which was uploaded on the EC website on 15 January 2025 without a public consultation. The complaint urges the EC to open an infringement procedure against Bulgaria until the EU requirements to end fossil fuel subsidies and direct funds to energy efficiency and renewable energy, as well as concrete measures against energy poverty and full public involvement in decision-making are fulfilled. Within 12 months, the Commission must examine the complaint and decide whether to initiate proceedings. Za Zemiata NECP complaint (Bulgaria, EU, European Commission)